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ABSTRACT 
Co-operative Financial Institutions (CFIs) are proving to be an effective tool for grass-root 
innovation to bring about local sustainable development. As a result, not only are financial co-
operatives improving the financial well-being of their members but they are also an instrument 
to enhance social cohesion in societies experiencing poverty and inequalities. The power of 
collaboration in CFIs helps members to help themselves collectively in tackling financial 
exclusion. Their response to the perceived failure of the mainstream banking system to serve 
marginalized communities had received global recognition. CFIs’ global membership and total 
assets are showing a strong growth trajectory supported by deregulation in some countries. In 
transition and mature economies, mergers and acquisitions are becoming popular growth 
strategies to sustain the cooperative movement. A driving force encouraging merger activity 
has been the pressure to cut costs and remain competitive. Despite having a third of the world’s 
CFIs, Africa’s contribution to the world CFIs in terms of membership and total assets is 
insignificant. 
The co-operative movement in South Africa has come a long way, but the results of such a 
long revolution are yet to be seen despite an enabling legislative environment and government 
incentives which increased their formation from 4,000 in 2004 to 132,000 in 2016. The 
sustainability of these co-operatives outside government grants is very doubtful, with most of 
them just appearing on paper without any meaningful economic activity happening on the 
ground. For co-operatives to be truly sustainable they need to work towards full 
implementation of the co-operative movement principles and values through a bottom-up 
approach to co-operative formation by reducing their overdependence on the state. In order to 
understand the challenges facing South African CFIs the questions addressed in the study have 
been organized into four empirical essays whose objectives, methodology, findings and 
recommendations are discussed in the following four paragraphs sequentially. 
The first essay examines the financial sustainability of community-owned financial institutions 
in their contribution to the social and ecological well-being, which makes the research of 
immense interest to ecological economists. The study utilized a CFI dataset of audited 
financials from South Africa with 202 observations for the period 2010–2017. Evidence show 
that South African CFIs are financially unsustainable at 91.3% against a benchmark of 100%. 
The regression results further suggest that return on assets, deposits, cost-income ratio, loans-
to-assets ratio, investments-to-assets ratio and grants are the major determinants of financial 
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sustainability. To improving CFIs’ financial sustainability requires a swift enhancement in 
efficiency by reducing costs, credit risk and grants reliance whilst improving revenue 
generation through product diversification and embracing new innovative delivery channels 
that reduce transaction costs. The ultimate objective of financial sustainability is to help CFIs 
contribute effectively to sustainable development by helping more poor people. The financial 
sustainability of community-owned financial institutions is crucial as they are an 
intergenerational endowment, as current members have to pass on to future generations the 
accumulated commonly-owned wealth inherited from past generations. 
The second essay examines the CFIs’ dual objective of attaining social and financial efficiency 
in their role of improving access to financial services for the poor and marginalized 
communities. Th study eemployed the two-stage double bootstrap data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) methodology on unbalanced panel. The results from the first stage give evidence that 
industry is socially and financially inefficient at 91.6% and 61.57% respectively. Second stage 
results suggest that size does matter in improving efficiency whilst age does not matter, return 
of assets is important but not significant, whilst average savings balance per member improves 
financial efficiency but has a negative significant impact on social efficiency. In addition, the 
capital adequacy ratio has a negative significant impact whilst the association of the CFI to a 
group negatively affects its social and financial efficiency but not significantly. Our findings 
are of interest to CFI management, regulatory authorities and the CFI trade association to 
implement a number of bold measures such as an industry strategy, business skills in 
leadership, driving growth and an effective asset allocation approach. 
The third essay investigates productivity change of South African CFIs using both unbalanced 
and balanced panel dataset of 192 and 120 observations respectively for the period 2010-2017. 
The study employed a bootstrap DEA-based Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) approach to 
estimate the productivity change. Results on unbalanced dataset indicate that CFIs have 
experienced an annual productivity regress of 3.9% on average, which is mainly attributable to 
technical efficiency change decline of 12.3%. Analysis by CFI type indicates that cooperative 
banks experienced productivity gains, whilst savings and credit cooperatives and financial 
services cooperatives had a productivity regress. Results on a balanced panel of 15 CFIs show 
productivity marginal regress of 0.2% annually. A second-stage bootstrapped regression 
analysis is employed to investigate the impact of some environmental variables on productivity 
change scores. Results reveal that financially sustainable CFIs have a higher productivity and 
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technological progress than otherwise. Results also show that mature CFIs tend to experience 
lower productivity compared to their younger ones.  
The fourth essay examines the performance drivers and inhibitors in South Africa`s CFIs by 
employing a hybrid Delphi-SWOT study. Issues generated by 36 experts over four rounds of 
questionnaires suggest that the sector is suffering more from internal than external inhibitors. 
From the 22 future developments identified by these experts, six growth strategies within the 
control or influence of management were drawn in the areas of technology, people, marketing, 
culture shift, environmental and policy interventions. The study presents a CFI performance 
ecosystem based on identifying key drivers, inhibitors and strategies to achieve high-
performance growth. 
The overarching evidence presented in this thesis suggests that CFIs in South Africa can play 
a significant role in improving the social and financial well-being of its members and society 
provided that they work toward achieving financial sustainability of their operations through 
cost reduction strategies, credit risk management and reducing their dependency on grants. At 
the same time, there is a need to put in place growth strategies to recruit more members and 
mobilize more savings as the current scale of operations is low resulting in marginal social 
impact and financial performance. The industry will need to consider reducing their asset 
allocation in investments to free up financial resources to lead members to improve both social 
and financial efficiency. More importantly, the industry needs to improve managerial 
capabilities, technological adoption, governance structures, public perception and its outreach 
for the industry to play a meaningful and significant role. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION1 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Low productivity is widely acknowledged as the major cause of poverty in economically active 
poor people (especially women) who fail to fully participate in meaningful economic activities 
due to lack of access to financial services. By stimulating financial inclusion there is potential 
to bolster shared economic growth while alleviating poverty. Given that financial inclusion 
provides access to savings, credit and payments, protects against crises and mobilizes resources 
essential for investment and consumption, it improves the social and financial well-being of 
marginalized communities (see Koku, 2015).  
It is not surprising that greater access to financial services is recognized as a key enabler for 
the achievement of most of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals by 2030 for 
the realization of the shared economic development. Even if that is the case, financial exclusion 
still remains a challenge in most economies as two billion people globally are estimated to lack 
access to appropriate financial services to help them escape from poverty (Klapper et al., 2016). 
Over the past decades microfinance, which is the provision of microcredit, micro-savings, 
micro-leasing, micro-insurance and payment systems, has been celebrated as one of the 
effective instruments for poverty alleviation after the success of the Grameen Bank model in 
Bangladesh. The focus was aligned with influential economic theory that linked productive 
inefficiencies to credit market failure and pinned the problem on inappropriate traditional 
lending approaches to information asymmetries (see Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)  
In recognition of the role of microfinance in fighting global poverty, the United Nations 
declared the year 2005 as the International Year of Microcredit, with Grameen Bank and its 
founder Muhammad Yunus winning a joint Nobel Peace Prize the following year (Armendáriz 
de Aghion and Morduch, 2005; Bateman, 2010; Nayak, 2015). However, over the past years 
microfinance has come under heavy criticism from both practitioners and academics over its 
focus on high profits in the new wave of commercialization of microfinance, resulting in a 
mission drift from its social goal of poverty reduction (Bateman, 2010, 2011; Sinclair, 2012; 
                                                          
1 An updated article based on this chapter, “Can Financial Co-operatives improve South Africans’ Societal and 
Financial Well-Being?” is under review by the International Journal of Bank Marketing for a special issue on 
Exploring Financial Well-Being. 
An earlier draft of the chapter was presented at the Economic Research Southern Africa (ERSA) Financial 
Economics workshop, Pretoria, South Africa, 25 November 2015 titled “The role of financial co-operatives in 
South Africa: How efficient and sustainable are they?”. 
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Hulme and Maitrot, 2014). Some nasty evidence is the suicides of borrowers in Andhra Pradesh 
in India in 2010 due to coercive loan recovery practices (see CGAP, 2010; Mader, 2013). 
However, most observers today see microfinance as a useful financial service but not a 
transformative social and economic intervention (Mossman, 2015). Even sympathetic 
observers worry that microfinance has lost its moral compass by focusing more on profitability 
than on the poverty reduction (Hulme and Maitrot, 2014). Recently, Cull and Morduch (2017) 
seem to reinforce the thinking that microfinance does have modest impact on the socio-
economic well-being of the poor despite its growing scale. However, they still believe that 
“microfinance is far from dead, but it needs fresh thinking” (Cull and Morduch, 2017: 36).  
These criticisms motivate the reconsideration of the original microfinance model of Grameen 
Bank (co-operative microfinance) owned by and serving its members-borrowers where motives 
for profit maximization are replaced by service and value maximization for members in a 
sustainable way. David Korten, in his foreword to Hugh Sinclair’s Confessions of a 
Microfinance Heretic, recommended that “instead of commercializing microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), the goal should be to restructure them as co-operative banks owned by their 
local borrowers” (Sinclair, 2012: xiii). Korten’s concern is that the poor are dependent on 
financial institutions over which they have no control. This is different from co-operative 
financial institutions (CFIs) which build strong social capital as they are owned by member 
savers and borrowers, rooted in and accountable to the communities they serve, where surplus 
and interest is recycled locally to support productive local economic activities (Sinclair, 2012).  
Similar views are shared by Bateman (2010) who analyzed the success of the bottom-up 
approach of co-operative banking models in Spain, Italy, Taiwan, South Korea and China, and 
made a strong recommendation for CFIs as an alternative to conventional microfinance. CFIs 
foster local development as they fullfil the needs of the society (environment), people and 
profits since they are owned by the people they serve. This differs from the commercialized 
MFI model owned and governed by private investors who are motivated by high returns. Since 
CFIs are member-owned and democratically controlled organizations where each member has 
equal voting rights regardless of the number of shares, they serve the interests of the majority 
rather than the needs of a handful of individuals as is the case with commercialized MFIs and 
traditional banks (McKillop and Wilson, 2015). Given their ownership and governance 
structure and their focus on understanding and serving local communities, they are better 
positioned to improve the socio-economic well-being of its members without exploitative 
motives. This enables vulnerable communities to escape from the poverty trap and over-
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indebtedness being reinforced by some MFIs due to high interest rates that seem hard to justify 
from a development perspective (see CGAP, 2010; Mader, 2013). 
There are however concerns about the ability of CFIs to mobilize meaningful savings from 
their members for onlending since most of them seem to be from disadvantaged groups. 
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) and Collins, Morduch, Rutherford and Ruthven 
(2009) posit that savings facilities are more in demand among the poor than credit, and in the 
absence of proper and accessible savings facilities the poor save their wealth in physical goods, 
making CFIs better placed to contribute to local economic development. Moreover, CFIs are 
not just a bank for poor people but for the entire community, comprising the economically 
active poor, the working class, the middle class and the affluent segment, so that savings of the 
rich will finance the credit needs of the poor. Therefore, it is not surprising that CFIs are also 
found in developed economies such as Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States 
(US), Australia, Canada, New Zealand, France, Spain and Italy, making a huge contribution to 
the population’s socio-economic well-being. Recently co-operatives did a remarkable job of 
withstanding the financial crisis that started in 2008 (Battilani and Schröter, 2012). This makes 
financial co-operatives more relevant in countries still battling with poverty, inequality and low 
entrepreneurial activities such as South Africa. However, understanding their efficiency and 
sustainability is of paramount importance to ensure appropriate measures are taken for them to 
continue providing inclusive financial solutions for the economic and social well-being of their 
members and communities. 
1.2 STATEMENT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
For years the government of South Africa has been trying to broaden the appeal of CFIs to 
address credit market failure and financial exclusion gap (Genesis Analytics, 2014). The 
economic thinking was that by addressing this gap in a financially sustainable manner, CFIs 
can become active in the formal financial system of the country by appealing better to the 
economically active poor, rural households and marginalized communities. When the Co-
operative Act of 2005, the Co-operatives Banks Act of 2007 and the subsequent formation of 
the Co-operative Banks Development Agency (CBDA) in 2009, hopes were very high that the 
financially excluded groups would enjoy improved financial empowerment at the community 
level. Therefore, improving their productivity and lift themselves from the circle of poverty 
through improved income and resilience to life shocks. The government in the mid-2000s 
envisaged the promotion of CFIs as a way of community empowerment which would address 
some of the credit market failures in the country and encourage the use of formal financial 
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services. Government views CFIs as having an important role in the provision of affordable 
credit and accessible savings facilities among those sharing a common bond. 
Despite high expectations on CFIs in economic and social development, the industry’s 
performance has been disappointing due to alarming failure rates and a decreasing outreach 
(Genesis Analytics, 2014) which calls for a systematic investigation into their efficiency and 
sustainability practices. It is a survival requirement for CFIs to operate efficiently to fulfil the 
dual mission of serving the economically active poor and being financially sustainable. The 
low CFI penetration rate2 of 0.06% (WOCCU, 2016) and the high failure rate could be due to 
inefficiency and unsustainable practices which require a systematic investigation into their 
operations to understand the causes and make evidenced-based recommendations to 
management, decision and policy makers to build a vibrant industry. The number of CFIs 
dropped significantly by 46% and members by 18% from the year 2010 to 2017 although 
saving, loans and total assets show a good growth record as shown in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1: Growth trend of CFIs 2009/10 to 2016/17 
Period No. CFIs Members Savings (ZAR) Loans (ZAR) Assets (ZAR) 
2010 56 36 434 124,365,000 93,651,000 142,069,000 
2011 121 59,394 175,265,000 116,577,000 195,213,000 
2012 106 53,240 196,230,000 132,227,000 217,506,000 
2013 35 38,084 200,841,000 142,310,000 220,800,000 
2014 26 33,391 198,624,948 140,463,755 231,367,670 
2015 26   24,721 201,101,522 152,143,102 236,533,481 
2016 30 29,752 233,763,289 179,338,526 279,624,000 
2017 30 29,818 228,216,993 202,160,606 293,493,697 
% 2010-2017 -46.4 -18.2 83.5 53.7 51.6 
% 2011-2017 -75.2 -49.8 30.2 42.3 50.3 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on CBDA and SARB Annual Reports 
The CBDA in its annual report advise that “this drop was primarily because of their failure to 
meet the minimum requirements of R100,000 in capital and 200 members, and because of 
insolvency” (CBDA, 2014: 44). This trend is different from the global picture presented by the 
World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU), a global trade association for CFIs, which showed 
their numbers reaching 68,882, with total assets of $1,8 trillion and serving 236 million 
members in 2016, up from 49,134, $1,2 trillion and 177 million respectively in 2007 despite 
the impact of the global financial crisis (WOCCU, 2016). South Africa has the lowest CFI 
                                                          
2 Penetration rate is calculated by dividing the total number of reported co-operative financial institutions (CFIs) 
members by the economically active population age 15–64 years old. 
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penetration rate in the world at 0.06% compared to Kenya (13.3%), Rwanda (13.8%), Togo 
(26.7%), Korea (11.5%), Nepal (17.2%), the Caribbean region (56%), Australia (17.6%), 
Canada (46.7%), the US (52.6%), Ireland (74.5%) and the worldwide average of 13.5% 
(WOCCU, 2016). This makes performance evaluation of these member-owned financial 
institions important to provide evidenced-based recommendations to assist in setting 
benchmarking goals that are measurable, attainable and actionable 
To the knowledge of the researcher, no study has made an attempt to evaluate the performance 
of CFIs in South Africa. The present study is the first attempt to empirically study the 
performance of the CFIs in South Africa, so as to identify the best and worst practices 
associated with high and low performers. Understanding the efficiencies and sustainability of 
CFIs is a major stepping stone in identifying strategies to implement to have a robust industry. 
The study is important for South Africa where 8.5 million are still excluded from the formal 
banking system according to the FinMark Trust (2015). In addition, the study will make a 
contribution to the growing empirical literature on efficiency and sustainability of CFIs. The 
contributions of co-operatives to their members and communities are many provided they 
operate efficiently and sustainably.  
South Africa is the most unequal country in the world, with a Gini coefficient of 63.4% in 2011 
from 59.3% in 1993 (World Bank, 2018). According to a FinMark Trust (2015) survey, about 
8.5 million adults are still financially excluded, despite the country having a well-developed 
and stable financial services sector by international standards. Data from the National Credit 
Regulator reveals that 40% of credit-active consumers have impaired status, which means they 
have in some way failed to meet their obligations. This is unsurprising as the country came last 
in a poll of 30 countries drawn globally when measuring consumer financial knowledge 
(OECD, 2016). On the other hand, the social fabric seems to be weakened by the high crime 
rate, racism and xenophobic attacks that have become associated with South Africa. It not 
surprising that the Global Peace Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) ranks 
South Africa among the most dangerous countries in the world at position 123 out of 163 
countries. These levels of violence and insecurity have a massive impact on the economy, with 
IEP measuring the cost of violence in South Africa at 22.3% of GDP, or US$144.2 billion 
(R1.92 trillion) (IEP, 2017). Unemployment, especially among the youths and women, is 
currently estimated at 27.7% and is also one of the social challenges the country is faced with 
(SARB, 2017: 24). 
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In recognition of the importance of broadening access to financial services to reduce low 
productivity and poverty, the South African government has tried many initiatives since 1990. 
These attempts include exemption from the Usury Act of loans below R6,000 in 1992 which 
was intended to open up access to micro-loans for emerging entrepreneurs by scrapping the 
interest ceiling and the launching of the low-cost Mzansi basic bank account in October 2004 
for the previously unbanked. These initiatives have had some successes and some drawbacks. 
Under the Usury Act consumers were being charged exploitative rates pushing the financially 
illiterate borrowers into a debt-trap, whilst the Mzansi account managed to assist the poor to 
have basic transaction and savings accounts but they lacked access to credit facilities, resulting 
in more than 42% of the six million accounts becoming dormant by the end of 2008. This 
initiative stopped as the big banks evaluate the account as not profitable since customers were 
not graduating to more mainstream banking services with a higher earning potential which 
could result in the cross-subsidization of the Mzansi account as only 12% had graduated to 
mainstream accounts (see Schoombee, 2009 for a detailed study).  
CFIs have a great potential to contribute to the socio-economic progress to South Africans as 
social ties (common bond) seem to be strong for co-operative finance to be embraced as an 
instrument to improve access to financial services. A survey done by Old Mutual (2017), 
reveals that nearly three-quarters of working South Africans use informal savings as their 
savings and investment vehicles, with 53% of them using stokvels, while 32% and 16% are 
using burial societies and grocery schemes respectively. 50% of respondents indicated that they 
had borrowed at least once an average of R4,660 in the past year to smooth household 
consumption and accumulate assets. In the same survey, 14% indicated that personal 
borrowings are from financial institutions (22% in 2016), while 13% borrow from families and 
friends, and 6% from a microlender. 
Co-operatives have the abiity to contribute to community development in various ways, 
through enhancing social capital and trust, rebuilding the social fabric, bringing sustained 
economic development to the grassroots through improved access to financial services. In 
addition, the circulation of money within communities is believed to enhance the local 
economy and better economic returns. The study of the performance of CFIs to contribute to 
their growth is not only beneficial to the members and local communities but to the whole 
economy and beyond in empowering the poor to help themselves.  
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based on the research problem discussed above, the research questions answered by this 
research are: 
1. How financially sustainable are co-operative financial institutions in South Africa in 
providing financial services to their members and communities, and what are the major 
determinants? 
2. What are the social and financial efficiency levels for CFIs in South Africa, and their 
determinants? 
3. What is the productivity change of CFIs’ performance over time in South Africa?  
4. What are the qualitative performance drivers, inhibitors and future growth strategies for 
CFIs in South Africa? 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The major objective of this research study was to conduct an empirical investigation on the 
efficiency and sustainability of CFIs in South Africa and its determining factors. To make the 
study more manageable the main objective was sub-divided into the following specific 
objectives: 
1. To empirically investigate the level of financial sustainability of CFIs in South Africa 
and the factors that contribute to such performance. 
2. To benchmark the level of social and financial efficiency of CFIs in South Africa and 
the determining factors in achieving their dual mission.  
3. To analyse productivity changes and their drivers over time in South African CFIs. 
4. To understand the qualitative drivers and inhibitors of CFI performance and suggest 
growth strategies that will drive high performance in the future. 
1.5 MOTIVATION: WHY THE STUDY OF PERFORMANCE IS IMPORTANT 
Efficiency in production theory refers to the conversion of inputs into outputs. It is concerned 
with optimal combination of inputs to produce maximum outputs or producing given outputs 
with the least possible quantity of inputs, hence minimizing waste (Widiarto and Emrouznejad, 
2015; Banker and Cummins, 2010; Brown and O’Connor, 1995). Despite the importance of 
efficiency and sustainability measurements, performance monitoring and improvement, there 
is a dearth of research in Africa on the measurement of CFI efficiency. Paradi and Zhu (2013) 
and Coelli et al. (2005) acknowledge that efficiency and productivity measurements are of great 
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importance in building a robust industry. In CFIs it means that efficient and sustainable 
institutions will continue to serve the financially excluded poor in a sustainable way.  
When a CFI pursues efficiency, it needs to concentrate on activities that yield better 
performance at minimum cost to the units and to members. Hence, attention will be given to 
good segment targeting, an effective and ethical marketing strategy, the designing of member-
centric product lines and the gradual removal of bottlenecks in the provision of financial 
solutions. In so doing, the CFI will be contributing not only to enhanced performance but also 
to the improved social and economic well-being of their members. Early research highlighted 
that credit union movements in most economies were characterized by increasing returns to 
scale. This provides a motivation for growth-led strategies by credit unions (either internally 
generated or via mergers and acquisitions) and for regulation permitting expansion of the 
common bond. 
Desrochers and Lamberte (2003) utilized parametric approaches to investigate the efficiency 
of co-operative rural banks in the Philippines, and found that co-operative rural banks with 
good leadership structures were more efficient than their bad governance practicing 
counterparts. Labie and Périlleux (2008) identified the sources of bad corporate governance in 
CFIs which affect performance as “moral hazard” conflict between “net borrowers” and “net 
savers”, conflict between owners and managers, conflict between the members and their 
elected board of directors, and conflict between (paid) employees and volunteers. Social 
capital, peer monitoring, and a culture closely linked to the mission and the co-operative spirit 
are essential to counter some of the challenges. Whilst, effective leadership and organizational 
restructuring are required to remove some of the governance inefficiencies for better 
performance. 
Haq et al. (2009) studied a sample of 39 microfinance programs in developing economies 
across Latin America, Asia and Africa, and found that Asia has the most efficient microfinance 
programs due to large population densities and low staff wages. Other factors, such as strong 
outreach and low operating expenses, have also helped Asian MFIs to be efficient. However, 
South Asian MFIs are relatively more efficient than their counterparts in East Asia. These 
differences in efficiency may be the result of various lending methodologies applied by the 
Asian MFIs. Many Indian MFIs, for example, reduce their staffing costs by lending to self-
help groups rather than to individual borrowers. CFIs have cost advantages over other 
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microfinance programs through the use of volunteers, low transaction and monitoring costs. 
These low-cost advantages are expected to translate to value maximizations for member. 
Co-operatives have a huge role to play in addressing allocative inefficiencies which result in 
market failures in an economy. Being voluntary member-owned and democratically controlled 
organizations, they pull their members’ resources together to solve a common problem by 
building social capital, reducing information asymmetry, enhancing members’ economic 
activities, improving productivity and eventually the financial well-being of their members and 
their communities (Battilani and Schröter, 2012). CFIs have proved in many ways that they are 
better placed to improve society’s financial well-being. They help members navigate financial 
challenges through an array of services, mainly making savings in times of surplus thereby 
building a financial record which they will use to take out insurance or borrow to cope with 
foreseen or unforeseen events. 
1.6 THE MAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY  
The investigation and analysis undertaken in this thesis makes some major contributions to the 
empirical literature on CFIs in the following ways. It includes the survey of the published and 
publishable academic articles in the field of CFIs sustainability, efficiency and productivity. 
Therefore, the thesis extends the empirical literature focused on performance of member-
owned community financial institutions. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this thesis 
presents the first comprehensive assessment and evaluation of the co-operative finance industry 
in South Africa. The thesis is first to analyse performance of CFIs with bootstrapped data 
envelopment analysis.  
The thesis also makes an important methodological contribution in terms of illustrating how a 
hybrid Delphi-SWOT technique can be used to solicit expert opinion to generate useful insights 
into a research agenda. The participation of the industry practitioners in the survey increases 
the chances of the recommendations being implemented as they take ownership rather than it 
being seen as “another academic research” which will end up on the shelf and not on the tables 
of decision makers. Finally, it provides the thesis legitimacy as a policy document that can 
serve as a reference in policy making process in strengthening the sector to better respond to 
the needs of the low-income groups of the society. 
1.7 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
The thesis comprises eight chapters. Following the introductory chapter, Chapters 2 and 3 give 
an overview of the co-operatives movement globally and South Africa respectively. The four 
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main objectives of the thesis are addressed and organized in article form in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 
7. Since the chapters are organized in publishable papers there is some repetition. mostly in the 
introduction and overview sections of each of the empirical papers. Since each empirical paper 
looked into different themes each, there are different literature reviews in these chapters. 
Chapter 2 presents a global overview of the co-operative movement narrowing down to co-
operative financial institutions (CFIs) looking at their economic theory, the role in the world 
economy, development patterns across the world, growth strategies and how they are evolving 
into global players through mergers, acquisitions and demutualization. The chapter also looks 
at CFI performance post restructuring or strategic alliance. This chapter gives a perspective on 
where Africa stands in relation to the overall movement, showing that although the continent 
contributes a third of total global CFIs, its contribution to total membership and total assets is 
just 9.86% and 0.52% respectively. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the co-operative movement in South Africa since 1892 and 
how the government facilitated or hindered their growth through the historical periods. 
Government policies and actions are analysed, as is the growth trend of the industry from 
2003/2004 to date. South African CFIs are compared to their African peers which revealed that 
the country had the lowest penetration rate in Africa at 0.06%. The growth pattern of CFIs is 
also discussed, their growth opportunities, financial inclusion levels and how the banking 
structure contributes to financial exclusion and the opportunities for CFIs. The overview also 
analyses the contribution of the sub-CFI groupings to the overall position, setting the stage for 
an empirical study on financial sustainability.  
Chapter 4 investigates the level of financial sustainability in the South African CFI industry 
through an FSS index built from CFIs financial statements. Results show that the industry is 
not financially sustainable, which might affect its social impact. Factors that are contributing 
to such performance were identified, with high cost structure, donation and credit risk 
contributing to the unsustainable performance level. Investment of the poor’s savings in 
financial instruments is criticized, and how financial sustainability will have an impact on 
social and environmental performance is discussed. A sub-sample study reveals that some 
factors affect them differently and the co-operative banks sub-sample was found to be 
financially sustainable whilst Savings and Credit Co-operatives (SACCOs) and Financial 
Services Co-operatives (FSCs) are not. 
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Chapter 5 examines the efficiency of CFIs in meeting their social and financial objectives: our 
bootstrapped data envelopment analysis (DEA) results show their inefficiency in both. Social 
inefficiency is very high as CFIs are not reaching out to more members, and financial 
investments take a substantial portion of assets meant for lending to members. This proves that 
to achieve social performance, CFIs need to achieve their economic goals first. Contributing 
factors are analysed. 
Chapter 6 analyses the productivity of the industry over the period 2010 to 2017 using DEA 
Malmquist Productivity Index and the results explain that industry is completely stagnant in its 
performance. This means there is no innovation taking place in the industry to improve its 
efficiency or improvement in managerial acumen to restructure so that there is optimum 
utilization of inputs or reduction of intermediation wastage to improve output or impact to 
members. The same also applies to the scale. Analysis by sub-samples reveal that FSCs which 
are mainly rural-based experienced an average productively regress of 2.8% per annum over 
the 8-year period. 
Chapter 7 looks at a survey using a hybrid SWOT-Delphi approach by engaging CFI experts. 
A diversify number of performance drivers and inhibitors were identified. Appropriate 
strategies are suggested to contribute to the growth agenda of the industry. Mainly, CFIs need 
to innovate and adopt the technology diffusion in their operations, address negative perceptions 
about the industry, strengthen their corporate governance and revamp their outreach strategy. 
Chapter 8 presents the overall conclusion of the thesis. The summary and policy implications 
of the study are first presented and discussed. Managerial recommendations emanating from 
the research are also presented. The chapter concludes with the contribution of the study, its 
limitations, as well as suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CO-OPERATIVE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
OVERVIEW3 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
There is overwhelming empirical evidence revealing that access to financial services can 
reduce households’ vulnerability, increase productivity and incomes and stimulate 
entrepreneurial activities (King and Levine, 1993; King and Levine, 1993a; Levine, 2004; 
Merton and Bodie, 2004; Seidman, 2005; Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010; Nayak, 
2015). The development of inclusive financial services has been recognized by policy makers 
the world over as an important issue on their economic and political agendas to stimulate much 
needed inclusive economic growth and poverty reduction (see Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008; 
Du, 2017; Périlleux, 2013).  
CFIs or credit unions are being recognized as an effective development finance instrument to 
collectively mobilize members’ financial contributions for onward lending to the same 
members who share a common bond as opposed to reliance on outside funding. The common 
bond prerequisite is predominantly vital. It is a common interest that the members share and is 
there to confirm that the CFI committee making credit decisions has information of the 
character and personal history of the member seeking a loan and can make a quick decision 
based on an applicant’s standing and savings profile, rather than on income and collateral 
(McKillop et al., 2007). CFIs are a grassroot innovation from the same population segment, 
which benefits from the innovation through collaborative efforts to achieve sustainable 
development. Inclusive innovations are concerned with the missing institutions as the benefits 
of mainstream innovations fail to reach the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid.  
The United Nations (UN) reaffirmed the importance of cooperatives by declaring year 2012 as 
the International Year of Cooperatives in recognition of their role in advancing inclusive 
growth and social integration. In addition, the International Summit of Cooperatives, a biennial 
gathering, is being held in Quebec starting from 2012 to discuss how cooperatives can be used 
                                                          
3 An article based on this chapter, “Co-operative Financial Institutions Performance Evaluation (Formation, 
Transition and Consolidation): An Overview” is under review by the journal Strategic Change: Briefings in 
Entrepreneurial Finance for a special issue on Collaborative Methods of Development.  
An earlier draft of the chapter was presented at Imbizo Research Network, University of Stellenbosch Business 
School, Cape Town, South Africa, 14 September 2017 titled “The global co-operative movement: A reflection of 
the challenges and opportunities for financial co-operatives”. 
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as an instrument to attain some of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by encouraging 
grassroot collaborative efforts. Their image was further enhanced by their resilience to the 
global financial crisis compared to investor-owned banks which are more profit-oriented (see 
Birchall, 2013; Becchetti et al., 2016). The ultimate goal of a CFI is to maximize members’ 
benefits through continuous performance improvement by quickly reaching the mature phase 
through economies of scale to have a competitive advantage. In search for enhanced efficiency 
and sustainability in the mature stage, CFIs face growth challenges with restructuring through 
mergers, acquisitions and demutualization becoming some of the available growth strategies. 
One will ask, what is the impact of CFIs as a collaborative method in enhancing members’ 
welfare along their life cycle? 
The objective of this exploratory study is to provide a performance evaluation of CFIs along 
the developmental stages on their ability to maximize benefits to members and society using a 
collection of previous empirical literature. This conceptual and empirical study will set the 
stage for empirical studies on CFIs’ performance evaluation in a country-specific context. 
The chapter is arranged as follows: Section 2.2 highlights the importance of CFIs in addressing 
financial markets failures, Section 2.3 discusses the economic theory of financial cooperatives, 
Section 2.4 covers the growth and distribution of CFIs with their performance evaluation in 
enhancing members’ welfare, while Section 2.5 discusses the impact of mergers, acquisitions 
and other growth strategies on performance and Section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF CFIs IN REDUCING CREDIT MARKET FAILURE 
The exceptional feature of CFIs is that they assist in reducing the transactional costs and 
information opacity that is rampant in the credit markets. Information asymmetry in the credit 
market leads to adverse selection problems where less creditworthy individuals/firms are 
considered for credit which will lead to defaults or moral hazard. To circumvent these 
challenges, mainstream banks do credit rationing by limiting credit (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
CFIs have an information superiority over banks for a certain category of borrowers; this 
position them to break the information problem that results in credit rationing in mainstream 
banking, thus promoting a “functional financial system4” in the words of Merton and Bodie 
(2004). This unique advantage enables them to provide appropriate financial services, 
especially loans, where other financial institutions are facing lack of tangible collateral in 
                                                          
4 A functional financial system is regarded as the most efficient intermediation of surplus and deficit units being 
that information regarding parties involved is freely or less costly available in the credit market. 
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intermediating for such low-income clients. These attributes in theory refer to “complete” 
appreciation of the local community which allows them to carefully select potential members, 
thus effortlessly and swiftly detecting possible bad debtors, hence lowering transaction costs 
from decreased selection and monitoring costs (Black and Duggar, 1981; Brown and 
O’Connor, 1995; Ward and McKillop, 2005). Low-cost information acquisition makes 
financial cooperatives an effective instrument in fighting financial exclusion through 
collaborative efforts of members.  
Seidman (2005) identifies two advantages that emanate from circumventing capital market 
imperfections. The first is improved economic efficiency and productivity as the previously 
credit-rationed firms/individuals can access and use capital more productively. Secondly, 
socio-economic advantages are generated from providing capital to enterprises (activities) 
which yield favourable results which private capital does not sufficiently value (for example 
reduced redundancy or environmental protection). Figure 2.1 below highlights possible lending 
challenges in the credit market and the hypothetical safeguards that financial cooperatives 
(group lending methodology) use to circumvent the imperfect information problems prevalent 
in credit markets (Simtowe and Zeller, 2006; Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010; 
Périlleux, 2013). 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: CFIs’ theoretical solutions to credit market imperfect information 
Source: modified from Simtowe and Zeller (2006) 
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In the cooperative model the adverse selection problem prevalent in the credit market is 
reduced through peer selection of members who are known to be creditworthy or trustworthy. 
Peer monitoring in CFIs is a solution to the challenges of ex-ante moral hazards to ensure that 
the business a borrowing member chooses and invests in is less risky or can be well managed 
to achieve expected results. Again, the theoretical solution through peer pressure in CFIs assists 
to manage the ex-post moral hazards where a member will not be willing to repay loans after 
the business has been successful (strategic default). CFIs in theory are anticipated to be more 
effective owing to information acquisition advantage, peer selection and peer monitoring as 
members know each other’s habits given the social capital in the shared common bond. 
However due to their small size of operation, they may fail to realize the economies of scale 
and suffer from high operating costs. This concern has been raised in some empirical literature 
which demonstrated that in some instances they are inefficient (Brown and O’Connor, 1995; 
Desrochers and Fischer, 2005; McKillop et al., 2005). This motivates the interest to understand 
their performance levels in the accomplishment of their poverty alleviation and financial 
sustainability objectives.  
2.3 THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF FINANCIAL COOPERATIVES 
CFI owners are both the providers of finance and consumers of credit and surplus income hence 
CFIs may not be regarded as having the definite objective of shareholders wealth maximization 
as in the typical neoclassical theory of the firm (Power et al., 2014; Marwa and Aziakpono, 
2015; Davis, 1997). Credit unions, being collaborative self-help organizations, are positioned 
towards achieving social and economic goals of members and the broader society (Seidman, 
2005; McKillop and Wilson, 2011). Naturally, nearly all CFI customers are its members who 
generally share a common bond of association founded on workplace (industrial CFIs), religion 
(parish CFIs) or residential location (community CFIs). Sharing of the common bond has the 
benefit of lowering transaction costs, ex-ante and ex-post moral hazards which are usually 
dominant in the financial markets.  
Financial cooperatives are different from mainstream banking in the sense that investor-owned 
banks focus mainly on shareholder wealth maximization through achieving high profits at the 
expense of customers’ welfare, yet there is an incidence of ownership and consumption in CFIs. 
However, McKillop and Wilson (2011) advise that credit unions continue to experience a 
possible conflicting interest among saving members (who require a high rate of funds invested) 
and borrowing members (who require access to low-priced loans). Itis vital to appreciate the 
extent of conflicting interests as it has an effect on the performance and sustainability of their 
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operations. Taylor (1971) studied three CFI situations: (i) the saver-dominated CFI (where the 
preferences of savers take priority); (ii) the borrower-dominated CFI (where the preferences of 
borrowers are superior); and (iii) the neutral CFI (where neither savers’ nor borrowers’ interests 
lead). The CFI structure needs to place high importance on how an equilibrium in sharing of 
returns between their saving and borrowing membership can be achieved, and how 
overdominance behaviours can interrupt this balance. Propositions from theoretical analysis 
are that neutral CFIs are much more effective as neutrality is unlikely to generate motives for 
CFIs to demoralize possible members joining and hence assists to preserve the strength of the 
organization (Smith, 1986; Brown et al., 1999). Overall, the neutral CFI seeks to maximize the 
total net gains to the borrowing and saving members without bias between them in terms of 
optimal borrowing and savings rates (Taylor, 1971). 
Policymakers in most mature CFI movements in Canada, Australia and the US emphasize the 
need to achieve open commercial-based CFIs (Davis, 1997; Ward and McKillop, 2005; 
Malikov et al., 2017). The deregulation that occurred in the mature economies resulted in CFIs 
becoming more commercially focused to compete with the mainstream banks through mergers 
and acquisitions. Various studies tried to understand better the competitive behaviour provided 
by CFIs in local financial markets (Jackson, 2006; McKillop and Wilson, 2011; Dopico and 
Wilcox, 2010). In the US, Tokle and Tokle (2000) found that CFI interest rate movements had 
a bearing on certificate of deposit rates provided by conventional banks. Feinberg’s (2001) 
theoretical framework shows that CFIs’ consumer credit rates moderate the level of market 
power by banks, whereas the Granger-causality tests by Feinberg and Rahman (2001) 
established that both CFIs and bank loan rates influence the other. Hannan (2003) evaluated 
the competitive impact of CFIs by probing the deposit pricing culture of banks in local markets 
with CFIs presence. He established that banks give better deposit rates in communities where 
there is substantial establishment of CFIs.  
On the pricing approaches of deposits and advances, Jackson (2006) found that CFIs and banks 
change deposit rates paid and interest on credit as market circumstances change, but the degree 
of adjustment varies between the two market participants. For deposits, banks and CFIs reduce 
rates in reaction to a reduction in market rates faster than they increase rates in reaction to an 
increase. For advances, banks respond similarly to trends in market rates. In contrast, CFIs 
usually reduce rates considerable faster when market rates are tumbling than they increase loan 
interest when market rates are rising. In summary, banks alter rates on deposits and loans in an 
approach as to maximize returns, while CFIs adjust rates in an approach to maintain an equal 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
20 
 
margin between average lending rates and average deposit rates. “Credit unions have a very 
different goal orientation to banks; they are people-centred rather than profit-driven and this is 
reflected in their lending systems” (Power et al., 2014: 59). In addition, CFIs are far less 
exposed to business cycle variations and are much better at weathering macro-economic shocks 
as they unusually engage in speculative transactions (Smith and Woodbury, 2010; Becchetti et 
al., 2016; Birchall, 2013). However, the level of competition they give to mainstream banking, 
financial services and growth strategies depends on their developmental typology. Issues facing 
mature movements may not be same as those from less well-developed movements. 
2.4 THE GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF CFIs WORLDWIDE 
CFIs have gained their reputation as important global instrument in the provision of responsible 
collaborative social finance. Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics on CFIs by geographical 
region as at the end of 2016. There were 68,882 CFIs operating in 109 countries, with a total 
membership of 235.8 million translating to a population penetration rate of 13.55% (which is 
the total reported number of CFI members divided by the economically active population). 
They have US$1.76 trillion assets under their management. As a measure of capital strength, 
the average reserve to asset ratio across all regions is 9.6%. Asia and Oceania are below the 
average at 3% and 8.3% respectively, Africa is slightly above at 9.7% whilst the remainder are 
above 10%. Africa and the Caribbean have the lowest reserves of below US$1 billion, revealing 
under-capitalization. A comparison with 2009 shows an industry growth since the global 
financial crisis from 49,330 CFIs in 98 countries, 184 million members, 7.6% penetration rate 
and US$1.35 trillion in total assets to current (WOCCU, 2009).  
North America, which consists of Canada and the United States, has a high penetration rate of 
52% contributing 82.7% of worldwide credit unions total assets although it has only 9.12% 
share of total CFIs. The second region is Asia with 7.89% share of global CFIs’ total assets but 
the highest number of credit unions amounting to 35,957 (52.2%). Although Africa contributes 
nearly a third of CFIs (31.5%), it has on average the lowest total assets per CFI of US$421,604 
compared to the global average of US$25.6 million. The second lowest region is Asia with 
average total assets of US$3.87 million per CFI. Africa’s credit union industry is very small in 
size (assets); however, the region is embracing the concept given the number of countries 
within the region with CFIs (25) and number of institutions. The CFI movement, through the 
support of the WOCCU is active in promoting CFIs in the developing economies of Africa and 
Asia to fight poverty (Ferguson and McKillop, 2000), hence these two regions have many CFIs.  
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Table 2.1: Worldwide distribution of credit unions in 2016 
Geographical Region  
(Number of Countries) 
No. of 
Credit 
Unions 
Membership   Savings (US$)  Loans (US$)   Assets (US$)   Reserves (US$) Reserves/ 
Assets 
(%) 
Penetration 
(%) 
Total for Africa (25) 21,724 23,248,774 5,847,680,494 6,901,215,612 9,158,929,819 886,385,958 9.7 8 
Total for Asia (21) 35,957 50,820,792 116,038,966,593 100,792,790,606 139,330,789,242 4,251,288,278 3.0 8 
Total for Caribbean (17) 299 2,258,204 5,255,347,702 3,500,290,383 6,354,508,021 641,107,856 10.1 56 
Total for Europe (14) 2,033 8,386,913 20,194,572,627 8,003,492,515 22,971,650,629 3,121,751,024 13.6 4 
Total for Latin America (17) 2,391 27,907,558 15,833,481,781 26,382,308,694 50,271,775,901 8,257,827,478 16.4 9 
Total for North America (2) 6,280 118,460,459 1,237,389,073,542 1,010,049,394,657 1,459,880,660,866 146,688,460,939 10.0 52 
Total for Oceania (13) 198 4,679,376 65,232,975,558 61,708,501,580 76,714,135,525 6,348,671,560 8.3 15 
Worldwide Credit Unions (109) 68,882 235,762,076 1,465,792,098,298 1,217,337,994,047 1,764,682,450,003 170,195,493,093 9.6 13.55 
Source: World Council of Credit Unions (2016) 
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2.4.1 Stages of CFI development and market classifications 
CFIs are becoming a source of responsible finance with their financial services differing with 
their developmental stage in each country or region. According to the life cycle theory CFIs 
advance through three different stages: the nascent (formative) stage, the transition stage and 
the mature (consolidation) stage (Greiner, 1972; Quinn and Cameron, 1983; Sibbald et al., 
2002; McKillop and Wilson, 2011). The precise characteristics which illustrate CFIs in each 
stage were discussed by Sibbaldet al. (2002) and Ferguson and McKillop (1997, 2000). CFIs 
placed within each of these developmental stages can be categorized by several financial and 
organizational characteristics. Table 2.2 classifies the three distinct CFI phases of development 
as well as their growth strategies as guided by Ferguson and McKillop (1997, 2000). 
According to Ferguson and McKillop (2000) and McKillop and Wilson (2011), at the nascent 
stage, CFIs are usually characterized by a tight common bond making them small in size 
(assets), with strict regulation, over reliant on voluntary labour, high growth, and providing 
limited basic financial services, mainly savings and loans. In nascent industries, economic 
development is seen as inseparable from the empowerment of individuals and the emergence 
of democratic institutions. CFIs in this phase normally face governance challenges resulting in 
a high mortality rate. During the transitional phase CFIs have large asset size, evolving 
regulatory and supervisory frameworks, less common bond restrictions, higher product 
diversification, development of professional trade associations, less reliance on volunteers, 
development of central services and a greater emphasis on growth and efficiency.  
Finally, mature movements have large asset and member size, have undergone structural and 
conduct deregulation accompanied by increased prudential regulation, a loose common bond, 
diversified product portfolio, professional management, centralized services, diffusion of 
innovative technologies and a deposit insurance scheme. CFIs at this stage are more 
commercially focused, driving their further growth and efficiency through restructuring 
exercises such as mergers, acquisitions, demutualization or entering foreign markets. Table 2.2 
below gives a summary of the characteristics and growth strategies of CFIs each developmental 
typology. 
The mature markets have quite a number of growth options ranging from internally-generated 
growth, new members outreach in extended common bond, diversification of income streams, 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and finally changing organizational form to corporate through 
demutualization. 
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Table 2.2: Stages and growth strategies of CFI development  
 Nascent Transition Mature 
Characteristics Small asset and member size Large asset and member 
size 
Large asset and member size 
 Highly regulated Shifts in regulatory 
framework 
Deregulation 
 Tight common bond Adjustments to common 
bond 
Loose common bond 
 Strong emphasis on 
voluntarism 
Shifts towards greater 
product diversification 
Competitive environment 
 Serve weak sections of 
society 
Emphasis on growth and 
efficiency 
Electronic technology 
environment 
 Single savings and loans 
product 
Weakening of reliance on 
voluntarism 
Well organized, progressive 
trade bodies 
 Requires sponsorship from 
wider credit union 
movement to take root 
Need for greater 
effectiveness and 
professionalism of trade 
bodies 
Professionalization of 
management 
 High commitment to 
traditional self-help ideals 
Development of central 
services 
Well-developed central 
services 
   Diversification of products 
and services 
   Financial services based on 
market rates 
   Emphasis on economic 
viability and long-term 
sustainability 
   Rigorous financial 
management operations 
   Well-functioning deposit 
insurance  
Growth 
strategies 
Internally-generated 
(retained income) 
Internally-generated  Internally-generated 
 Aggressive outreach 
(members acquisition) 
Membership acquisition in 
extended common bond 
Membership acquisition in 
extended common bond 
  Diversification of financial 
services  
Diversification of income 
streams – non-funded 
income (member-centric 
growth) 
  Mergers and acquisitions  Mergers and acquisitions  
   Demutualization 
Source: Sibbald et al. (2002)
According to Ferguson and McKillop (1997, 2000) and McKillop and Wilson (2011), nascent 
industries are presently located mainly in the developing economies of Asia, Africa and the 
former Soviet bloc. In these countries/regions, they are usually viewed as poverty reduction 
interventions in the overall microfinance program as opposed to a total banking solution for 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
24 
 
all. Kenya is the only African country in the transitional phase with a 13.28% penetration rate. 
Table 2.3 below gives a summary of the regional location of CFIs and their growth phase. 
Table 2.3: Regional location of CFIs and their growth phase (2016) 
Country/Region No. of 
CFIs 
Membership  Assets  
(US$) 
 Savings  
(US$) 
Penetration 
(%) 
Mature CFIs           
 United States 5,996 108,320,375 1,309,142,008,442 1,107,120,425,959 52.61 
 Canada 284 10,140,084 150,738,652,424 130,268,647,583 46.71 
 Australia 82 4,200,000 75,687,765,000 64,453,425,000 17.65 
 France5  3   26,000,000 4,276,836 1,804,886 52.00 
 Korea 904 5,801,000 61,095,869,987 58,121,117,241 11.47 
Transition CFIs         
 Kenya 6,468 6,272,077 6,324,267,668 4,200,055,451 13.28 
 Hong Kong 41 88,540 1,825,000,000 1,753,000,000. 1.22 
 Taiwan ROC 340 220,242 859,000,000 750,000,000 0.94 
 Sri Lanka 8,423 1,039,458 83,000,000 54,000,000 5.02 
 Singapore 22 103,444 671,000,000 549,000,000 1.87 
 Thailand 2,285 4,078,311 62,954,000,000 46,079,000,000 5.94 
 Ireland 390 3,500,000 17,007,597,281 14,130,732,159 74.47 
 Great Britain 312 1,263,131 1,768,939,855 2,440,176,058 1.93 
 Poland 40 1,934,482 2,806,756,987 2,614,080,432 5.01 
 Fiji 16 12,477 10,415,607 NA 1.38 
 New Zealand 11 170,841 689,097,406 779,550,558 3.53 
 Caribbean 299 2,258,204 6,354,508,021 5,255,347,702 56.0 
 Latin America 2,391 27,907,558 50,271,775,901 15,833,481,781 9.0 
Nascent CFIs           
 Africa6 15,256 16,976,697 2,834,662,151 1,647,625,043 5.4 
 Asia7 23,942 39,489,797 11,842,919,255 8,732,849,352 2.4 
 Russia 257 347,268 382,768,798 212,511,968 0.2 
 Ukraine 462 900,074 75,287,144 47,710,263 2.0 
Source: World Council of Credit Unions (2016) 
However, there is still debate on the classification of Ireland (with a 77% penetration rate) in 
transition stage as it is sometimes considered to be in the mature phase. Table 2.3 reveals that 
there are only five countries where the credit union can truly be said to have achieved a mature 
status. The US, Canada, Australia, France and Korea could be viewed as having a mature 
financial cooperative industry with penetration rate averaging 40%. In each of these markets 
                                                          
5 These amounts are for 2016 and are consolidated figures for BPCE, Credit Mutuel and Credit Agricole. 
Source: European Association of Co-operative Banks (2016). 
6 Africa region does not incorporate Kenya which is now classified in the transitional stage. 
7 Asia region does not incorporate Korea, which is categorized as a mature CFI country or Thailand, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Sri Lanka and Taiwan ROC which are classified as transition CFI countries. 
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the CFI movement is a dominating force in the provision of financial services and has achieved 
substantial penetration of the economic active population. 
Although it is necessary to become familiar with the main attributes of each stage of 
development, it is of more importance to appreciate the interaction of issues which drives or 
hinders progress between the different developmental stages. Five factors have been 
acknowledged as core in hindering the progression of CFIs from one stage to another: the 
quality of leadership, the sophistication of trade associations, management professionalization, 
nature of legislative support for change and innovation, and technological progression (Sibbald  
et al., 2002). According to Cabo and Rebelo (2005), management quality is of prime 
importance as it can drive performance, and trigger consolidation of CFIs and even failure. 
2.4.2 CFIs growth strategies along the developmental stages 
Based on the exceptional attributes of each growth stage as stated by the life cycle theory, it is 
projected that CFIs in different typologies face differing challenges, although some of the 
performance problems might be similar in all the phases, such as the role of effective 
leadership. There are also unique specific challenges depending on the stage of development 
of an individual organization. The formative phase usually experiences high scope for growth, 
undercapitalization and growing heterogeneity amongst members which might result in an 
upsurge in transaction costs which affects performance (McKillop and Wilson, 2011; Marwa 
and Aziakpono, 2015).  
As CFIs progress from the nascent stage to the transition stage, they begin to appreciate the 
problems which might call for a strategic change to realize further growth. Strategic turnaround 
decisions might result in re-inventing the ownership structure, product diversification, adoption 
of information technology to improve member value proposition and perceptions or exit. At 
the mature stage CFIs face further challenges of growth, and therefore the need to compete 
with mainstream banks. If CFIs are to compete with mainstream financial services providers 
and achieve efficiency of operations, then restructuring may be inevitable (Power et al., 2014). 
To maintain the cooperative values, M&A has been the most population source of growth for 
CFIs at the mature stage. The same is being witnessed in the corporate world with different 
degrees of success and failure (see Gomes et al., 2016; Gomes et al., 2011).  
“However, there is nothing, in theory, to avoid an additional stage after the mature phase which 
involves the conversion of CFIs beyond their present co-operative form into a completely new 
type of organization through demutualization” (Sibbald et al., 2002:401). This study will 
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review some empirical studies to understand the impact of these collaborative practices on CFI 
performance and members’ welfare. 
2.5 EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF CFIs PERFORMANCE POST RESTRUCTURING 
CFI activities in most economies are focused on increasing returns to scale. As explained by 
McKillop and Wilson (2011), increasing returns to scale can result in better earnings for saving 
members and reduced loan interests for borrowing members. This explains growth strategies 
followed by financial cooperatives (either internally generated or via mergers and acquisitions) 
given the regulation allowing common bond expansion in some markets. Using a 1994-2011 
study period in the US, Malikov et al. (2013) predicted that the CFI industry will continue to 
witness consolidations due to product diversification demands as well as organization level 
scale efficiencies.  
Goddard et al. (2009) investigated the determining factor of acquisition for US CFIs during the 
period 2001 to 2006 and found that:  
(i) CFIs that are growth-constrained are less likely to be attractive acquisition targets; 
(ii) Highly liquid credit unions appear to be attractive acquisition targets, because they have 
a tendency not to realize an adequate return on their assets; 
(iii) Low capitalized CFIs are at greater risk of acquisition, this could be because they have 
been inefficiently managed, and offer acquirers scope for introducing efficiency gains; 
and  
(iv) Those without a website were at the highest risk of acquisition, followed by those with 
informational, interactive and transactional websites. In other words, the risk of 
acquisition decreased as the level of website sophistication and capability increased. 
Probably, the acquiring managers who have the technological capability perceive that 
they can earn higher returns from the target CFIs’ assets. 
In recent years, growth patterns via M&A were witnessed, therefore it is necessary to 
understand their impact on CFIs’ performance and members’ welfare. For a more detailed 
guidance on critical success factors for improved performance pre- and post-M&A also 
applicable to CFIs, see Gomes et al. (2013).  
2.5.1 The impact of mergers on CFI performance and members welfare 
Restructuring via mergers and acquisitions has resulted in a massive reduction in the number 
of financial institutions in many economies (Berger et al., 1999; Goddard et al., 2009; McKillop 
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and Wilson, 2015; McKee and Kagan, 2016). Overall, the empirical evidence on bank mergers 
suggests that there is often little improvement in the efficiency or performance of the merged 
entity. Historically, mergers have been widespread in mature CFI movements in Australia, 
Canada and the US as well as in some isolated transition markets in the UK and New Zealand. 
Findings on the reasons for CFI mergers are scant but a few country-specific researches provide 
some insights (McKillop and Wilson, 2011).  
McKee and Kagan (2016) studied the trend of the US credit unions and find that they dropped 
from almost 24,000 organizations in 1969 to roughly 7,240 in 2012, and 6,100 in 2015 
(WOCCU, 2015), a decline of over 74% since 1969. The overall consequence of deregulation 
brought changes in the patterns of growth across different types of credit unions (Goddard et 
al., 2009). Larger credit unions in the UK tended to expand quicker than their smaller 
counterparts. Externally generated growth also took place via mergers and acquisitions, where 
larger, well-capitalized and technologically-advanced CFIs took over smaller, less capitalized 
entities that did not implement banking technologies. Between 2003 and 2013, the number of 
credit unions reduced by approximately 3% per year. In 1994, there were 7,848 credit unions 
with assets over US$10 million; by the end of 2012 this figure had dropped to 2,489, a 68% 
decline (McKee and Kagan, 2016). Consequently, there has been a rapid growth in credit union 
asset size. In 2013 the average credit union had US$160.9 million assets compared to US$65.6 
million in 2003 (McKillop and Wilson, 2015). However, Goddard et al. (2009) found other 
growth sources through diversification into non-funded income activities, although this did not 
result in higher earnings for members in the UK. 
In a similar move, in the US, the 1998 Credit Union Membership Access Act effectively 
dissolved the common bond requirement. As an outcome, CFIs extended their membership 
classes and, in the process, their financial performance was weakened by mergers. Dopico and 
Wilcox (2010) investigated CFI mergers between 1984 and 2009, the results show that merged 
CFIs achieved financial performance progress in favour of the smaller merging partner. When 
measured as operating gains expressed as non-interest expense per assets (NIEXP) over five 
years, smaller merger partners experienced large reductions in NIEXP (-0.79%) and in loan 
rates (interest income fell by 0.51%) and increases in rates paid on deposits (interest expense 
rose by 0.08%). In contrast, these impacts are very small (0.00%, –0.04%, and –0.01%, 
respectively) for members of the larger merger partner (i.e. the acquirer). Acquiring CFIs are 
usually significantly larger than the target (on average their assets are 20 times larger). The 
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improvements credited to the merger of the small CFIs (the target) and the larger CFIs (the 
acquirer) benefit the small CFIs.  
Ralston et al. (2001) conducted a post-merger empirical investigation on the attempt by credit 
unions in Australia and the United States to increase efficiency through mergers using a data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) methodology. The post-merger improvements in technical and 
scale efficiency realized by 31 Australian CFI mergers in 1993/1994 and 1994/1995, relative 
to non-merging CFIs, suggests that mergers do not necessarily result in efficiency 
improvements better than those realized through internally-generated growth.  
In a similar study covering a longer period from 1995 to 2003 on 1,569 mergers using the Bauer 
(2008) event study method on US credit unions, Bauer et al. (2009) found that although the 
post-merger gains on CFI performance are to some extent non-existent compared to mergers 
in commercial bank industry, CFI members gain utility via the rates offered for loans and 
deposits. Members of the target CFI gain more (as financial stability of the merged firm 
recovers remarkably) but not the acquiring firm. Regulators also gain utility as mergers remove 
risky entities from the industry. Their finding supports the thesis that most mergers are 
instigated by regulators to avoid using insurance funds to bail out failing institutions. Dopico 
and Wilcox (2010) recap that mergers within the CFI sector in the US improve overall CFI cost 
efficiency due to reduced operating costs, particularly when a large entity consolidated with a 
much smaller CFI. These benefits are enjoyed more by members of the target entity. 
Mcalevey et al. (2010) found mixed results in New Zealand using two cross-sectional datasets 
for the years 1996 and 2001. After employing DEA, they found that credit unions have become 
more efficient over the period, notably in 14 entities that undertook mergers as opposed to the 
42 that remained unchanged (i.e. those that were not acquired and survived as a single entity). 
The Malmquist index indicates significant technological progress over the period but a slight 
regression in efficiency. Thus, contrary to previous empirical evidence, involvement in 
acquiring other credit unions is shown to lead to some efficiency improvements. Given that 
New Zealand industry is still in the transition phase this might provide some insights that 
mergers in the transition stage enhance efficiency as there is still scope to increase memberhip 
outreach compared to the mature stage. However, the initial motivation for mergers in New 
Zealand was not the common cause of trying to improve performance for competitive 
objectives but was rather forced government-initiated mergers. 
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Similarly, Fried et al. (1999) found that in the US, acquiring CFIs benefited more when they 
and the target CFIs had different profitability levels and different numbers of select employee 
groups, and when one of them had a community charter. On average, members of the acquiring 
CFI experienced no deterioration in service provision post-merger, while members of the 
acquired CFI experienced improvements of at least three years’ duration. 
Using qualitative data obtained through interviews with members of community-based credit 
unions in Ireland, Power et al. (2014) concluded that in the context of mergers, there is a need 
to guard against the erosion of the movement’s unique and community-embedded competitive 
advantage. They cautioned that excessive emphasis on mergers would increase the spatial 
distance and, consequently, the psychological distance, between members and decision-
makers. The resulting ‘disembedding’ effect is likely to erode members’ attachment to their 
CFIs and thereby undermine competitive advantage. The same was also observed from a case 
study by Gomes et al. (2011) on the impact of misaligned culture on strategic alliance between 
two African organizations. 
2.5.2 The impact of internal growth on performance 
Besides the pursuit of growth through consolidations, Malikov et al. (2017) found internal 
growth (retaining net income) in the US retail credit union sector through economies of 
diversification in financial services (by becoming member-centric) brought good performance. 
The study found that as many as 27-91% of diversified CFIs enjoy substantial economies of 
diversification, the cost of most remaining CFIs is invariant to the scope of services. They also 
found strong evidence of increasing returns to scale in the industry.  
The drop in CFI organizations in mature economies continues to change the interaction 
between members, CFIs, financial services competition, financial partners and industry 
structure. The outcome of consolidation may result in a CFI industry less differentiated from 
commercial banks, and financial services that may be less attractive to underserved members, 
as well as a migration from the central basic ideologies of CFIs. With the continuation of the 
CFI industry consolidations, the uniqueness of CFIs may no longer be clear and member-driven 
in a struggle to survive the continuing scale issues tempting CFIs to move beyond the 
cooperative form. 
2.5.3 Beyond cooperative: demutualization and the privatization of credit unions 
Jain, Keneley, and Thomson (2015) studied the reasons why credit unions convert to customer-
owned banks (mutual banks) in Australia using semi-structured interviews with seven credit 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
30 
 
union CEOs. They found that the conversions are being necessitated by the need to change 
customer perceptions, ensure future growth, and facilitate access to external capital by attaining 
a good credit rating. Despite this change, mutual banks retain the core principles of mutuality. 
However, beyond customer-owned banks there is also demutualization happening to 
completely move from a mutual structure to shareholder-owned entities. 
One major motivation for demutualization is the access to external capital to finance growth, 
however, the process is believed to have an impact of members’ wealth transfer to outsiders 
and social costs for the society as a whole. There were just 91 credit unions in Australia in 
2015, down from over 700 in the 1960s, but the penetration rate ramained strong. According 
to Davis (2016), since 2012 some of the larger credit unions have taken advantage of a 
regulatory change enabling them to use the term ‘mutual bank’, with apparent connotations in 
the public mind of greater safety and a wider range of banking services. As a result of losing 
their tax exemption status in the early 1990s, credit unions had difficulties sustaining their 
overall share of the retail loan and deposit markets. However, over recent decades the sector 
has been able to generate sufficient surpluses to grow capital at a rate more than sufficient to 
meet regulatory requirements arising from larger scale.  
Three Australian credit unions (Goldfields Credit Union, Gateway Credit Union and MyState 
Financial Credit Union) decided to demutualize as there were good performers in a sector not 
in terminal decline, but one facing ongoing competitive challenges limiting growth. So 
demutualization was seen as strategy motivated by the need to acceralate further growth or 
wealth expropriation incentives by converting from a co-operative enterprise to a corporate 
form where members are issued with shares and external investors invited to aquire a stake (see 
Davis, 2016). Despite the increase in demutualization, the commitment to co-operative 
ideology has been maintained in certain countries and markets. However, it might be premature 
to conclude that the future of the credit union movement is secure. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
The importance of CFIs has captured the attention of researchers, the international development 
community and policymakers as a responsible intervention to assist marginalized communities 
from the financial markets to collectively address lack of access to financial services. Such a 
collaborative method of mobilizing financial resources from members who share the common 
bond helps to circumvent information opacity which leads to credit rationing, adverse selection 
and moral hazard prevalent problems in the credit markets. As democratically member-
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controlled organizations based on the principle of one member one vote, CFIs serve the 
collective interests of their members in achieving their social and economic objectives. 
The recognition of cooperatives by the UN in 2012 and bi-annual summits on cooperatives 
being held in Quebec to plan and track progress on how cooperatives are helping in attaining 
SDGs is a re-affirmation of how they are helping people to help themselves. The resilience of 
CFIs to the global economic crisis put them squarely back on political and economic agendas 
as a source of responsible finance for sustainable development. The global credit union 
membership and total assets trends are showing a strong performance supported by rapid 
formation of CFIs in the nascent markets of Asia and Africa. Large CFIs by asset value are in 
the mature markets of North America. The growth patterns being witnessed in the nascent, 
transition and mature markets differ depending on the industry development phase. CFIs in 
nascent and some in transition markets are driving their growth internally through increased 
member outreach and diversification of financial services to appeal to many. 
Mergers have been an ongoing process of the CFI movement globally, particularly in the 
transition and mature markets. resulting in a marked drop in CFIs. The post-merger evaluations 
reveal overwhelming evidence that small target CFIs gain enhanced performance through 
reduced costs, lower interest rates on loans, better rates on deposits and better financial services 
diversification. In addition, regulators save on the deposit insurance fund which is supposed to 
bail out failing CFIs which are taken over by healthy and large players. The findings from New 
Zealand suggest mixed results with technological progress but a slight regression in efficiency 
in the post-merger period. 
Other findings from Australia reveal better CFI performance coming from internal growth than 
through mergers, whilst other studies in US point to better performance realized by becoming 
member-centric through diversifying financial services and non-funded income. Fee income in 
financial cooperatives is becoming progressively vital as also in conventional banks. Some 
studies caution the emphasis on mergers as it weakens the competitive advantage of CFIs 
because some members feel disempowered resulting in many members no longer exercising 
their ownership rights as they no longer see themselves as owners. Eventually, members who 
feel disempowered either withdraw or end up in wilful loan defaults. 
Another strategic change is the demutualization of CFIs into investor-owned banks to enable 
mobilization of external funding. Although this restructuring strategy reinvigorates the 
organizational performance, it works against cooperative principles and values by 
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disempowering the community to collaborate effectively and equally. The following chapter 
will focus on the South African co-operative movement to understand the movement’s history 
and why they have the lowest penetration rate in the world.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW8 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
There are quite a number of concerns that are raised when it comes to the study of co-operatives 
as a form of business enterprise, such as: how vital are co-operatives in our communities and 
the entire economy? Are co-operatives a disappearing form of business, important only in 
developing economies and imperfect markets? Or are they a sustainable business venture that 
equals stockholder-owned entities? How sustainable are financial co-operatives in South 
Africa? 
All these concerns appear to be answered by the declaration of the year 2012 as the 
“International Year of Co-operatives” by the United Nations. This was a notable development, 
putting co-operatives squarely back on the political, economic and social agenda to empower 
ordinary citizens. This was followed by International Summits of Co-operatives hosted by the 
International Co-operative Alliance (ICA), and held in Quebec City, Canada every two years 
starting from 2012. It celebrates co-operatives as one of the global interventions for the 
attainment of some of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. The co-
operative sector is large, with the world’s largest 300 co-operatives having US$2.53 trillion of 
annual turnover in 2014 (ICA, 2016), which is nearly equal to Italy’s gross national product. 
Mayo (2012) did a statistical comparison of co-operative and usual business ownership 
globally, and found that there are a billion people who are member-owners of co-operative 
businesses compared to 328 million people who own shares. These statistics show that co-
operatives play a significant role in the global economy to stimulate entrepreneurship, which 
is sometimes the only way to survive and try to get out of poverty (Attuel-Mendès et al., 2014). 
Thus, we believe, it is worthwhile to pay attention to this distinct form of enterprise.  
                                                          
8 This chapter has been accepted for publication in a forthcoming special issue on sustainable business models of 
the journal Strategic Change: Briefings in Entrepreneurial Finance in forthcoming Vol. 27, Issue 6, Nov 2018, 
titled, “The Co-operative Movement in South Africa: Can Financial Co-operatives Become Sustainable 
Enterprises?”.  
An earlier draft of the chapter was presented at the 8th International Conference on Social Sciences (ICSS), 
organized by North-West University, (Southern Sun Elangeni & Maharani Hotel) Durban, South Africa, 23-25 
August 2017 titled “The co-operative movement in South Africa: Can financial co-operatives become sustainable 
enterprises?”. 
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Although economic conditions look challenging for markets in Africa, agriculture and financial 
co-operatives play an important role in addressing market failures, and have a track record of 
resilience in tough times. However, the growth pattern of co-operative industry in the continent 
has demonstrated a rise and fall which questions the overall effectiveness of these enterprises 
in improving the economic welfare of their members. Trying to understand industry dynamics 
in a country-specific context is useful in coming up with better informed policy 
recommendations and managerial decisions. The objective of this exploratory study is twofold: 
first, to understand the historical co-operative development in South Africa; second, to identify 
the challenges and opportunities for financial co-operatives in addressing some of the financial 
market failures. This background study for CFIs in South Africa sets the stage for empirical 
studies that will follow.  
The chapter is arranged as follows: Section 3.2 presents the overview of the global co-operative 
movement, Section 3.3 discusses the co-operative movement in South Africa from 1892 to 
date, Section 3.4 covers the financial co-operatives’ growth patterns in South Africa, Section 
3.5 highlights historical and emerging issues impacting sustainable financing in CFIs, Section 
3.6 discusses financial inclusion in South Africa, highlighting opportunities for CFIs, and 
Section 3.7 will conclude. 
3.2 THE GLOBAL EVOLUTION OF CO-OPERATIVES  
Co-operatives are a very old idea, in existence since the advent of civilization, however the 
modern movement began mainly as a response to market failures of industrial capitalism. To 
address this challenge, those concerned about the problems created by capitalism searched for 
innovative grassroot solutions to mitigate market distortions created by prevailing economic 
changes. Being private enterprises, co-operatives have the dual mission of making money and 
attaining social goals, while addressing market failures. Being a grassroots innovation, co-
operatives are membership-driven, often exclusively serving their members, who contribute 
agreed minimum capital and obtain a voting right. In constrast to investor-owned businesses, 
a larger contribution does not translate into increased voting rights, as all members have equal 
voting rights, irrespective of the amount of capital contribution. This position co-operatives to 
serve the majority. 
Co-operatives exist in diverse sectors of economic activity, including financial services, 
retailing, public utilities, agriculture, and housing. One of the most influential acknowledged 
co-operative was the Rochdale customer co-operative started in England in 1844. Its members 
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were a group of Rochdale weavers who opened a co-operative shop for their families members 
to buy quality, reasonably priced foodstuffs as a way to combat low wages, high prices and 
poor quality food. Rochdale’s long-term achievement was anchored on its written and 
religiously followed principles which currently provide the fundemental principles of all co-
operatives globally (Balnave and Patmore, 2012). From the UK, consumer co-operatives 
entered Switzerland (its first consumer co-operative opened in 1851), Germany (1852), Italy 
(1854), Japan (1879), Brazil (1887), South Africa (1892), and so on. Germany was the starting-
place for credit co-operatives, when Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen and Hermann Schulze-
Delitzsch, independent of each other, started co-operatives to provide small loans to their 
members. A shoemaker, Schulze-Delitzsch created a co-operative for a group of shoemakers 
to pool their finances and buy leather in bulk, while Raiffeisen, a burgomaster, built a credit 
co-operative to support small farmers (Kuhlengisa, 2011).  
The success of these pioneers in co-operative development followed a botton-up approach 
which was opposite to what colonial rulers tried unsuccessfully in India, and in most African 
countries mainly in the 1960s, the period when most African nations gained their independence. 
Commonly, the governments of the decolonized nations reinforced the top-down approach of 
the past colonial rulers, and firmly linked co-operatives to specific government institutions. In 
some instances, co-operatives were nationalized, as was the case in Tanzania in the 1970s 
(Maghimbi, 2010). These developments mainly explain why even presently co-operatives are 
unequally spread over the world. The political thinking that did not appreciate the future 
survival of co-operatives assumed that they were a short- or medium-term intervention in what 
in the long run a government should do, that is, to effectively manage the economy; whereas 
other politicians maintained them as a short- and medium-term intervention to influence what 
in the future the perfect markets must do (but had failed to achieve). The outcome has been a 
variety of explanations and enthusiasms in the cause of developing co-operatives worldwide to 
address entrenched imperfect markets.  
After the disruption of many co-operatives, in the 1990s many old co-operatives were re-
organized, the governments’ controls were lessened, and the ICA co-operative principles 
emerged as guiding-points for a new generation of co-operative laws. Regardless of all that, 
today the diffusion of co-operatives in Africa is moderately wide, and some African countries 
exceed Europe in figures. However, these co-operatives tend to be smaller and include a 
smaller percentage of the population (Battilani and Schröter, 2012). To give context we shall 
focus more on South Africa.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
40 
 
3.3 THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Our major focus will be on financial co-operatives, though notable events with impact on all 
co-operative types are discussed. Table 3.1 below summarizes the key events and legislative 
changes since 1892 in South Africa that have contributed towards the co-operative movement 
we see today. 
3.3.1 Co-operatives in colonial and apartheid regimes (1892-1981) 
The history of the co-operative in South Africa is long, with its historical developments 
constantly intertwined with the state’s. Its history as an economic vehicle can be tracked from 
the early 19th century in South Africa, beginning with white farmers’ agricultural co-operatives 
focused on building a more vibrant white-owned agricultural community with financial support 
from the government. The Pietermaritzburg consumer co-operative, founded in 1892, was the 
first registered co-operative. However, the increase in the consolidation and market power of 
big chain stores made the consumer co-operatives fail, with only agricultural co-operatives 
being successful. However, it was not until 1908 that South Africa’s first co-operative 
regulation (the Co-operative Societies Act of 1908) was passed in the Transvaal, now Limpopo 
and Mpumalanga provinces (Genesis Analytics, 2014; Okem, 2016). In 1922 the Co-operative 
Society Act became law, and regulated co-operatives in the country. At first the co-operative 
development was focused on trading and agricultural co-operatives. The Department of 
Agriculture was responsible for their development with favourable agricultural policies being 
put in place for their advancement. During the colonial and apartheid regimes, co-operatives 
were economic vehicles to enrich white South Africans, especially those in the agricultural 
sector (Okem, 2016).  
The state’s desire to promote white-owned co-operatives is evident in the passage 
of various legislations and the establishment of co-operative support institutions 
(such as the Co-operative Societies Act enacted in 1908, the Land and Agricultural 
Bank [the Land Bank], the Co-operatives Societies Act [Act 28 of 1922], the Co-
operative Societies Amendment Act [Act 38 of 1925], the Marketing Act of 1937 
[later amended as Act 59 of 1968], and the Co-operatives Act [Act 91 of 1981]) 
(DTI, 2012: 31).  
Effectively, co-operatives were used as an instrument for syphoning public funds as well 
as creating white monopoly in the agricultural sector. 
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Table 3.1: A historical perspective on South African co-operatives and co-operative financial 
institutions 
Period  Notable Event/Legislation Objective 
1892 1st co-operative formed in South 
Africa 
The first formally registered co-operative a consumer co-
operative was formed in Pietermaritzburg 
1908 1st Co-operative Societies Act 
passed 
This enabled other colonies to register co-operatives under the 
Co-operative Societies Act (Transvaal) 
1922 The Co-operative Societies Act 
of 1908 became law, amended in 
1922 and 1925  
This enabled full controlling of co-operatives across South 
Africa, then became Co-operative Societies Amendment Act of 
1925 
1939 Catholic church in Natal 
advocate for farmers credit co-
operatives 
The Catholic church, encouraged the establishment of credit co-
operative for black farmers as an approach of encouraging 
economic activities and financial discipline 
1981 Co-operatives Act of 1981 The law legally acknowledged CFIs as an enterprise type to be 
registered as trading co-operatives but denied deposit 
acceptance. It also opened up for blacked-owned agricltural co-
operatives registration. 
1981 Cape Credit Union League 
(CCUL) established 
The establishment of CCUL by the Catholic Church as a 
representative body of credit unions, which later converted to the 
Savings and Credit Co-operative League (SACCOL) 
1993 CCUL transformed to SACCOL  SACCOL was to specifically focus on the registration, education 
and capacity building, training and setting up of systems for 
SACCOs 
1994 1st exemption from the Banks 
Act 
The SARB sought to formalize informal financial sector, based 
on the “common bond” principle  
1994 1st FSC established The first village Financial Services Co-operative (FSC) was 
established in the North West province 
1998 2nd exemption notice from the 
Banks Act 
Providing for the establishment and regulation of FSCs, through 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
1999 3rd exemption notice from the 
Banks Act 
Financial Solutions (FinaSol) mandated to regulate FSCs which 
were part of its franchise system 
2002 FSA and FinaSol operations 
seized 
FSA and FinaSol had to seize their operations after grants from 
government and private donors and government to undertake 
their financial regulation and support functions were suspended 
2004 1st Co-operative Development 
Policy  
The policy laid the foundation for the development of co-
operative legislation, strategy and support instruments for the 
development of co-operatives in all sectors of the economy 
2004 Co-operative Development 
Strategy (2004-2014)  
To increase competitiveness of co-operatives and their 
contribution to national economy by enhancing their ability to 
participate in all markets by reducing market failures faced by 
co-operative enterprises  
2005 Co-operative Act of 2005 To provide for registration, formation and regulation of co-
operatives 
2007 Exemption Notice No. 887 of 
2008 
The regulatory responsibilities for FSCs on an interim basis was 
mandated The South African Microfinance Apex Fund 
(SAMAF)  
2007 Co-operative banks Act of 2007 Paved way for Co-operative banks Development Agency 
(CBDA) formation and the appointment of Supervisors for Co-
operative banks to register, regulate and supervise co-operative 
banks  
2009 Establishment of the CBDA In 2012 the CBDA start the registration, regulation, supervision 
and capacity building to the CFI sector. 
2010 Co-operative Incentive Scheme 
(CIS) launched 
The objective of the 100% grant with a limit of R350,000 is to 
improve the viability and competitiveness of co-operative 
enterprises by reducing their operational costs 
2012 Integrated Strategy on the 
Development and Promotion of 
Co-operatives (2012-2022) 
To ensure that co-operatives are given recognition and allowed 
to flourish in all sectors of the economy through financial and 
non-financial support 
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2012 First Co-operative banks 
registered 
Ditsobotla and Orania (OSK) were registered with SARB as 
Co-operative Banks 
2013 Co-operative Amendment Act of 
2013 
Introducing the national apex body, a Co-operative Development 
Agency to provide financial support, a Co-operative Tribunal for 
conflict resolution and Co-operatives Advisory Council for 
policy research. 
2013 The formation of NACFISA An advocacy apex body for CFIs after closure of SACCOL and 
merge of SAMAF and SEFA in 2012 
Source: Author’s compilation of notable events
In 1939, a Catholic church in Natal, South Africa, advocated the formation of credit co-
operatives for African farmers as a means of promoting economic participation and financial 
discipline. This early determination had minimum achievement owing to the presence of brutal 
political forces in African politics as well as almost non-existence backing from local 
government institutions at the time (Kuhlengisa, 2011). Although the apartheid regime 
proactively tried to deny the growth of co-operatives among the African population, there were 
strong informal financial co-operatives emerging built around strong social capital in the form 
of rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) popularly known as stokvels (DTI, 2012). 
Despite the stokvels’ limited success, majority of them remained weak and underdeveloped 
owing to the regime’s resistance, with most of them finally collapsing. It was only through the 
Co-operatives Act of 1981 that financial co-operatives were legally recognized as a form of 
enterprise that could be registered as trading co-operatives. However, the Act did not allow for 
the acceptance of members’ deposits as expected for financial co-operatives. 
From the preceding, it can be settled that the pre-1994 co-operative movement emerged along 
two different paths. The first led to the creation of strong white-owned co-operatives operating 
in the first-class economy. The second route was characterized by the stifling of African-owned 
co-operatives, resulting in black-owned co-operatives operating largely in the informal 
economy. In addition, white-owned co-operatives in pre-democratic South Africa were 
extremely connected to the state, and their successes were largely dependent on extended state 
funding (Okem, 2016). Against this background, the co-operative sector was not being 
managed in line with the universally accepted co-operative movement principles and values. 
What with the absence of state support, and the monopoly of marketing boards, many 
agricultural co-operatives demutualized in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Van Wyk, 2014). 
3.3.2 The historical developments of financial co-operatives (1981-1994) 
In the early 1980s, civil society began to recognize and accept co-operatives as a mechanism 
for reducing economic and social deprivation among the economically active poor. For 
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example, trade unions started creating savings and credit co-operatives (SACCOs) as an 
instrument to address retrenched and redundant workers’ economic needs. The National Union 
of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA) created the Sarmcol Workers Co-operative 
(SAWCO), which later collapsed owing to insufficient skills in co-operative governance and 
management. Emulating NUMSA, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) also tried to 
start co-operatives in the late 1980s to alleviate the redundancy of mineworkers, but 
unfortunately this ended in failure. Community organizations and churches also provided 
funding independently for worker co-operatives in response to unemployment and 
retrenchments during the same period (DTI, 2009; DTI, 2012). 
In the 1980s financial co-operatives faced many challenges, including lack of members willing 
to take up leadership positions, and high demand for loans, but limited savings and share 
capital. In the 1980s, the Catholic Church established the Cape Credit Union League (CCUL), 
which in 1993 turned into the Savings and Credit Co-operative League (SACCOL). SACCOL 
was formally registered in 1998 as a second-tier co-operative representing SACCOs 
(Schoeman et al., 2003; DTI, 2012). It was credit union membership-owned and controlled, 
with members exercising proportionate voting rights according to their membership size, 
making it a self-regulating body. SACCOL was offering registration, education and training, 
assistance with management training and setting up of systems services to its member 
institutions.  
SACCOL’s major source of funding was the Canadian Co-operative Association in the period 
1981 to 1994. The funding had the primary social mission of providing low-cost financial 
service to members (credit at 1% per month) through a variety of products. Donor policies and 
objectives were given priority over sustainability, and while control was limited over SACCOs, 
which negatively affected their viability. Schoeman et al. (2003) summarized that this type of 
assistance resulted in overdependence on donor funding killing the self-help ethos of a co-
operative, which entails active membership contributions (savings) and borrowing. A viability 
assessment done by the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) in 1991 revealed that only 
three of the prevailing 47 SACCOs were viable (Genesis Analytics, 2014). This led the 
movement to adopt a more business-oriented approach focused on nurturing strong and sound 
SACCOs with the long-term economic interests of members in mind, rather than short-term 
social missions gains. 
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3.3.3 Post-apartheid regimes (1994-2004) 
In the era 1994 to 2001, SACCOL was given a USAID grant of US$1,3 million. and 
implemented a new strategy focused on achieving self-sufficiency, with the emphasis on 
establishing workplace- or employer-based SACCOs, and the consolidation and merger of non-
viable co-operatives. This resulted in the employee-based entities emerging as some of the 
more successful SACCOs in the country today. The movement achieved a 2% self-sufficiency 
at the end of the period. Without further external funding a new strategy was adopted which 
demanded that the growth of the movement start from the bottom up. In pusuit of that startegy, 
most SACCOLs’ staff were deployed in SACCO structures, leaving SACCOL with just six 
staff members. In February 2002, SACCOL attained an 80% self-sufficiency ratio with four 
staff members. Increased membership fees and consolidation of smaller SACCOs into fewer 
larger institutions grew their income base. As a result of consolidations the movement’s 
capacity for further growth was being affected, as no new entities were being formed. The 
organization is one of the co-operative-related entities that succeeded in surviving for some 
time before closing in 2011, even after donor funding dried up (Schoeman et al., 2003). 
The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has long recognized the need for and benefits of an 
informal tier to the banking system. In its recognition of the importance of the informal 
financial sector, the first exemption to the Banks Act (No. 94 of 1990) was made just before 
the post-apartheid era began in 1994 to permit common bond entities to mobilize deposits under 
certain conditions for on-lending to their members. The conditions included being a member 
of a recognized self-regulatory apex body, such as the SACCOL for SACCOs, or the National 
Stokvel Association of South Africa (NASASA) for stokvels (Schoeman et al., 2003). The first 
exemption to the Banks Act also paved way for the formation of Village Banks, commonly 
known as Financial Services Co-operatives (FSCs).  
The FSCs idea was presented as a project for South Africa financed by the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the African Rural and Agricultural Credit 
Association (AFRACA) in 1994 in the North-West province (Schoeman et al., 2003; Genesis 
Analytics, 2014; Mashigo and Kabir, 2016). The first two phases of the project saw the 
establishment of three Village banks from 1994 to 1996, with many organizations showing 
interest in the project, resulting in the formation of a consultative group with representatives 
from FNB, ABSA and Development Bank of South Africa, among others. The FSCs project 
came in response to the failure of the private banking sector to offer affordable inclusive 
financial services in rural communities (Genesis Analytics, 2014). The failure was equally a 
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function of high transaction costs and high information asymmetry. The idea of a Village Bank 
was perceived to create semi-formal financial institutions that would reduce transaction costs 
of financial intermediation, increase the circulation of money in the communities, lower 
informational costs, provide loans and thus reinvest funds in the communities they were 
mobilized (Schoeman et al., 2003). Also see Jayashankar et al. (2015) for a similar concept on 
slow money. These financial innovations thrive on strong social capital embodied in stokvels, 
labour and community groups, burial societies and a myriad other collective action 
establishments in rural communities. The Village Bank was envisaged as a mechanism with 
which communities would be able to access an inclusive range of financial services, and could 
interrelate with the broader financial sector at reduced transaction costs. The FSCs concept was 
not only innovative for the rural people involved, but also for the commercial banks and 
government institutions collaborating in the scheme. 
During the pilot project the need for a dedicated support structure became important to ensure 
sustainability after IFAD and AFRACA ended their involvement with the project. This resulted 
in the Financial Services Authority (FSA) being formed by the existing FSCs through the 
second exemption from the Banks Act in 1998. This led to the formal recognition of FSA as a 
self-regulating body for its member FSCs by the Registrar of Banks. As an apex body for 
Village banks, the core duties of the FSA were to encourage and support them through training 
and direct financial provison for the development of new Village banks; to design new financial 
services; and to advocate for members’ interests at different forums. According to Schoeman 
et al. (2003) and Genesis Analytics (2014), in 1999 the national Department of Welfare 
approved a R7 million FSC project grant for the formation of 70 FSCs in seven provinces. This 
funding made it possible to formalize the activities of the FSA. Over the funding period of 30 
months, 29 FSCs were established in communities. Further funding applications were made to 
the Department of Social Development for an extension of the project. However, the 
Department commissioned a project review which exposed lack of proper management and 
poorly trained staff without experience in microfinance, among other things. Resultantly, the 
funding application was declined, and the FSA closed operations in 2002, leaving behind 32 
registered FSCs (Genesis Analytics, 2014). 
Another non-profit organization called Financial Solutions (FINASOL) had been registered in 
January 1999 with its model based on a franchising system which provided start-up assistance 
to Village banks. FINASOL under a third exemption notice from the Banks Act, was appointed 
to regulate FSCs when the FSA was facing difficult operational challenges. USAID, DFID, 
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DGRV, the Swedish Co-operative Centre and FNB made FINASOL’s operations easier 
through financial support. However, management shortcomings resulted in poor performance, 
FNB pulling out of the consortium, and DFID’s £1 million funding (through the Financial 
Deepening Challenge Fund) not being used, ending with FINASOL closing down in late 2002, 
leaving behind 30 registered FSCs. Village banks that were using the FINASOL centrally 
managed banking platform had to revert to manual ways of managing their financial records, 
resulting in burdensome administrative challenges (Schoeman et al., 2003; Genesis Analytics, 
2014).  
In 2003, the Ministry of Finance started a process of closing down non-viable FSCs by making 
R5.3 million available to refund the savings of FSC members that had run into liquidity 
challenges and had lost members’ savings. Only 13 out of 62 registered FSCs officially agreed 
to close operations, while the rest continued operating. The reminder were then regulated by 
the South African Microfinance Apex Fund (SAMAF) under an Exemption Notice No. 887 of 
2008 (Genesis Analytics, 2014).  
SAMAF was initially established to improve access to financial services and support capital 
mobilization on a wholesale basis for onlending to co-operatives and other intermediaries as 
delivery mechanisms for its services to economically active poor. It also invests in 
intermediaries’ technical assistence to improve their efficiency. SAMAF was later merged into 
the Small Enterprise Finance Agency (SEFA), which later redefined its role as a wholesale 
funding institution for co-operatives and other enterprises.  
3.3.4 The co-operative reform period (2004 to date) 
Given that the CFI sector had remained fragile with fragmented regulations, the government 
had to come up with its first explicit Co-operative Policy in 2004. The Co-operative Policy 
followed the realization that the sector need to operate according to the universally accepted 
principles and values of the co-operative movement. The policy also forms the basis for Co-
operative Strategy (2004-2014), the new Co-operative Act of 2005 and the Department of 
Trade and Industry’s (DTI) Corporate and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) as 
frameworks for implementation of the policy. The Registrar of Co-operatives’ office in DTI 
was mandated with the responsibility for the legislative framework, policy and strategy, 
coordination and administration of the co-operative sector.  
In order to accelarate the formation of co-operatives the DTI launched in 2010 the Co-operative 
Incentive Scheme (CIS), which is a 100% grant for registered primary co-operatives. The 
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objective was to improve the viability and competitiveness of co-operative enterprises by 
reducing their operating costs, with a maximum limit of R350,000. According to the DTI 
(2014), in the 2012/2013 financial year, a total of 1,527 co-operatives were supported under 
the CIS to the tune of R152.7 million. Towards the end of the Co-operative Strategy (2004-
2014) lifespan, the government came up with a more comprehensive strategy titled “Integrated 
Strategy on the Development and Promotion of Co-operatives (2012-2022)”. The four pillars 
for support of co-operatives are (a) increasing the supply of non-financial support services to 
co-operatives; (b) creating demand for co-operative enterprises products and services; (c) 
improving the sustainability of co-operatives; and (d) increasing the supply of financial support 
services to co-operatives (DTI, 2012).  
The new Co-operatives Act (No. 14 of 2005) came into force providing for “the formation and 
registration of co-operatives; the establishment of a Co-operatives Advisory Board; the 
winding up of co-operatives; the repeal of Act 91 of 1981; and matters connected therewith” 
(Republic of South Africa, 2005:2). Furthermore, the Co-operatives Act spelt out the duties 
and responsibilities of government towards the co-operative movement. The duties include the 
registration of co-operatives; the dissemination of information about co-operatives; and the 
provision of support to co-operatives through its departments, ministries and agencies. 
Moreover, the Co-operative Act aimed to promote the formation of sustainable black-owned 
co-operatives, particularly among rural and underdeveloped communities. An immediate 
positive effect of the formal legislative framework was an upsurge of newly established black-
owned co-operatives, as shown in Figure 3.1 below. The number of co-operatives registered 
between 1922 and 1994 were about 4,000 on average (DTI, 2012). From 2004 onwards, after 
the Co-operatives Act of 2005 was in place, the country witnessed an increase in the number 
of newly registered co-operatives. In 2014, the CIPC highlighted that it was receiving huge 
number of new registration applications.  
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Figure 3.1: Trend in numbers of co-operatives in South Africa 
Source: Author’s compilation using secondary data from the DTI and CIPC 
The CIPC attributed this increase to “government departments promoting the registration of 
co-operatives as a vehicle for poverty alleviation, and assisting rural communities to grow 
economically” (CIPC, 2014:105). By the 2015/2016 financial year, it was estimated that nearly 
132,000 co-operatives were registered in South Africa based on the CIPC’s statistics on new 
registrations over the years (CIPC, 2006-2016). Although the country has witnessed a rapid 
increase in the number of co-operatives, this growth has not correlated with the strengthening 
of the co-operative sector. The focus of government tends to be on the number of registered 
co-operatives rather than the extent to which existing co-operatives sustain themselves without 
government intervention. 
Braverman et al. (1991) argued that measuring success of the co-operatives sector by noting 
the number of co-operatives does not add any meaningful information, given that the number 
of co-operatives is not an indicator of the strength of the co-operative sector. In fact, some co-
operatives could exist merely on paper, but provide no specific goods or services. Similarly, 
such co-operatives might be established merely in order to access government resources, which 
is the case in South Africa. According to the DTI (2009:39) baseline study,  
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   only 2,644 of the 22,030 could be confirmed to be operational, representing a mere 
12% survival rate, indicating a mortality rate of 88%. This might reveal that most 
co-operatives in South Africa have not been formed on a genuine basis. They tend 
to be established for the purpose of accessing free money, instead of genuinely 
building a co-operatives movement that addresses some economic and social ills. 
Testimony to this are ongoing conflicts among co-operative members over issues 
of money and the usage and ownership of assets, coupled with poor management 
and co-operation.  
However, an effective board is crucial to improve performance of co-operatives by monitoring 
senior management and providing guidance for strategy (Allemand et al., 2013). 
3.3.5 Regulatory reforms in the Co-operative Finance sector 
Before the promulgation of the Co-operative banks Act of 2007, all financial co-operatives 
operated under the regulatory guideline of the Co-operatives Act of 2005. The Co-operative 
banks Act is intended to improve access to financial services by providing a legislative 
framework allowing co-operative banks to develop and provide financial services to their 
members. The Act enabled the establishment of the Co-operative banks Development Agency 
(CBDA) in 2009, which took over the CFIs, once supervised by SACCOL and SAMAF, that 
comply with registration requirements of R100,000 in share capital and 200 members in April 
2012. The CBDA is responsible for regulating and supervising primary financial co-operatives 
that hold deposits of between R1 million and R20 million, and have a membership of at least 
200 members. The same Act mandates the SARB to regulate and supervise all primary co-
operative banks holding deposits of over R20 million (Republic of South Africa, 2007).  
This model encourages the development of financial co-operatives into co-operative banks, and 
collectively they are referred to as co-operative financial institutions (CFIs). It is important to 
note that the CBDA and SARB are under the Ministry of Finance (Treasury), and from 2010 
to 2014 they used to come up with combined annual reports of supervisors even though the 
first two co-operative banks were registered in 2011. The CBDA is also mandated to provide 
CFIs with capacity building, training and technical assistance programmes (Republic of South 
Africa, 2007). The CBDA is putting more emphasis on ensuring that CFIs achieve financial 
sustainability through enforcing some prudential limits such as (i) external credit limit may not 
exceed 15% of total assets, and (ii) there should be no more than 5% investment in non-earning 
and fixed assets to total assets. The business of a CFI is deposit-taking and issuing loans, 
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therefore it need to maintain enough liquidity to meet withdrawals (CBDA, 2016a). In this 
regard, Périlleux (2013) recommended the need for adequate supervision and good governance, 
as maturity mismatch can be fatal for CFIs, and can generate dramatic social consequences, 
such as the destruction of poor people’s savings.  
3.3.6 National Association of CFIs in South Africa (NACFISA) 
Since the closure of SACCOL in 2011 and the merge of SAMAF and SEFA in 2012, the sector 
was left without an apex and advocacy body. Given the different development history of 
SACCOs and FSCs, the two had been in separate camps. The National Association of Co-
operative Financial Institutions in South Africa (NACFISA) was formed in 2013 as an umbrella 
body for SACCOs, FSCs and co-operative banks to represent and provide second-tier support 
to CFIs. Currently NACFISA is financially weak and is being housed and supported by the 
German Co-operative Confederation (DGRV), an organization representing the German co-
operative banking sector (NACFISA, 2013). The expected role of NACFISA is to work with 
the CBDA to provide capacity building, training and technical assistance programmes to CFIs, 
with the long-term view of taking over this role completely, leaving the CBDA as a purely 
regulatory and supervisory body. Many stakeholders are of the view that its formation and 
rolling out of operations has been slow owingdue to loss of key staff and limited resources 
(Genesis Analytics, 2014). NACFISA has membership to the African Confederation of Co-
operative Savings and Credit Associations (ACCOSCA) and the WOCCU.  
3.4 CFIs GROWTH PATTERNS AND TRENDS (2004 TO DATE) 
Given the different development history of CFIs in South Africa, where SACCOL was focusing 
on the formation of employment- or association-based SACCOs in towns, while FSCs started 
in rural areas with the assistance of IFAD and AFRACA, their distrubtion across the country 
represents that historical development. From Figure 3.2 below it can be noticed that most 
SACCOs are concentrated in major town provinces, that is, Gauteng and the Western Cape, 
whilst FSCs are mostly in rural and peri-urban provinces, that is, Limpopo, Kwazulu-Natal and 
North-West, where the IFAD and AFRACA project focused. However, it is suprising that there 
are few CFIs in Mpumalanga despite the province being another focus for the IFAD and 
AFRACA village banks project. 
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of CFIs in South Africa 
3.4.1 The state of South African CFIs compared to African peers  
Despite government efforts in policy formulation, regulatory reforms, capacity building and 
financial support, there seems to be nothing much to show for it. The country has the lowest 
financial co-operative penetration rate compared to other African countries, as well as a low 
number of CFIs and assets. This is despite the importance placed on CFIs to address financial 
market failures in South Africa through increasing alternative inclusive financial mechanisms. 
As shown in Table 3.2 below, South African CFIs are still an insignificant industry with a 
lowest penetration rate at 0.06% compared to Africa’s average of 8%, Kenya (13.3%) Togo 
(26.7%), Senegal (15%) and Mauritius (5.2%). South Africa also lags behind mature countries: 
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Australia (17.6%), Canada (46.7%), United States (52.6%) and Ireland (74.5%) (WOCCU, 
2016).  
Before the global financial crisis in 2007, credit unions had 177.4 million members and total 
assets of US$1.2 trillion. By the end of 2015 these figures jumped to 235.8 million members 
and US$1.76 trillion in total assets. The resilience of CFIs to the global financial crisis had 
attracted the interest of many people to be members (WOCCU, 2016). 
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Table 3.2: The state of CFIs in Africa (2016) 
Country No. of CFIs Members Savings (USD)  Loans (USD)  Reserves (USD)  Assets (USD)  Penetration 
Benin 36 1,830,428 145,189 186,805 19,611,893 153,253,629 0.17% 
Burkina Faso 67 1,632,773 286,709 222,764 74,479,551 427,328,715 0.09% 
Cameroon 220 457,539 236,239,892 197,857,175 21,769,196 306,655,892 2.00% 
Ethiopia 5,5 1,112,195 38,283,824 23,927,287 NA NA 1.11% 
Gambia 71 69,296 19,828,542 15,240,417 NA NA 3.50% 
Ghana 476 571,479 155,051,340 89,168,440 20,292,378 185,452,491 2.07% 
Guinea-Bissau 6 9,905 311,511 126,604 39,98 386,474 0.56% 
Ivory Coast 64 1,171,212 325,811 303,015 NA NA 5.07% 
Kenya 6468 6,272,077 4,200,055,451 5,177,292,286 548,520,106 6,324,267,668 13.28% 
Lesotho 90 76,000 NA NA NA 7,300,000 3.49% 
Liberia 45 3,459 726,295 571,596 NA NA 0.08% 
Malawi 32 80,807 10,550,877 9,259,759 2,246,736 14,414,511 0.46% 
Mali 70 1,042,995 74,716,100 76,043,772 20,444,812 116,520,267 5.97% 
Mauritius 138 66,000 NA NA NA 35,000,000 5.24% 
Niger 44 262,465 15,980,370 20,827,954 13,378,333 26,361,863 1.32% 
Rwanda 416 1,607,560 101,831,680 46,295,264 27,803,247 137,199,202 13.82% 
Senegal 214 2,247,473 315,954,216 334,423,346 136,443,672 523,410,834 15.01% 
Seychelles 1 14,889 19,980,575 5,023,271 1,351,965 22,918,963 15.84% 
South Africa 26 33,400 NA NA NA 23,000,000 0.06% 
Swaziland 73 40,582 NA NA NA 100,400,000 3.08% 
Tanzania 5,559 1,153,248 283,000,000 545,000,000 NA 599,500,000 2.14% 
Togo 82 1,979,208 206,458,781 164,842,853 NA NA 26.68% 
Uganda 1,94 1,325,517 163,178,721 168,903,123 NA 136,570,652 3.30% 
Zambia 11 20,767 4,761,899 15,695,323 NA 18,969,316 0.13% 
Zimbabwe 75 167,500 12,711 4,559 4,090 19,342 1.06% 
TOTAL for Africa    21,724 23,248,774 5,847,680,494 6,901,215,612 886,385,958 9,158,929,819 8% 
Source: WOCCU (2016) Statistical Report 
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3.4.2 The growth trend post-CBDA regulation  
Over the recent years, there has been a decrease in South African CFIs and membership from 
121 and 59,394 in 2011 to 30 and 29,818 in 2017 respectively (CBDA, 2015 and 2017), as 
shown in Table 3.3 below. The decrease can be partly explained by the setting of the minimum 
number of members and share capital contribution at 200 and R100,000 respectively by the 
CBDA. The implementation of the regulation could have been harsh to small but growing CFIs, 
forcing some out of the regulatory environment or pushing out the rent-seeking ones formed to 
benefit from government financial support. This puts to question whether the South Africa 
sector has reached the crossroads despite the global financial co-operative movement coming 
out of the global financial crisis stronger and unscratched; or does it still have a future?  
Table 3.3: The trend in the numbers of CFIs from 2010 to 2017 (amounts in Rands)  
 No. 
CFIs 
Members Savings 
(ZAR) 
Loans 
(ZAR) 
Assets 
(ZAR) 
2010 56 36,434 124,365,000 93,651,000 142,069,000 
2011 121 59,394 175,265,000 116,577,000 195,213,000 
2012 106 53,240 196,230,000 132,227,000 217,506,000 
2013 35 38,084 200,841,000 142,310,000 220,800,000 
2014 26 33,391 198,624,948 140,463,755 231,367,670 
2015 26   24,721 201,101,522 152,143,102 236,533,481 
2016 30 29,752 233,763,289 179,338,526 279,624,000 
2017 30 29,818 228,216,993 202,160,606 293,493,697 
% 2010-2017 -46.4 -18.2 83.5 53.7 51.6 
% 2011-2017 -75.2 -49.8 30.2 42.3 50.3 
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on CBDA and SARB Annual Reports 
However, it seems the remaining CFIs, though with fewer members, are gaining the confidence 
of their members, given an increase in savings, loans and total assets over the years. 
3.4.3 The composition of CFI categories to overall sector 
The CFI sector in South Africa as discussed is currently small, though it could play a more 
significant role given a huge potential market to improve the quality of financial inclusion. 
Currently there are only two registered co-operative banks (Ditsobotla and Orania), nine 
SACCOs and 15 FSCs. Co-operative banks are community based, whilst SACCOs are more 
concentrated in towns and cities (mainly in Gauteng and the Western Cape), given their 
historical focus on employees and associations. FSCs are more present in rural communities 
and townships. 
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According to Table 3.4 below, in terms of size, on average Co-operative Banks (CBs) are the 
largest, with average total assets of R56.8 million compared to SACCOs (R13.7 million) and 
FSCs (R2.5 million). CBs also lead in terms of savings, loans and investments, which is not 
surprising as they are required to have a minimum deposit of R20 million compared to R1 
million for SACCOs and FSCs. However, with regard to membership mobilization and 
member share capital contribution, SACCOs are doing well compared to CBs and FSCs. 
SACCOs are proving to be aggressive in lending as 74% of their total assets are loans compared 
to CBs (71%) and FSCs (38%).  
Table 3.4: The contribution of CFIs categories to the sector in 2017 (amounts in Rands)  
 
Co-operative 
banks 
SACCOs FSCs Totals 
 No. of CFIs  2 11 16 29 
 Members  2,392 18,308 12,387 33,087 
 Member Share Capital  777,577 21,414,190 6,371,068 28,562,835 
 Savings Deposits  103,973,004 112,933,809 28,719,760 245,626,573 
 Loans  80,780,917 111,866,694 15,424,678 208,072,289 
 Investments  29,279,936 28,052,149 21,514,808 78,846,893 
 Total Assets  113,674,620 150,290,221 40,603,985 304,568,826 
 Average Members  1,196 1,664 774 1,141 
 Average Member Share Capital  388,789 1,946,745 398,192 984,925 
 Average Savings Deposits  51,986,502 10,266,710 1,794,985 8,469,882 
 Average Loans  40,390,459 10,169,699 964,042 7,174,907 
 Loans to Total Assets  0.71 0.74 0.38 0.68 
 Investments to Total Assets  0.26 0.19 0.53 0.26 
Source: Author compilation using CBDA and SARB Annual Reports  
FSCs are not lending much to their members as they are investing most of their mobilized 
savings, as 53% of their total assets are in fixed investments, especially with banks and the 
RSA Financial Co-operative Retail Bonds. The CBDA, in its 2015/2016 annual report, reported 
that the amount invested by CFIs had reached the R6 million mark, with over R217,000 earned 
in interest. This translates to an average annual return of just 3.62%. This looks like a bad 
strategy as CFIs need to lend back to their members so that they can engage in more productive 
economic activities that will help them break the circle of poverty caused by lack of access to 
finance and low productivity. Unsurprisingly, FSCs have low membership, averaging just 800 
because members might not see the real economic benefits of making savings while access to 
credit facilities is being restricted. Jayashankar et al. (2015) and Du (2017) recommend that 
rural savings mobilized by financial institutions must be invested back in rural areas to promote 
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local entrepreneurship and community projects that foster development. CFIs need to achieve 
sustainability in their operations. 
3.5 IMPLICATIONS OF PAST AND CURRENT TRENDS ON SUSTAINABILITY 
The South African CFIs are being confronted by challenges which have destabilized their 
success despite the intensive sector support especially after the Apartheid government. For 
South Africa CFIs to become truly sustainable, they must radically apply the principles and 
values of the cooperative movement. This requires elimination of dependence on the state and 
ensuring that cooperatives address socio-economic issues which they are formed to resolve. In 
addition, there is a need to promote the organic growth of cooperatives as opposed to 
government facilitating a false growth through unsustainable financial and non-financial 
incentives. If properly harnessed cooperatives can be an instrument for addressing social ills 
such as crime, racism and xenophobia that have become associated with South Africa. Rwanda 
has demonstrated the important role of cooperatives in societal integration through 
reconciliation and building of social capital after the 1994 genocide (Okem, 2016). Rwanda 
has now a CFI penetration rate of nearly 23%, third only to Togo and Senegal (WOCCU, 2015).  
From a macro-economic perspective, CFIs are able to help create middle-classes in societies 
as they provide an entry to the formal financial system. In a study of the emerging middle-class 
in Africa, Resnick (2015) and Mattes (2015) found that the existence of a broad middle-class 
greatly contributes to political and economic stability which is so fundamental for sustainable 
economic development and social transformation. CFIs are able to improve the ‘financial 
literacy’ of the biggest number of the population, especially in South Africa, where financial 
literacy is low. CFIs institutionalize the relationship between the saving members and the 
borrowing members. The results are committed savers who understand what their CFI is using 
their money for (improve livelihoods, promote fair trade, and respect of the environment), and 
borrowers who feel having a societal debt. To enable CFIs to attain sustainability there is need 
to continuously improve their efficiencies by reducing unnecessary waste through improved 
managerial capabilities, technology, effective marketing, risk management, market-based rates 
and being member-centric. The term ‘sustainability’ has broad dimensions, including impact 
sustainability, environmental sustainability, mission sustainability, market sustainability, 
institutional sustainability, programme sustainability, and financial sustainability (see Marwa 
and Aziakpono, 2015). 
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3.5.1 How CFIs can attain sustainability in the provision of inclusive finance 
CFIs have become a global reality that can no longer be ignored. Universally they are showing 
how to run banking in a less speculative, more reality-oriented manner in order to reduce the 
financial exclusion gap and avoid future crises. Although CFIs in number and size are still 
relatively small factors within the international financial business, their importance is growing, 
especially in Africa and Asia, where financial inclusion rates are still very low. For example, 
in Kenya, CFIs are playing a significant role serving more than five million adults, and 
managing assets in excess of US$5 billion, mostly loans (WOCCU, 2015). South Africa could 
learn from the Kenyan experience particularly given the reality of little growth and 
development through the current state-led approach to the cooperatives development. In Kenya, 
it was only after the state reduced its active role in the running of cooperatives that saw them 
flourishing in mobilizing people socially and economically through the adoption of cooperative 
principles and values (Okem, 2016). There also is need for South African cooperatives to 
appeal to the middle-class society to attract valuable financial capital which is a key challenge 
in the South African cooperative sector. 
3.5.2 How sustainable financing promotes socio-economic development 
CFIs have been proven in so many ways as a source of ethical finance which balances the triple 
bottom line (people, planet and profit) through applying the principles of social responsibility, 
transparency, and sustainability. According to Benedikter (2011), during the global financial 
crisis of 2007-2010, not only did they not lose any money, but they made the highest gains in 
their history, increasing their assets with growth rates of about 20-25% per year during 2006-
2008 alone. In 2009, at the peak of the crisis, their average growth rate was about 30%. The 
answer is easy: during the crisis, many customers gained insight into the “mainstream” banking 
and moved their investments to CFIs. However, without any doubt, CFIs must undertake 
constant, periodically renewed reforms to remain competitive in the fast-changing financial 
sector environment as they cannot take their outstanding success, particularly during the crisis 
years, for granted. Cooperatives are an effective instrument to attain nearly all the United 
Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals by empowering communities through improved 
access to financial services. However, understanding the financial inclusion gaps and structure 
of the banking sector will help identify sustainable growth opportunities for CFIs. 
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3.6 OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN SOUTH AFRICA  
Of the 39 million adult population in South Africa, 77% have bank accounts, but usage is low. 
If the social grant beneficiaries are excluded, only 58% are banked. Most of the social grant 
beneficiaries just have access to a transactional bank account to receive monthly government 
payouts, but they lack access to the much-needed credit facilities from banks (i.e. quality of 
financial inclusion). According to FinMark Trust (2015), 27% of people withdraw their money 
immediately from their accounts given no real return on savings owing to high bank fees. This 
makes South Africa’s savings rate one of the lowest in the world at 16.3% compared to its 
peers in middle-income and emerging economies at above 20% (SARB, 2017a). On the other 
hand, banks are not a major source of credit for many South Africans as just 14% are borrowing 
from banks, 46% from non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs), and 51% from various 
sources (FinMark Trust, 2015). High credit rationing may be due to the structure of the banking 
sector.  
3.6.1 The structure implications of the banking sector on financial inclusion 
Over the years the number of registered banks has been decreasing, from 30 in 2002 to 17 in 
2016, a situation which increases the dominance of some banks in the market, as shown in 
Table 3.5 below. Minsky (1993) found that with bank concentration big banks become 
concerned with big deals, making some households and small businesses credit rationed. This 
is in line with the structure-conduct-performance theory of market structure and bank behavior. 
South Africa’s banking sector is dominated by five big banks9, which collectively held 90.7% 
of the total banking-sector assets as at 31 December 2016 (31 December 2015: 89.2%). The 
local branches of foreign banks accounted for 5.8% of the total banking-sector assets at the end 
of December 2016 (December 2015: 7.3%), while the remaining banks operating in South 
Africa represented 3.5% at the end of both December 2015 and December 2016 (SARB, 2016). 
This level of domination is much higher than China’s five large commercial banks at 44%, 
which Wahed (2017) thinks is high.  
This oligopoly structure has resulted in lack of competition in the banking system owing to 
barriers to entry which have a negative impact in the reduction of the related banking 
transaction costs. As a result, nearly 8.5 million are excluded from the formal banking system, 
according to FinMark Trust (2015). The coming into the market of foreign banks and branches 
                                                          
9 Standard Bank, FirstRand Bank, ABSA Bank, Nedbank and Investec Bank. 
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of international banks failed to dilute the dominance of the big banks as new entrants decided 
to focus on the niche markets not dominated by the corporate banking divisions of the big five. 
This credit market failure presents an opportunity for CFIs and ROSCAs (stokvels) to play a 
crucial role in the provision of social banking services in local communities.  
Table 3.5: The trend of number of players in the banking sector in South Africa 
 
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 
Commercial banks 30 20 19 19 17 17 17 17 
Branches of foreign banks 14 15 14 14 13 14 15 15 
Mutual banks 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Co-operative banks 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 
Representative offices 52 43 43 43 41 41 40 36 
TOTAL 98 80 78 78 73 77 77 73 
Source: Author compilation from SARB Annual Reports 
3.6.2 The significance of the informal financial market in South Africa 
According to the DTI (2012), there are at least 800,000 active stokvels with nearly 10 million 
members. Stokvels occupy a vital position in the South African economy regardless of 
functioning largely in the informal market. The stokvel economy is estimated by various 
sources to be between R25 billion to R49 billion (Schoeman et al., 2003; DTI, 2012; Coetzer, 
2014). The financial aspect of these associations is undoubtedly significant, which presents a 
huge potential market for CFIs. A survey done by Old Mutual (2017), reveals that nearly three-
quarters of working South Africans use informal savings as their savings and investment 
vehicles, with 53% of them using stokvels, while 32% and 16% are using burial societies and 
grocery schemes respectively. 50% of respondents indicated that they had borrowed at least 
once an average of R4,660 in the past year to smooth household consumption and accumulate 
assets. In the same survey, 14% indicated that personal borrowings are from financial 
institutions (22% in 2016), while 13% borrow from families and friends, and 6% from a 
microlender.  
The two surveys (FinMark Trust and Old Mutual) are giving a clear indication that banks are 
not a major source of saving and borrowing for most South Africans, who prefer the informal 
financial arrangements connected to social ties. Even though there are more formal alternative 
sources of saving and borrowing in the country, given its developed financial system, social 
networks are strong ties that binds when it comes to finances. Given that CFIs make use of the 
social capital at the grassroots, they are well positioned to play an important financial 
intermediation role in local communities. The insignificant role currently being played by CFIs, 
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despite over eight million adults being financially excluded, and informal financial services 
(stokvels) dominating, is a strong call to evaluate their efficiency and sustainability. The 
findings will assist in coming up with better informed, evidence-based managerial and policy 
recommendations to improve their performance and outreach to the poor and working class 
with appropriate innovative financial services. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
The co-operative movement in South Africa has come a long way since 1892 with necessary 
enabling and at the same time restrictive regulations to facilitate or hinder performance along 
racial lines. The government’s support and incentives failed to enable the growth of the sector 
even after the apartheid era. Most co-operatives are being formed for the wrong reasons just to 
benefit from government grants. The high mortality at 88% is of grave concern to policymakers 
who expected the sector to be playing a significant role in economic development. The 
government’s top-bottom approach is proving to be a failure as it is destroying the self-help 
echoes of the co-operative movement. Besides, the sector is also being affected by lack of 
critical skills in management at the board of directors’ level to provide strategic direction. 
CFIs seem to be performing below their potential, as they are small and weak. The coming in 
of the CBDA seems to have unsettled the sector, as witnessed by the sudden drop of players 
from 121 in 2010/11 to just 26 in 2014/15. However, the provision of capacity building, 
limitation of external borrowing and investment in fixed assets, and the agency’s emphasis on 
financial sustainability encourage organic growth of the sector through active outreach 
strategies as opposed to the top-down approach. The market for CFIs seems to be ripe as the 
majority of the poor and working class are shunning banks as sources of savings and credit, 
preferring the informal arrangements based on strong social capital. More people are generally 
spending more time in social networks, which increasingly form part of consumer purchase 
processes for new products and services, which positions CFIs to effectively provide social 
banking.  
In addition, education on CFIs’ value proposition is necessary to attract more membership from 
the working class, the rural population, stokvels and other organized groups. However, 
policymakers need to implement policies that encourage sustainable development of the sector 
through active members’ contribution and participation at the grassroots; that is, encourage the 
bottom-up approach. On the other hand, CFI management needs to address the critical skills 
shortage in the sector by taking advantage of the free technical assistance from the CBDA, 
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among other providers. If the above measures are properly implemented, financial co-
operatives can become sustainable enterprises. 
The area of further research would need to empirically investigate how financially sustainable 
CFIs are and what determines their sustainability so that more empirically driven 
recommendations could be made.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY OF CO-OPERATIVE FINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
IN SOUTH AFRICA10 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
In recognition of the importance of co-operatives in promoting global equity and sustainable 
development, the United Nations declared the year 2012 as the “International Year of Co-
operatives.” This remarkable development puts co-operatives back on the global political and 
economic agenda of policymakers, a position which had already been reaffirmed by their 
resilience during the global financial crisis (Battilani and Schröter, 2012; Birchall, 2013 
(Martínez-Campillo et al., 2016; Gogilo and Alexopoulos, 2016). These events seem to be 
sufficient to justify an assessment of their role and sustainability in the world economy. Co-
operative Financial Institutions (CFIs) are one type of such social enterprises that pool 
members’ financial resources for onward lending to the same members based on collective 
governance (Scheidel and Farrell, 2015). This social intermediation enables members to enter 
into a social contract involving reciprocal obligations that foster community development 
(Bennett and Cuevas, 1996). As providers of sustainable finance, CFIs are faced with a 
challenge of how to balance the interaction between their financial, social and environmental 
concerns. 
CFIs are increasingly becoming important players within the financial sector capable of 
addressing social and economic imbalances in local communities experiencing financial 
markets failure (Brown et al., 1999; Battilani and Schröter, 2012; Gogilo and Alexopoulos, 
2016). Being grass-root innovations and member-driven enterprises deeply rooted in local 
communities, CFIs are theorized to be better positioned to reduce information asymmetry and 
high transaction costs which result in market imperfections and credit rationing (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981; Paxton and Cuevas, 1998; Giagnocavo and Gerez, 2012). By creating strong 
social capital among their members, they are able to improve access to financial services for 
low-income households excluded from mainstream banking (Manetti and Bagnoli, 2013; 
Ojong, 2014). As social enterprises they cannot usually be said to have the profit maximization 
                                                          
10 This chapter is under review by the journal Ecological Economics, manuscript titled “Financial Sustainability 
of Co-operative Financial Institutions for Sustainable Development: A South African Perspective”. 
An earlier draft of the chapter was presented at the ERSA Conference on Politics, Finance and Growth, South 
African Reserve Bank, Pretoria, South Africa, 30-31 March 2016 titled “Financial sustainability of co-operatives 
financial institutions in South Africa: An empirical evidence”. 
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goal but the goal of maximizing benefits provided to members. However, to effectively achieve 
a fair balance on the economic, social and ecological well-being aspects, first and foremost 
CFIs must be sustainable, just like micro-angel investors who are concerned with how their 
investment can contribute to the triple-bottom-line (Estapé-Dubreuil et al., 2016).  
Costanza and Patten (1995: 193-194) define the broad term of sustainability as a “system which 
survives or persists”, whilst “economically, it means avoiding major disruptions and collapses, 
hedging against instabilities and discontinuities.” Sala et al. (2015) advise that the goal of 
sustainability assessment is to help pursue plans and activities that make an optimal 
contribution to sustainable development. In the microfinance context, Sa-Dhan (2004) 
highlighted that the term ‘sustainability’ has broad dimensions including financial 
sustainability, institutional sustainability, mission sustainability, programme sustainability, 
human resource sustainability, market sustainability, environmental sustainability, and impact 
sustainability. However, McKillop and Wilson (2003) argued that if CFIs are to effectively 
achieve their social and environmental missions they must achieve their economic missions 
first. The same logical thinking is supported by Hannam and Ashta (2017) who argued that the 
maximization of social impacts is impossible without long‐term financial sustainability through 
reinvesting surpluses into the business and also remaining vigilant about cost‐control. Rhyne 
(1998) rightly suggests that “sustainability is not an end in itself but rather a means to the end 
of improved social welfare.” The concern for financial viability stems from the need to generate 
sufficient resources to support the social mission rather than from a desire to maximize profits 
(Santos et al., 2015; Martínez-Campillo et al., 2016). The current study is an attempt to 
understand financial sustainability of CFIs in South Africa and their quest to contribute to 
sustainable community development. It also attempts to suggest managerial recommendations 
to improve their performance in poverty reduction.  
South Africa is an interesting case to study CFIs. The industry has been on a declining trend 
since 2011 in terms of number of players and membership despite the global movement 
emerging stronger from the global financial crisis. This poses the question, how financially 
sustainable are South African CFIs in their attempt to contribute to local development? 
Understanding financial sustainability of CFIs is crucial for three reasons: firstly, to safeguard 
or enhance their performance for continued provision of financial solutions to the marginalized 
communities. Secondly, as discussed by Marwa and Aziakpono (2015), it acts as a barometer 
to inform interested stakeholders how to guide the industry in the desired direction to attain its 
triple botton-line goals. Lastly, it makes a distinct contribution to the sustainability discourse. 
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We estimate the financial self-sufficiency (FSS) scores and explore factors which explain the 
variations in sustainability scores and suggest measures to improve it. 
This chapter presents the contextual background and role of CFIs in community development 
(Section 4.2), the theoretical and empirical literature on microfinance sustainability (Section 
4.3). Data and methodology (Section 4.4), followed by results and discussion (Section 4.5), 
and concludes with recommendations followed by directions for future research (Section 4.6). 
4.2 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND  
In order to examine the financial sustainability of CFIs, a brief description of the context in 
which they operate is useful. South Africa is an interesting case to study CFIs performance to 
in order to accelerate their contribution to the socio-economic well-being of low-income and 
marginalized communities. Although the country is classified as an emerging economy and a 
member of BRICS (the association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa), the country has the highest income inequality in the world with 
a Gini coefficient of 62.8% in 2017 up from 59.3% in 1993, with 18.6% of its population in 
extreme poverty and an unemployment rate of 27.7% (World Bank, 2018). About 8.5 million 
of its adult population are financially excluded despite having a well-regulated and developed 
financial service sector by international standards (FinMark Trust, 2015). The World Bank 
(2018) estimated its unbanked adult population at 33%, with the majority being thinly served 
with savings facilities only.  
South Africa’s banking sector is highly dominated by the five big banks, which collectively 
hold 90.7% of the total banking sector assets as at 31 December 2016, up from 89.2% in 2015 
(Mushonga et al., 2018). Minsky (1993) posits that in an oligopolistic market, big banks are 
interested with big deals, making households and small businesses in need for small credit 
facilities being credit-rationed due to high information asymmetry and transaction costs. 
Recent empirical findings by Seven and Coskun (2016) suggest that although financial 
development promotes economic growth, neither banks nor stock market development play a 
significant role in poverty reduction in emerging countries. Sarkar and Pansera (2017) 
discovered that, while the grassroot poor micro-entrepreneurs live and work in resource-
constrained environments they strive to create economic value by combining social and 
environmental goals to shape their future. To circumvent these challenges CFIs have been 
encouraged in South Africa as an instrument for socio-economic empowerment (see Genesis 
Analytics, 2014). According to Mushonga et al. (2018) South Africa has a long and rich history 
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of community-based financial institutions designed to assist the poor which dates back to the 
early 1890s. This history includes stokvels, Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ROSCAs), and financial co-operatives which were set up and grant funded by the government, 
development agencies and the wider communities. However, the sustainability of these early 
attempts outside grants was questionable. 
The growth pattern of the CFI sector has not been encouraging as the country has the lowest 
penetration rate in the world of 0.06% (WOCCU, 2016) despite consensus among policy 
makers of their importance to attain the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Despite 
the global CFI movement coming out of the recent global financial crisis stronger with an 
impressive growth in numbers and membership, South Africa is on an opposite trajectory. In a 
comparable period between 2011 and 2016, the global CFI industry grew 20% in membership 
to 235.7 million, 35% in their numbers to 68,882 CFIs, 14% in total assets to US$1.56 trillion 
and a penetration rate up from 7.80% to 13.55% (WOCCU, 2011 and 2016). However, the 
number of CFIs in South Africa and their membership has decreased from 121 and 59,394 in 
2011 to 30 and 29,818 in 2017.  
The negative growth can be partly explained by changes in regulatory requirements and 
because of insolvency. In 2011 the Co-operative Banks Development Agency (CBDA) fixed 
the minimum membership at 200 and share capital contribution at R100,000 pushing small 
CFIs out of the regulatory environment (CBDA, 2014). In other economies CFIs are significant 
players. In 2015 Austria’s two CFIs, Raiffeisenbanks and Volksbanks, together hold more than 
one third of the total banking assets, in Italy the SMEs market share in 2014 was 19.7%, in 
Germany they control 14% of the banking market (Karafolas, 2016), and Desjardins, the largest 
cooperative bank in Canada, serves more than seven million clients (Périlleux and Nyssens, 
2017). 
Previous attempts by the South African government to improve access to financial services 
using the market-driven microcredit approach resulted in unintended consequences. The Usury 
Act exemption of 1992 scrapped the interest ceiling on loans below R6,000 with a repayment 
period of less than 36 months, therefore promoting the mushrooming of microcredit institutions 
(MCIs) which was initially widely seen as one of the solutions to fund small businesses and 
therefore reduce high unemployment, inequality and poverty that prevailed in the black South 
African community. The end result was further improvishing of far more black South Africans 
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than it was actually helping to escape from poverty by exploitative rates pushing financially 
illiterate borrowers into overindebtedness (see Schoombee, 2009).  
One of the most devastating manifestations of the problems brought about by market-driven 
MCIs was in relation to the events of August 16th, 2012, when 34 striking miners were shot 
dead by police in the Marikana mining area in Rustenberg. The genesis of this disturbing 
incident lies in the fact that many MCIs saw mineworkers at the Marikana mine as ideal clients 
for consumer credit, with many miners being financially illiterate. The widespread use of the 
garnishee order system by MCIs ensure timely collection and reduced repayment risk. By 2012, 
a very large percentage of miners in Marikana were in serious debt with some receiving only 
30-40% of their monthly salary with the rest going to repay microloan instalments, forcing 
them to sign up for subsequent larger loans. Miners were in a debt trap. Eventually the miners’ 
anger turned to frustration and rage, and then to job action which resulted in the worst episode 
of state violence to date in post-apartheid South Africa.  
In addition to numerous payday lenders and traditional loan sharks, a total of 81 formal MCI 
branches were providing financial services to a population of around 250,000 people in 
Rustenburg alone. It is agreed that greedy profit-driven MCIs were to blame for the single-
minded way that they ‘pushed’ large amounts of expensive debt on to these vulnerable 
individuals (see Bateman, 2015 for a detailed study). This raises the question as to whether 
microcredit policies are part of the solution, or in fact part of the problem given the increase in 
the  over-indebtedness of the poor (Guérin, et al., 2014; Khachatryan and Avetisyan, 2017). 
This makes CFIs important not only in giving members an opportunity to pool their savings 
and access fairly priced credit but an opportunity to strengthen the social fabric and their 
financial well-being.  
Being self-help enterprises with triple-bottom-line outcomes, CFIs are better positioned to 
finance economic activities with greater benefits not only to society but to the environment, 
such as the financing of smallholder farming activities (see Scheidel and Farrell, 2015 for a 
case study in Cambodia). In Nepal, Paudel (2018) found that households in community-
managed forests for firewood are more participatory and spend significantly more on food 
consumption than those relying on governement forests. Similarly, Brites and Morsello (2018) 
found that fostering community co-operation may outcompete financial benefits. Bateman 
(2007) found CFIs at the centre of economic, social, and ecological transformation in Emilia 
Romagna (Italy) and Basque (Spain). Despite these regions being extreme casualities of World 
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War II, CFIs were active in mobilizing local savings and investing them locally. Finance was 
directed to member small-growing co-operative businesses, with potential to local 
development impact on quality employment creation, ability to feed into the local 
manufacturing value chains and a contribution to the environmental protection. While once 
poor and under-developed, Emilia Romagna became the second richest region in Italy and the 
tenth richest region in the EU. CFIs were active in ensuring locally mobilized savings circulated 
and developed the local economy, sometimes better known as slow money (see Jayashankar et 
al, 2015) contributing to the green environment. This is similar to what Goldstein (2001) 
advocated for in Costa Rica to encourage financial markets to incorporate long-term 
environmental sustainability.  
In order to improve environmental and social well-being, recent research has started making 
strong arguments for the restructuring of investor-owned MFIs to cooperative banks, where 
profits and ownership belong to customers and the community (Bateman, 2010, 2011; Bateman 
and Chang, 2012; Sinclair, 2012; Hannam and Ashta, 2017). This will reduce community 
capital outflow and assure community liquidity (Scheidel and Farrell, 2015). On the other hand, 
CFIs attract grants or subsidized funding from the government and developmental agencies 
interested in community development. Although these funds are may be important in 
accelerating the achievement of their missions, they pose a sustainability challenge as they are 
more volatile and fragile and less focused. History has shown that grants weaken the 
community’s self-help ethos on which co-operatives are founded (Mushonga et al., 2018). 
4.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.3.1 Theoretical framework on the role of CFIs 
CFIs have an informational advantage over the mainstream banks since they are community-
based which allows them to efficiently screen prospective members, and more easily and 
quickly identify potential defaulters, therefore reduce screening, monitoring and evaluation 
costs (Ward and McKillop, 2005; Black and Duggar, 1985; Brown and O’Connor, 1995). In 
theory, such low-cost information and the use of social collateral to impose inexpensive but 
effective sanctions on defaulters makes CFIs a potential tool in the fight against financial 
exclusion, low productivity and poverty. These features permit CFIs to tailor loan terms more 
closely to borrowers’ needs and lend to individuals whom banks would reject (Guinnane, 
2001). However, the CFI organizational structure comes with additional drawbacks. Since co-
operatives are joined by members who share a common bond, that might expose the institution 
to excessive systematic risk due to members’ homogeneity. Additionally, the common bond 
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may be a stumbling block towards further growth and may negatively affect the gains from 
economies of scale and their ability to garner a significant talent pool for management and 
effective institution oversight (Marwa and Aziakpono, 2015). 
There are conflicting views on whether credit unions should be “saver-dominated” or 
“borrower-dominated” and what effects either model may have on the distribution of benefits. 
The borrowing members want access to low-cost credit and saving members want a high rate 
of funds invested (McKillop and Wilson, 2011). This area of conflict is important to understand 
as it has a bearing on the CFI’s sustainability. The CFI model should place strong emphasis on 
how a balance in the distribution of benefits between their borrowing and saving members can 
be realized. Theoretically neutral CFIs are considered more efficient as neutrality is unlikely 
to create incentives for CFIs to discourage potential members from joining and therefore helps 
to maintain the strength of the institution (Smith, 1986; McKillop, Ward and Wilson, 2007; 
Brown et al., 1999). Neutrality maximizes the total net gains to the borrowing and saving 
members without bias between them in terms of optimal borrowing and savings rates (Taylor, 
1971).  
As a unique business model, CFIs have their own strengths and weaknesses. The advantages 
emanate from the share of the common bond and common interests through shared values, 
aspirations and social ties which bind members together to feel like real owners of the 
enterprise. Using the identity economics theory, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) found that when 
people feel they belong and partly own the organization, as “insiders” they behave differently 
from “outsiders”. They further posit that behavioural economics predict that “insiders” are 
more likely to put extra and dedicated effort to protect, advance the vision and patronize the 
interest of the organization. Ceteris paribus, the expectation is a better performing CFI 
compared to the investor-owned enterprise. This makes CFIs less exposed to speculative 
transactions and business cycles. However, CFIs operate in an institutional context which is 
less favourable than investor-owned MFIs in terms of size, client segments, transaction size, 
location and operating systems, which may impose extra costs and jeopardize their 
performance and sustainability.  
4.3.2 Financial sustainability concept of microfinance  
Sustainability has become an area of attention within the academic circle, practitioners, and 
policy makers after the Brundtland report of 1987. The Brundtland report foresaw sustainable 
development as uncompromising needs of present and future generations’ economic, social, 
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and environmental aspects of life (Brundtland, 1987). Sustainability measurement promotes 
sustainability in various ways: (i) the explicit definition of goals, (ii) changing of goals, (iii) 
exposing of priorities, (iv) practical ways to attain goals, and (v) proving what can be done 
(Schreiner, 2002). This is consistent with Sala et al. (2015) who explicitly say that sustainability 
assessment is conducted to support decision-making and policy in a broad environmental, 
economic and social context. In the context of microfinance Schreiner (2000) said that 
sustainable microfinance organizations must meet their goals now without harming their ability 
to meet their goals later. 
Figure 4.1 depicts the interconnectedness of the triple-based outcomes of sustainability as an 
ecosystem. To achieving total sustainability requires that institutions serving the poor and 
marginalized must first achieve financial (economic) sustainability. Financial sustainability has 
a strong influence in achieving social impact to bring about an equitable society and viable 
interaction with the environment. The achievement of an equitable society promotes a livable 
ecosystem with society living in harmony with nature. CFIs need to attain financial viability 
for continous provision of financial services to members who are mainly women and the poor 
to help them escape from the environment of low productivity and poverty.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The sustainability ecosystem 
Morduch (2000) acknowledged the presence of “schism” in the ideology behind microfinance. 
This has resulted in sustainability having bi-directional perspectives in microfinance. He urged 
that sustainability depends on the approach being pursued, either the poverty lending approach 
(welfarists) or the financial systems approach (institutionalist). Institutional scholars are 
concerned with the long-term viability and survival of the institutions via financial sufficiency 
 
Sustainable 
ECOLOGICAL (3) 
SOCIETAL (2) ECONOMIC (1) 
Equitable 
Livable   Viable 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
74 
 
through profits, market-based rates and cost reduction as the future home of microfinance (Cull 
et al., 2007; Marwa and Aziakpono, 2015). However, researchers and practitioners with a 
strong focus on social impact influenced the emergence of a welfarist school of thought to 
increase outreach through donor and government involvement (Hashemi and Rosenberg, 2006; 
Woller et al., 1999; Schicks, 2007). The proponents of this approach argue that the poor cannot 
afford higher lending rates; therefore, aiming at financial sustainability eventually goes against 
the goal of serving large groups of poor borrowers. Hermes and Lensink (2011) challenge this 
view by stressing that sustained outreach is not guaranteed when institutions meant to serve the 
poor are not financially sustainable through charging market-based or cost-recovery rates. The 
argument is that these institutions will be able to serve more poor people than can be served by 
programs supported by grants (Morduch, 2000).  
The welfarists push for the agenda that if focus is on financial sustainability it may lead to a 
trade-off on depth of outreach by serving the richest of the poor and charging of high interest 
rates that the poor cannot afford. They strongly believe that the social mission should be 
prioritized and if there are losses, the government, social investors and the donor community 
should cover the shortfall (Woller et al., 1999). Therefore, financial sustainability is not 
regarded as the immediate goal. Whilst critics of this camp forward the argument that donations 
have become very volatile, not building financially viable institutions might erode capital, thus 
putting the availability of service to the poor in jeopardy. Schreiner (2000: 425) put it clearly 
when he said, “Unsustainable microfinance might help the poor now, but they will not help the 
poor in the future because they will be gone”, whilst Adams et al. (1984) observed that 
unsustainable microfinance might not even help the poor now. Institutionalists believe that the 
objective of microfinance is to create a functional and sustainable financial intermediation, as 
the poor are not so worried about affordability as about accessibility to financial services. 
Mersland (2009) signalled that donations can affect managerial decisions by giving donors the 
power to influence/control the organization whilst the unsubsidized set their agenda 
independently.  
The current study follows the institutionalist approach that microfinance programs need to levy 
market-based rates, control their costs and be financially sustainable to achieve social and 
ecological goals. More importantly, CFIs being self-help enterprises where the members are 
the providers of capital and also consumers of the services, the motive for profit maximization 
from themselves is limited compared to investor-owned MFIs. Unlike MFIs, membership is 
voluntary by buying shares and making savings before accessing credit. As Doherty et al. 
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(2014) observed, the scholarly interest in social enterprises has progressed beyond the early 
focus of definitions and context to investigate their management and performance. 
4.3.3 Empirical literature on financial sustainability of microfinance programs 
Due to data limitation there is little empirical literature on the financial sustainability of credit 
CFIs due to data unavailability from the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) database. 
However, the empirical findings on financial sustainability of microfinance programs is mixed. 
The importance of achieving financial sufficiency was strengthened by the findings of 
Morduch (1999a) which revealed that for Grameen Bank to become completely subsidy-
independent, it would have needed to increase its lending rates by 75% in the period 1985-
1996. Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) also found that, in the period 1985-1996, 
Grameen received US$175 million in subsidies, and its profits were influenced by whether or 
not it has received grants as part of its revenue. If Grameen was to cover expenses from its own 
generated revenue, then the bank had been making unsustainable losses since 1987.  
In a similar comparison study between three credit unions and two non-governmental MFIs 
(NGO-MFIs) in Latin America, Paxton and Cuevas (1998) found that credit unions tend to 
have higher financial sustainability and reach more poor clients with bigger loan sizes than 
poverty-oriented NGO-MFIs. NGO-MFIs were highly subsidized with CARE Guatemala 
having an extreme Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) of 4.77 compared to a range of -0.03 to 
0.12 for credit unions. However, NGO-MFIs tend to have a greater depth of outreach than 
credit unions although they offer short-term loans. Whilst credit unions had FSS index 
averaging 1.14, CARE Guatemala NGO-MFI had zero as it is 100% grant funded. Surprisingly, 
the real effective interest rates for NGO-MFIs were higher at 38.25% and 55% compared to 
the range of 11.04% to 19.51% in credit unions. In additional, NGO-MFIs had a higher arrears 
rate, therefore carrying riskier assets hindering their sustainability which proves the assertion 
by Morduch (2000) correct that subsidized credit programs are inefficient and ultimately bound 
to fail.  
On a sample of 1,074 MFIs using 2010 MIX dataset, D’Espallier et al. (2013) found that 23% 
of the world’s MFIs manage without subsidies. However, unsubsidized MFIs have a lower 
share of female borrowers and reach fewer poor borrowers than subsidized counterparts. 
Financial performance and interest rates do not seem to vary with subsidization, although 
unsubsidized had a higher return on equity (ROE) and operational self-sufficiency (OSS) at 
8.60% and 1.13 compared to 7.19% and 1.11 respectively for subsidized MFIs. A similar global 
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study by Hudon and Traca (2011) found that although subsidized MFIs are more efficient, 
beyond a certain threshold the marginal effect on efficiency is negative. As such 26% highly 
subsidized MFIs would require a marginal cut on subsidy intensity to increase their efficiency. 
In an attempt to understand the impact of external funding on savings and credit co-operatives 
(SACCOs) in Tanzania, Ndiege et al. (2014) found that the higher the level of financial linkage 
the more the SACCO becomes unsustainable. Implying that, for SACCOs to be sustainable 
they should be cautious or try to keep away from using external funds in their loan portfolio. 
Temu and Ishengoma (2010) found that an increase in financial linkages between SACCOs 
and commercial banks or pension funds reduces the members’ savings motives because there 
are always enough funds to borrow from.  
In Uganda Fiorillo (2006) found that external funding weakens members’ savings incentive, 
which eventually endangers the loan recovery rate. To minimize commercial lenders’ interest 
rate risk on unutilized facilities, funds are disbursed under pressure as they are received, 
therefore weakening the credit evaluation process. Moreover, financial risk for members 
increases as external funds are expensive. Nyamsogoro (2010) found 77.9% of Tanzanian 
SACCOs to be financially sustainable with an average FSS index of 1.56. This is higher than 
what Marwa and Aziakpono (2015) found using a 2011 dataset as 51% of Tanzanian SACCOs 
were operationally and financially sustainable with an FSS index of 1.27.  
4.4 DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
4.4.1 Data and empirical approach 
Empirical progress on understanding the sustainability of CFIs has been held back by the 
unavailability of CFIs’ annual financial information from the MIX database. MIX is a not-for-
profit private organization dedicated to promote information exchange in the microfinance 
industry. Whenever CFIs are included in empirical studies, they are included among investor-
owned MFIs, NGO-MFIs and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), which differ from CFIs 
in terms of ownership, sources of capital and profit motives. Few studies have looked into the 
financial sustainability of CFIs separately (see Marwa and Aziakpono, 2015 in Tanzania using 
2011 data; Piot-Lepetit and Nzongang, 2014 in Cameroon using 2009 data; Amersdorffer et 
al., 2015) in Bulgaria using 2000-2009 data; Nyamsogoro, 2010 using 2008 data collected 
through questionnaires; Hartarska et al., 2012 in 41 countries globally using 2003-2010 data; 
Ayayi and Sene, 2010 in 101 countries using 1998-2006 data). None of these studies included 
South African CFIs. Our study utilizes up-to-date data from audited financial statements.   
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The data covering the period 2010-2017 was obtained from the CBDA and some from 
individual CFIs. The selected period is due to the availability of data but more importantly, it 
covers a period of regress in the CFI sector growth which is of interest to investigate. We used 
unbalanced panel data with 206 observations after excluding some CFIs where information on 
variables required in our study was unavailable. The number of CFIs in our study ranges from 
21 to 31 per annum. Although the data set was not a total representation of all CFIs in South 
Africa under the regulation of the CBDA, our sample collectively represents approximately 
99% of CFI members and a similar proportion of total assets. An interesting feature of our data 
is its disaggregate of income streams, expenses (interest expense, finance costs and operating 
expenses), decomposition of savings (fixed, regular, youths and special), decomposition of 
assets (loans, investments, current and fixed assets), number of members and the legal 
status/category of CFIs (FSC, SACCO or co-operative bank) (see Mushonga et al., 2018 for 
categorization). The dataset enabled us to offer a more complete analysis of sustainability by 
legal status which is important to draw specific recommendations. 
The current study differ from previous studies in several ways. We use the most recent data, 
our database comprises only CFIs, which makes comparison easy, it is country-specific to 
avoid heterogeneity challenges, and its panel allows assessment of performance over time. 
Although Hartarska et al. (2012) employed more recent data, in the area of further research 
they said, “Our results suggest that there is a significant heterogeneity in cooperative MFIs and 
that future work may need to focus on a less aggregate level of analysis, in cooperative MFIs 
and their networks within a country” (Hartarska et al., 2012: 70). This makes our study suitable 
to address some of the previous research shortcomings.  
4.4.2 Estimation techniques 
The most commonly used (and preferred) measures of self-sufficiency are operational self-
sufficiency (OSS) and financial self-sufficiency (FSS) indices (Barres, 2006). OSS measures 
the CFI’s ability to cover its costs from its operating revenues. Technically, it is the index of 
operating revenue over its expenses which can also be expressed as a percentage. An OSS 
index above 110% indicates that a CFI will continue operating at the present scale without 
requiring additional subsidies, meaning it is “self-sufficient” (Armendáriz and Morduch, 
2010). It is however recommended that financial expenses and loan loss provision expenses be 
included in its calculation as they are normal and significant operating costs (CGAP, 2009) as 
expressed equation 4.1.  
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𝑂𝑆𝑆 =
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
(𝑓𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 +  𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 +  𝑂𝑝 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠)
 𝑥 100%      … (4.1) 
 
FSS measures how well a microfinance program could cover its costs if it was not subsidized 
and funding was being obtained at “market” rate, meaning that both revenue and expenses need 
to be adjusted. Any ratio below 100% indicates that a CFI will not be able to survive without 
subsidized funding (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010; CGAP, 2009; Marwa and 
Aziakpono, 2015). The FSS ratio is preferable to other financial sustainability measures 
because the data is adjusted to offer a more complete summary of inputs and outputs than 
standard financial ratios (Cull et al., 2007). In this study we adjusted grants by removing them 
from revenue as well as finding the cost of the grant and adding it to financial costs. See 
equation 4.2 on its calculation. We used the commercial banks’ average prevailing lending 
rates from the South Africa Reserve Bank (SARB) for each year to arrive at an estimated cost 
on grants. FSS is intended to show how self-reliant the CFI is in covering its costs when all 
funding is being accessed on market-based rates without putting reliance of grants or donations. 
However, there are several factors that influence financial sustainability, making it vital to 
understand them for managerial recommendations. 
𝐹𝑆𝑆 =
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 − 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
Adj(fin costs + loan loss provision + Op expenses + Op adjustments)
 𝑥 100%       … (4.2) 
4.4.3 Determinants of sustainability 
The key dependent variable in our analysis is the FSS index. In an attempt to explain 
differences in performance of CFIs or microfinance programs, many studies include 
independent variables to see how they influence FSS. According to Schreiner (2000), 
sustainability is linked to profitability and loan repayments as losses and loan defaults are the 
symptoms of an unhealthy microfinance program, which weakens the enterprise to death. One 
of the fundamental sustainability questions is whether financial services can be delivered to 
clients at an affordable cost. Answering this question requires looking carefully at the cost 
structure and delivery channels of financial solutions to clients (Rhyne, 1998). Minimization 
of expenses is therefore vital for MFI sustainability. Nyamsogoro (2010) used portfolio at risk 
(PAR) <30 days when trying to understand the financial sustainability of Tanzanian MFIs to 
reflect the efficiency of the MFIs in recovering loans. Ayayi and Sene (2010) found a high 
quality credit portfolio, coupled with a positive interest rate/portfolio yield and sound 
management, instrumental to explain the financial sustainability of MFIs. 
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The financial performance of microfiance programs is often studied by the gross loan portfolio 
(GLP) which indicates the scale of operations of the MFI in terms of all outstanding loan 
principals due for all borrowers (Rai and Rai, 2012). Jorgensen (2011) found a positive relation 
between GLP and MFI profitability, as a large loan portfolio tends to generate more income 
when charging real interest rates combined with low credit risk. Others have used loans but 
calculated as loans-to-assets to cater for how much of the total assets are in earning assets 
(Nurmakhanova et al., 2015). Tehulu (2013) considered deposits as one of the determining 
factors in a study of 23 MFIs. Hulme and Mosley (1996) and Groeneveld (2012) observed that, 
if members are not willing to put savings in their financial institutions, it will fail or just lead a 
marginal existence, they also recommended charging real interest rates. The life-cycle theory 
posits that an organization’s performance improves with experience and age. It is unsurprising 
that age has been used as an important explanatory variable in a number of studies (Morduch, 
1999; Cull et al., 2007; Marwa and Aziakpono, 2015; Nurmakhanova et al., 2015). Similarly, 
age was found to have a positive but smaller impact on financial sustainability (Ayayi and 
Sene, 2010). However Ayayi and Wijesiri (2017) found that new and younger NGO-MFIs 
(NMFIs) perform better than mature ones.  
Ndiege et al. (2016) recommended that SACCOs should minimize the allocation of assets in 
other investments which are different from credit to members as it leads to no expansion in 
SACCOs as members will be denied loans. In addition, empirical literature shows institutional 
characteristics, business strategy/lending approach, agency cost, environment and governance 
as other factors that influence sustainability (Labie and Périlleux, 2008; Ghatak, 2000; Allet 
and Hudon, 2013; Halouani and Boujelbène, 2015; Marwa and Aziakpono, 2015). Pascal et al. 
(2017) found empirical evidence that suggest that MFIs with CEOs who have a business 
education perform significantly better, financially and socially, than those managed by CEOs 
with other types of educational backgrounds. Zeller and Meyer (2002) found a group lending 
approach instrumental in attaining good loan repayment rates of around 98% in Grameen Bank, 
BRI and BAAC. This is because the costly job of screening, monitoring and repayments 
enforcement is transferred largely from the MFI to group members.  
Table 4.1 below details the choice of independent variables based on the review of existing 
literature as well as their description along with their expected sign of relation with the 
sustainability scores (the dependent variable). The independent variables have been judiciously 
selected so that there is minimum correlation amongst the variables. The correlation amongst 
the final chosen independent variables is given in Table 4.3 below. 
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Table 4.1: Variables description and supporting literature 
 
Variable Name Definition/measurement Indicative of Variable code Expected 
relation 
Supporting Literature  
Financial self-sufficiency Adjusted operating revenue / Adjusted 
(financial cost + loan loss provision 
expense + operating expense + operating 
adjustments) 
Sustainability FSS n/a MicroBanking Bulletin (2005); 
Cull et al. (2007); Marwa and 
Aziakpono (2015); Daher & Le 
Saout (2013) 
Operational self-sufficiency Operating revenue / (financial costs + loan 
loss provision expense + operating 
expenses) 
Sustainability FSS n/a MicroBanking Bulletin (2005); 
Cull et al. (2007); Daher & Le 
Saout (2013) 
Return on assets 
 
Net operating income / Average total 
assets 
Profitability ROA n/a 
 
Schreiner (2000); Tucker and 
Miles (2004); Jorgensen (2011) 
Age Age of the CFI in years Experience Age +/− Marwa and Aziakpono (2015); 
Ayayi & Wijesiri (2017) 
Loan loss provision Loan loss provision amounts / Gross loan 
portfolio 
Credit risk Risk − Nyamsogoro (2010); Godquin 
(2004) 
Portfolio yield Financial revenue from loan portfolio / 
Average gross loan portfolio 
Lending Interest 
rate 
PortYield + Hulme & Mosley (1996); Ayayi 
& Sene (2010); Daher & Le Saout 
(2013) 
Investment yield Investment revenue/Total investments Investment return InvestYield +/− Jorgensen (2011); Ayayi & Sene 
(2010) 
Interest on savings Interest expense + rebates or dividend to 
members/Saving and member share capital 
Savings interest Interest +/− Groeneveld (2012) 
Grants-to-Income ratio Grants/Gross income Grant dependency Grants − Schreiner (2000) 
Loans-to-Assets ratio Gross loan portfolio / Total assets Lending LTA + Nurmakhanova et al. (2015); 
Ndiege et al. (2016) 
Investments-to-Assets Total fixed income investment / Gross loan 
portfolio 
Non-lending ITA − Daher & Le Saout (2013)  
Costs-to-income Total costs / Gross income Efficiency CIR − Rhyne (1998); CGAP (2009)  
Deposit mobilization Total deposit / total gross loan portfolio Savings 
accumulation 
Deposit + Hulme and Mosley (1996); 
Groeneveld (2012); Tehulu (2013) 
Number of members Total CFI membership Outreach Members + Groeneveld (2012) 
Investments Total investments Non-loans Investments +/− Ndiege et al. (2016) 
Loans Total gross loans outstanding Scale of operation Loans + Rai & Rai (2012); Jorgensen 
(2011) 
Size Total value of assets Size Assets +/− Allet & Hudon (2013) 
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4.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section discusses the results of the financial sustainability of the sector and its 
determinants at aggregate and disaggregate levels. Firstly, we examine the characteristics of 
our variables and the financial sustainability scores (indices) as well as their behaviour. 
Following a similar approach by Ayayi and Sene (2010) potential variables are analyzed at 
aggregate and disaggregate levels. The variables were checked for outliers and normality 
assumptions using the Shapiro Wilk test, resulting in four observations being dropped after 
checking for their overall distortion on the results. Following Marwa and Aziakpono (2015) 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) test was employed to determine the presence of multi-
collinearity in our variables. Although the standard cutoff point is 10, our VIF values were 
below 3. In addition, we conducted the Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity and our 
results were in acceptable range of above 0.05. 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics results  
The key descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.2 below based on 202 observations after 
4 outliers have been removed. The FSS index averages 0.913 which is below the benchmark 
of 1.00, whilst the OSS index is 1.027 is below the minimum of 1.10, proving that our sample 
comprised financially unsustainable CFIs. The difference between FSS and OSS indicates that 
the industry might be receiving substantial grants, therefore needs to improve its performance 
in several aspects to be self-sufficient. The low FSS index can be partly explained by a -7.1% 
ROA although there are some extreme performers. The industry is not profitable and is 
performing below 3% which is the least expected ROA for microfinance programs (Marwa and 
Aziakpono, 2015). Only 35% of CFIs are financially sustainable with an FSS index of 1 and 
above despite the industry being fairly mature with an average experience of 9.5 years. The 
low FSS scores and profitability limit CFIs’ ability to attain their social and ecological goals. 
Over the years the FSS score has been on the increase from 0.83 in 2010 to 1.04 in 2017, an 
indication that the industry is becoming financially sustainable over time with the reduction in 
grants. 
The industry cannot be said to be over-dependent on grants as only 7.9% of total income is 
grants, but some players are heavily grant-reliant as shown by the maximum of 89%. However, 
grants have decreased from R2.6 million in 2011 to R833,915 in 2017 in line with the 
regulator’s strategic thrust to eliminate false fuelled industry growth. The cost-to-income ratio 
(CIR) of 143% will erode the pooled financial resources and affect the going concern of the 
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industry. This position is reinforced by the high cost-per-member ratio averaging R1,617 with 
the maximum close to R15,000. The loan portfolio yield of 33.4%, which is a proxy for loan 
interest rate, is far below the annualized rates charged by moneylenders and microfinance 
institutions in South Africa which range from 74% to 120% per annum. The levying of interest 
rates below moneylenders’ rates is expected as profit maximization is not the main objective 
of CFIs. The yield is however above the prevailing South African commercial banks’ lending 
rates of between 11 to 14% given the need to cover higher operating costs. The returns from 
these investments is just 8.5%, less than the 33.4% that could be earned from lending. Nearly 
38% of the industry’s total assets are invested in financial instruments.  
The CBDA (2017) encouraged CFIs to invest part of their mobilized savings in RSA Financial 
Co-operative Retail Bonds offering average rates of 8.2% per annum among other investments. 
This strategy might be noble for liquidity management purposes since there is limited default 
risk compared to loans. However, the approach curtails lending to members as it promotes the 
outflow of money from poor communities to the cities which hinders local development as the 
real objectives of CFIs is to mobilize and circulate money locally to promote community 
development. Only 48% of total assets are circulated to members as loans. 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Name Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Financial Self-Sustainability (FSS) 0.913 0.625 -1.829 3.946 
Operational Self-Sustainability (OSS) 1.027 0.696 -1.829 5.548 
Return on Assets (ROA) -0.071 0.368 -3.029 0.913 
Age (Years) 9.5 6.091 1 25 
Grants to Gross Income (Grants) 0.079 0.186 0 0.891 
Portfolio Yield 0.334 0.441 -0.013 4.820 
Saving Interest rate 0.023 0.027 0 0.127 
Investment Yield 0.085 0.267 -0.013 2.652 
Cost-in-Ratio (CIR) 1.430 2.229 0.207 21.860 
Provision to Gross Loans (Risk) 0.101 0.174 0 1.108 
Loan-to-Assets (LTA) 0.478 0.304 0.003 1.662 
Investments-to-Assets (ITA) 0.377 0.263 0.008 0.967 
No. of Members (Members) 1,263 1,687 17 10,777 
Cost Per Member (CPM) 1,617 2,944 3.06 14,971 
Profit 14,904 397856 -1,276,183 2,530,616 
Investments 2,507,398 4945128 13,087 30,805,624 
Loans 5,797,848 11838505 1,477 72,441,095 
Deposits 7,746,625 15285015 1,000 96,353,394 
Assets 9,042,610 16310781 15,532 103,408,531 
 
The average interest on savings of 2.3% can be viewed as not attractive enough to saving 
members as it gives a negative real interest rate considering inflation of slightly below 5%. On 
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the other hand, increasing interest on savings will negatively impact FSS but will attract much 
needed savings. The CIR averages 143%, pointing to low cost efficiencies. This calls for 
innovative and cost-effective ways of delivering financial solutions to members. Provisions for 
default risk average 10.1% which can be considered low given the rate of failures in the 
industry, negative ROA and low FSS scores. The differences between average and maximum 
membership, deposits and assets indicate that our CFIs comprise very small and large players. 
Since CFIs in South Africa are in three sub-groups as detailed by Mushonga et al. (2018) it will 
be important to understand the variations in their sustainability and profitability by their legal 
status so as to proffer appropriate managerial recommendations. In summary, FSC are focused 
on providing peri-urban and rural financial services, SACCOs are predominantly township and 
city based mostly formed by associations whilst co-operative banks (CBs) are more formal 
community-based financial institutions, currently there are two of these. 
Table 4.3 below present the summary statistics by CFI legal status which reveals that FSCs are 
the least sustainable both financially and operationally with an index score of less than 1. They 
also have the lowest ROA of -6.9% with SACCOs and CBs having -0.1% and 0% respectively, 
despite them charging the highest interest rate to borrowing members of 38.4% on average. 
SACCOs have a portfolio yield of 29% with CBs charging 20.5% on average. Despite earning 
a relatively high portfolio yield, 45.4% of FSCs’ total assets are in financial investments 
earning 6.8% per annum whilst 37.4% are in loans earning on average 38.4% interest per 
annum. CBs seem to be doing better on portfolio allocation with 73% of their assets in loans, 
whilst 23% is held in financial investments for liquidity management though earning a 4% 
return. In addition, CBs have a lower CIR of 92% compared to FSCs and SACCOs, however, 
it is too high by international standards. FSCs and SACCOs are also suffering from cost 
inefficiencies given their CIR of 150%, though in monetary value their costs per member 
(CPM) looks favourable compared to CBs. However, the high CPM for CBs might be partly 
associated with interest rate on savings of 5.1% compared to 1.1% and 3.4% offered by FSCs 
and SACCOs respectively, which might partly explain the ability of CBs to mobilize 
substantial deposits. 
Although CBs are better able to mobilize more savings, their size variations are high when 
considering the standard variation on deposits and assets, the same also applies to SACCOs. 
SACCOs and FSCs are attracting 9.3% and 7.8% respectively of their gross income in grants. 
In monetary terms, in the period 2010 to 2017 FSCs and SACCOs received R3.1 million and 
R10.1 million respectively whilst CBs only attracted half a million. 
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics by legal status 
 Financial Services Co-
operatives (FSCs) 
Saving and Credit Co-
operatives (SACCOs) 
Co-operative Banks 
(CBs) 
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev. 
FSS* 0.825 0.554 1.005 0.750 1.056 0.175 
OSS 0.952 0.640 1.121 0.821 1.074 0.168 
ROA* -0.069 0.396 -0.090 0.366 0.000 0.031 
Age* 9.9 6.502 8.5 5.9 12 2.4 
Grants* 0.078 0.194 0.093 0.191 0.014 0.057 
Portfolio Yield* 0.384 0.534 0.290 0.317 0.205 0.093 
Saving Interest* 0.011 0.021 0.034 0.026 0.051 0.022 
Investment Yield 0.068 0.257 0.117 0.305 0.040 0.037 
Cost-in-Ratio (CIR)* 1.466 2.174 1.486 2.518 0.920 0.110 
Provision (Risk)* 0.118 0.207 0.091 0.134 0.033 0.024 
LTA* 0.374 0.268 0.569 0.322 0.732 0.067 
ITA 0.454 0.262 0.303 0.256 0.226 0.091 
Members 847 744 1,925 2,432 850 348 
CPM 470 472 2,366 3,589 5,701 4,270 
Profit -2,404 166,356 18,515 603,846 114,135 197,931 
Investments 1,245,751 2,700,599 2,515,846 2,846,879 10,982,325 12,082,405 
Loans 670,692 872,824 8,722,746 11,463,093 26,147,276 22,872,802 
Deposits* 1,730,457 2,696,150 10,519,873 13,312,525 34,836,171 33,007,079 
Assets 2,219,296 2,922,436 12,571,944 14,007,862 37,894,475 34,835,506 
*variables to be used for regression analysis 
4.5.2 Correlation coefficient matrix 
We critically examine the links between financial sustainability and the independent variables 
to be sure that the relationship between all variables retained is not too strong or unbalanced. 
Table 4.4 below presents the correlation matrix used to test for multicollinearity which refers 
to the existence of a “perfect” or exact linear relationship among some or all explanatory 
variables of a regression model. In our case only two variables, loans-to-assets (LTA) and 
investment-to-assets (ITA) ratios are negatively and strongly correlated, this is expected as they 
both compete for asset allocation. Other variables are nearly independent.  
We find that financial sustainability is positively correlated with ROA ratio at a statistically 
significant level, which is expected as profitability enhances organization performance hence 
is an assurance of a going concern. Loan portfolio yield is positively correlated with financial 
sustainability but is not statistically significant. This reveals that, although levying of positive 
interest rates on borrowing members improves the financial health of the co-operative, CFIs 
need not charge excessive interest rates as their goals go beyond financial returns to social and 
environmental impact which need to be fairly based
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Financial sustainability is negatively and statistically significantly correlated with the grants-
to-income ratio. This relationship is expected as grants gives a false picture of performance by 
creating an overdependency and inefficiencies. By eliminating grants most non-market-
oriented interventions are unsustainable.  
CFIs FSS and provisions to gross loans ratio (a proxy for credit risk) are negatively correlated 
and statistically significant. According to Ayayi and Sene (2010) the gradual increase in 
volume of unpaid loans is detrimental to the financial sustainability of a microfinance program. 
Whilst FSS is positively correlated with age but low statistically significant, which seems to 
indicate that although experience matters it is no longer perfectly associated with better 
performance (Ayayi and Sene, 2010). Surprising FSS is positively correlated with savings 
interest rate at a statistically significant level which suggests that indirectly the increase in 
interest rate attracts more deposits which can be loaned out at good returns. This can be 
reinforced by the positive correlation between financial sustainability and deposits at a 
statistically significant level. The CFI’s ability to mobilize more savings from its members 
enables it to disburse more loans that will earn interest to enhance not only FSS but also its 
social and ecological goals.  
Financial sustainability and CIR are negatively correlated at a very strong statistically 
significance level as costs have a negative impact on the financial sustainability of CFIs. So, 
managing costs through cost-effective models will improve the performance of financial co-
operatives even without increasing the portfolio yield. The LTA is positively correlated with 
FSS at statistically significant level as loans are the highest earning assets of a CFI compared 
to returns from risk-free investments. Financial sustainability is negatively correlated with ITA 
as returns on investments are low. In addition, deposits are at statistically significant levels, 
whilst as expected ROA and CIR are negatively correlated at statistically significant levels as 
costs reduce the organization’s profits. Accordingly, we did not identify collinearity between 
the explanatory variables. 
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Table 4.4: Correlation analysis between variables 
 LnFSS ROA Portfolio 
Yield 
Grants 
ratio 
Provisions 
ratio 
(Risk) 
LnAge Saving 
Interest 
LnDeposit CIR LTA ITA 
LnFSS 1.000           
ROA 0.562*** 1.000          
 0.000           
Portfolio Yield 0.082 0.089 1.000         
 0.246 0.209          
Grants -0.247*** 0.193*** 0.043 1.000        
 0.000 0.006 0.546         
Risk -0.228*** -0.226*** -0.106 0.128* 1.000       
 0.001 0.001 0.132 0.068        
LnAge 0.129* 0.160** -0.061 0.096 0.128* 1.000      
 0.067 0.023 0.385 0.175 0.070       
Savings interest 0.152** 0.069 -0.169** -0.158** -0.142** 0.012 1.000     
 0.031 0.328 0.016 0.025 0.044 0.865      
LnDeposits 0.218*** 0.184*** -0.138* -0.074 0.007 0.469*** 0.496*** 1.000    
 0.002 0.009 0.051 0.293 0.925 0.000 0.000     
CIR -0.653*** -0.478*** -0.094 -0.102 0.004 -0.195** -0.089 -0.144* 1.000   
 0.000 0.000 0.185 0.150 0.959 0.005 0.210 0.041    
LTA 0.149** -0.024 -0.229*** -0.122* -0.257*** 0.159** 0.282*** 0.428*** -0.137* 1.000  
 0.034 0.739 0.001 0.084 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.052   
ITA -0.040 -0.046 0.165** 0.084 0.314*** -0.188*** -0.282*** -0.337*** 0.060 -0.774*** 1.000 
 0.577 0.516 0.019 0.234 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.398 0.000  
 
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
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4.5.3 Regression model results 
The model is intended to estimate the impact of ROA, loan portfolio yield, grants-to-income, 
provisions to gross loans (risk), age, interest on savings, deposits (size), CIR, LTA and ITA on 
the FSS of CFIs. The empirical model used to estimate their impacts is expressed as: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽3(𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛽5(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽7(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽8(𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛽9(𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽10(𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                   … (4.3) 
where 𝛽0 𝑡𝑜 𝛽10 are the coefficients of the variables and ε is the random error term. The results 
obtained after the first regression of the model imply that our model is well specified. However, 
to be certain, we refine the analysis by examining the residuals to ascertain that there are no 
problems of endogeneity and heteroskedasticity. These tests enabled us to determine that the 
coefficients obtained from our regressions are not biased. Table 4.5 below presents the results 
which reveal that the model is well specified with non-biased coefficients. F test = 36.33 with 
the Prob > F = 0.000 which signifies that our model has good explanatory power. This is further 
confirmed by the R2 of 65.68% which means that 65.68% of the total variation of financial 
sustainability scores is explained by the independent variables.  
Table 4.5: Results of the regression model 
logFSS Coef t-statistic # obs F (10, 190) Prob>F R2 Root 
MSE 
Cons -0.75717 (-2.55) ** 202 36.36 0.000 0.6568 0.43812 
ROA 0.81450 (6.04) ***      
PortYield -0.01264 (-0.17)      
Grants -1.32616 (-7.56) ***      
Risk -0.73572 (-3.54) ***      
LnAge 0.00614 (0.14)      
Savingsint -0.00528 (-0.55)      
LnDeposits 0.03928 (1.72) *      
CIR -0.15532 (-8.72) ***      
LTA 0.33044 (1.84) *      
ITA 0.53881 (2.77) ***      
 
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
The coefficient of ROA is positive, and statistically significant as theory predicts that 
profitability determines the organization’s going concern. An improvement in sufficient returns 
from total assets promotes the organic growth and increases loanable funds to the members, 
indirectly impacting positively on their social and environmental well-being. In our model, 
ROA is the highest positive coefficient in absolute value, indicating that it is a key determining 
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indicator of financial sustainability. The findings are consistent with Marwa and Aziakpono 
(2015) who found that 77% of the variation of FSS was explained by ROA alone in their study 
of SACCOs in Tanzania. In other words, to be financially sustainable CFIs should adopt 
measures that ensure they are profitable not necessarily by charging high real interest rates but 
by finding innovative and cost-effective financial intermediation channels with their members. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient of loan portfolio yield is slightly negative (-0.013) and statistically 
non-significant. Theory expectation is that loan interest rates contribute to the profitability of 
the enterprise and finally to financial sustainability. The fact that CFIs do not have the ultimate 
goal of profit maximization but of balancing their triple objectives through service 
maximization to their members, could explain this. This result leads us to reject the commonly 
held notion that high interest rates lead to financial sustainability of a microfinance program as 
it might contribute to high default risk with major consequences. However, our results are 
consistent with Cull et al.’s (2007) findings that raising interest rates very high does not ensure 
greater profitability as evidence in solidarity group lenders suggest that financial performance 
tends not to improve as yields increase. This is also congruent with Stiglitz and Weiss’s (1981) 
assumption, which says that raising interest rates will undermine portfolio quality due to 
adverse selection and moral hazard.  
The coefficient of grants is negative and statistically significant. This is consistent with the 
argument that grants contribute to unsustainable microfinance programs as they encourage 
inefficiencies and limit innovation. This result supports the position advocated by 
institutionalists that, although grants might be necessary at the inception of a microfinance 
program for capacity building purposes, they might contribute to the dependence syndrome 
and eventually result in unsustainable programs. The grants coefficient is the highest negative 
in absolute value, indicating that it has the most negative impact on financial sustainability. 
The portfolio quality variable as measured by loan loss provisions ratio (default risk) has the 
expected sign and is highly statistically significant. The high default risk reduces financial 
revenue, cash flows and loanable funds, risking insolvency. According to Ayayi and Sene 
(2010) high credit risk would lead to credit rationing and consequently failure of the 
microfinance program to provide loans to its clientele resulting in a negative impact on 
financial viability, social and ecological performance. Once members are not deriving any 
economic benefits from CFIs they withdraw their membership and savings, leading to 
bankruptcy. Therefore, it is important for CFIs to engage in good risk management by 
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proactively assessing their capacity to recover problem loans to prevent contagion risk among 
the borrowers. More importantly, CFIs must continue to strengthen social capital among their 
members by applying the group lending principles to borrowers to co-guarantee, monitor, and 
apply peer pressure and social sanctions on each other to enforce good credit behaviours 
(Stiglitz, 1990; Ghatak, 2000; Morduch, 1999). Achieving lower credit risk enables CFIs to 
increase their lending to members and gradually lower their effective interest rates.  
The experience (age) has a minor positive coefficient of 0.006 and is statistically non-
significant, which implies that the age of CFIs does not guarantee financial sustainability as 
they might be slow in adopting new and innovative ways of interacting and delivering financial 
services to their members. These findings are consistent with Ayayi and Wijesiri (2017) who 
found that new and younger NMFIs perform better than mature ones, meaning that age does 
not matter, whilst Ayayi and Sene (2010) and Wijesiri et al. (2017) found that older MFIs 
perform better than younger ones in achieving their financial objectives. Paying of a savings 
interest rate has a negative coefficient (-0.0053) but is not significant. This implies that as a 
CFI pays interest on savings to encourage more savings from members it has an insignificant 
negative impact on its sustainability. However, the deposit coefficient is positive and 
significant, as deposit mobilization is important for the financial sustainability of CFIs. An 
increase in savings makes funds available for lending to members or investments to generate 
returns. Our findings are compatible with Tehulu (2013) and Groeneveld (2012) who found 
that deposits enhance FSS. 
The efficiency and asset management variables have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant. The coefficient of CIR, which is a measure of cost efficiency, is negative and 
statistically significant which is consistent with the argument that, ceteris paribus, an increase 
in operating costs causes a decrease in financial sustainability. Therefore, to be financially 
sustainable CFIs must significantly lower their costs by identifying and implementing cost-
effective measures. On the asset management side, the coefficient of LTA is positive and 
marginally significant, which shows that an increase in loanable funds results in an 
improvement of FSS but credit risk also increases as gross loans increase, which results in a 
negative impact on FSS. This may suggest that the coefficient of 0.3304 at 10% compared to 
ITA’s coefficient of 0.5388 is strongly significant. Since investments are almost risk-free 
compared to loans, ITA statistically significantly contributes to FSS besides low investment 
return of 8.5% compared to 33.4% on loans. However, this might be difficult to comprehend 
calling for further study by legal status. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
90 
 
90 
 
4.5.4 Analysis according to legal status 
Following the analysis of our results at an aggregate level, we examine financial sustainability 
according to legal status to illustrate similarities and differences and to answer some of the 
outcomes from aggregate level. Due to limited observations (just 16) for the two co-operative 
banks over the eight years they are dropped from this analysis, so our analysis will focus only 
on FSCs and SACCOs. Table 4.6 below presents the results of our regressions 
Our regression result based on the legal status partly confirms the results obtained at aggregate 
level but there are some differences. FSCs and SACCOs have the highest positive coefficient 
in absolute value on ROA, which is statistically significant. There are conflicting results on 
portfolio yield as the coefficient is negative and statistically insignificant for FSCs, whilst the 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant for SACCOs. This implies that portfolio yield 
does not affect FSCs’ financial sustainability whilst in SACCOs they do. These conflicting 
results can be better understood from the descriptive statistics which show that FSCs allocate 
a bigger portion of their assets in investments (45.4%) earning a return of 6.8% compared to 
37.4% in loans earning a yield 38.4% with a higher default risk of 11.8%. On the other hand, 
SACCOs prefer more asset allocation into loans (56.9%) earning a 29% yield with a possible 
default risk of 9.1% whilst 30.3% is in investments earning 11.7% in average returns. 
Table 4.6: Regression results by legal status 
FSS Financial Services Co-operative 
(FSCs) 
Saving & Credit Co-operatives 
(SACCOs) 
ROA 1.07915 1.10181 
 (4.19) *** (6.41) *** 
PortYield -0.06626 0.24014 
 (-0.70) (1.63) *** 
Grants -1.71274 -0.92901 
 (-5.70) *** (-2.94) 
Risk -0.88177 -0.58135 
 (-3.21) *** (-1.33) 
LnAge 0.05106 0.02645 
 (0.65) (0.45) 
Savingsint -0.08121 0.01493 
 (-0.34) (1.46) 
LnDeposits 0.05326 -0.12710 
 (1.26) (-3.25) *** 
CIR -0.14994 -0.12366 
 (-5.28) *** (-5.45) *** 
LTA 0.51992 0.58235 
 (1.62) (2.28) ** 
ITA 0.75203 0.34588 
 (2.60) ** (1.25) 
Constant 1.07915 1.52739 
 (-2.49) ** (2.78) *** 
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# obs 107 78 
F (10, 190) 15.25 28.46 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.6137 0.8095 
Root MSE 0.49251 0.35014 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
Grants and risk coefficients for both FSCs and SACCOs are negative and statistically 
significant, for FSCs meaning they have negative impact on financial sustainability whilst they 
are statistically insignificant for SACCOs. Age is found to have a positive coefficient but not 
statistically significant in both categories as previously found. The interest rate on savings 
coefficient on FSCs is negative and insignificant whilst it is positive and insignificant on 
SACCOs.  
Surprisingly the deposits coefficient on SACCOs is negative and statistically significant, 
meaning that an increase in deposits will lead to a decrease in financial sustainability. One of 
the likely explanations is that since SACCOs are paying an interest rate of 3.4% compared to 
1.1% by FSCs, any increase in savings not loaned back to members is a cost since they have to 
pay interest on those deposits. As expected, CIR coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant for both categories. LTA coefficients are positive for both sub-groups, and 
nonsignificant for FSCs but statistically significant for SACCOs. This means for SACCOs to 
be financially self-sufficient they need to increase the assets allocated to loans. ITA coefficients 
are positive and statistically significant in FSCs whilst insignificant in SACCOs. In summary, 
FSCs and SACCOs are following different asset allocation strategies for investments and loans. 
4.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study examined the financial sustainability of community and membership-owned 
financial institutions which are known for their ability to reduce the biggest challenge of 
information asymmetry for people sharing a common bond. Their approach to “savings-first” 
differentiates them from “credit-first” microfinance programs. This approach has enabled them 
to transfer high transaction costs associated with financial intermediation in marginalized 
segments from an external financial intermediary to the community level by exploiting existing 
social capital. Being governed by the co-operative principles whose ideals and beliefs seek to 
bring about social justice and solidarity for the greater good of the communities within which 
they operate, they contribute to sustainable development. As member-centric institutions, CFIs 
are driven by improving the economic and social well-being of their members through giving 
people control over their financial destiny.  
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Based on our findings, the CFI industry is financially unsustainable with an FSS index of 0.913 
which is below the expected performance benchmark of 1. Based on our sample only 35% of 
CFIs are financially sustainable with 65% in need for a turnaround strategy in order to be 
financially viable. The industry has an OSS index of 1.027 which is below the standard of 1.1. 
The difference between OSS and FSS reflects low profitability of the industry and the effect of 
incoming grants. The industry ROA average is -7.1% with grants helping some players to 
survive as 7.9% of total income is grant funding. Our regression results show that ROA, LTA, 
ITA, deposits, grants, credit risk, and cost-to-income ratio are the major determinants of CFI’s 
financial sustainability.  
On a disaggregate level the major determinants of FSCs’ financial sustainability is ROA, 
grants, risk, CIR and ITA, whilst ROA, portfolio yield, deposits, CIR and LTA are the 
significant determinants of SACCOs’ sustainability. The CIR of our sample CFIs is very high 
at 143% which is at variance with theoretical expectations that due to the common bond 
financial co-operatives are able to reduce operating costs due to reduced information 
asymmetry, credit evaluation and monitoring costs. The 10.1% provisions for doubtful debts 
are of great concern to the financial viability of CFIs as the identity economics theory expects 
members to behave in the best interest of their organization. In addition, due to peer monitoring, 
peer pressure and social sanctions the potential default risk is expected to be low. 
Our findings demonstrate that CFIs need to continuously improve their efficiencies through 
costs minimization whilst at the same time improving revenue generation through product 
diversification, embracing new innovative delivery channels that minimize transaction costs. 
The adoption of mobile money and strengthening of social ties might contribute to cost 
structure reduction. In addition, members also need to appreciate the basic principles of co-
operation and the underlying rationales. They have to be motivated and committed to work 
together for their individual and common benefit as co-operative enterprises are as strong as 
their members make them. The viability and success of co-operatives depend on the readiness 
of their members to fulfil a number of requirements such as making savings, monitoring each 
other and repaying loans.  
It is important to realize that financial sustainability is only one major dimension of the 
overarching concept of sustainability, and as such it is a means to the end not an end of itself. 
Cooperatives must make a profit to build sufficient reserves for solvency, growth and 
continuity. However, donations might be necessary at formative stages for technical assistance 
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to help CFIs to learn, improve and survive in the market without donor funding. To encourage 
CFIs to strike a healthy balance between sustainability and outreach, donors are encouraged to 
lubricate entry and exit.  
Our major recommendation is for CFIs to achieve financial viability to effectively contribute 
to the attainment of sustainable development, as the best way to help the poor is not to be like 
them, but to be successful. Similarly, CFIs as social enterprises serving the economically active 
poor need to be financially sustainable to uplift their members from the trap of low productivity 
and poverty. To achieve this, CFI management need to have the mind of a banker and the heart 
of a social worker by ensuring their institutions make fair surpluses to guarantee their longevity 
in making a lasting impact on their members` livelihoods, society and the ecology at large. 
Our study has some limitations. Since we utilized only audited CFI financial statements this 
might have led to some biases in our results as CFIs with unaudited financials were excluded 
from our study. Although we wanted to include the CFIs with unaudited financials in our study, 
they were not willing to share their financial records with us. As a follow-up to our research, 
further research may consider empirically investigating the social and financial efficiency of 
CFIs in South Africa and its determinants. Another area for further research might be on the 
impact or influence of size and membership profile (affluent group and the poorer) on the 
sustainability of financial co-operatives. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL EFFICIENCY OF CO-OPERATIVE FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA11 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The mainstream financial sector has experienced an intense process of concentration in recent 
decades resulting in the sharp decrease of financial institutions while their average size has 
risen. As a result, small and growing businesses, and marginal communities are experiencing 
inadequate to access to financial services as banks consider them too costly to serve. As noted 
by Minsky (1993), big banks like big deals with low information and transaction costs. 
Microfinance programs emerged as one of the solutions to alleviate global poverty and 
financial exclusion over the past years (Woller et al., 1999; Armendariz de Aghion and 
Morduch, 2005; Balkenhol and Hudon, 2011).  
As originally conceived, microfinance is the provision of small loans, payments, insurance and 
savings facilities to poor households to establish or expand simple income-generating 
activities, thereby supposedly facilitating their eventual escape from poverty (Bateman, 2010). 
This way microfinance institutions (MFIs) help to address the credit market failures in the 
financial markets which make households credit-rationed by the formal banking system due to 
the prevalent of information asymmetry. Recently, investor-owned MFIs faced criticisms from 
practitioners and researchers due to their profit maximization motives over poverty reduction 
in the current wave of microfinance commercialization (see Copestake, 2007; Bateman, 2010, 
2011; Sinclair, 2012).  
There are strong calls by some researchers and practitioners that MFIs have lost their moral 
compass of addressing poverty through fairly priced credit to the poor and marginalized people. 
These critics are calling for the restructuring of MFIs to be owned by their borrowers as co-
operative banks (CFIs) so that borrowers have control over them whilst their profits are 
ploughed back in their communities (Bateman, 2007; Sinclair, 2012). CFIs differ from MFIs 
in many aspects as they are owned and democratically controlled by their members who 
                                                          
11 This chapter is under review by the journal World Development, the manuscript is titled “Social and financial 
efficiency of Co-operative Financial Institutions: Evidence from South Africa”. 
An earlier draft of the chapter was presented at the 14th International Conference on Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA), Jianghan University, Wuhan, China, May 23-26, 2016 titled “The efficiency of cooperative financial 
institutions in South Africa: an empirical study using DEA approach”. 
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contribute its capital and savings for on-lending to finance their economic activities at much 
reasonable rates. During the recent global financial crises CFIs proved to be better resilient to 
global shocks as they limit transactions in speculative activities. As a result, during the global 
economic crisis their total assets and membership increased from US$1.2 trillion and 177 
million in 2007 to US$1.8 trillion and 235 million in 2015 respectively, winning people’s trust 
as responsible institutions (World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU), 2007 and 2016). CFIs 
are a more socially responsible way to reach out to the economically active poor to lift 
themselves from the trap of poverty and low productivity. This makes CFIs face dual and 
conflicting objectives of reaching to the poor whilst striving for long-term sustainability. 
The current debate in co-operative finance is whether it is possible for CFIs to be financially 
sustainable while at the same being able to improve their outreach to large number of members 
(socially sustainable). The situation is tricky as CFIs will need to mobilize financial resources 
from the same people excluded from the formal banking system for own lending to them. 
McKillop and Wilson (2011) highlighted that in the intermediation process CFIs face potential 
conflicts between borrowing members (who want access to low-cost credit) and saving 
members (who want a high rate on funds invested). Taylor (1971) studied three credit union 
scenarios: (i) the neutral credit union (where neither savers’ nor borrowers’ interests dominate); 
(ii) the saver-dominated credit union (where the interests of savers dominate); and (iii) the 
borrower-dominated credit union (where the interests of borrowers dominate). Theoretical 
analysis suggests that neutral credit unions are more efficient as neutrality is less likely to create 
incentives for CFIs to discourage potential members joining and therefore helps to maintain 
the strength of the institution (Smith, 1986; McKillop et al., 2007; Brown et al., 1999). 
“Overall, the neutral CFI seeks to maximize the total net gains to the borrowing and saving 
members without bias between them in terms of optimal borrowing and savings rates” (Taylor, 
1971; 211). This means there could be a trade-off between financial and social sustainability of 
CFIs (Hermes and Lensink, 2011; Annin, 2012; Lebovics et al., 2016). 
Quite a number of studies have investigated the trade-off between social and financial 
efficiency of MFIs (see Annin, 2012; Bédécarrats et al., 2009; Widiarto and Emrouznejad, 
2015; Martínez-Campillo et al., 2016; Wijesiri et al., 2017). Most of these studies include all 
types of MFIs in a single study – NGO MFIs, investor-owned MFIs, non-bank financial 
institutions and financial co-operatives (credit unions). Few studies have separately 
investigated social efficiency or the trade-off in CFIs (see Hartarska et al., 2012; Piot-Lepetit 
and Nzongang, 2014; Amersdorffer, Buchenrieder et al., 2015; Martínez-Campillo et al., 2016; 
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Martínez-Campillo and Fernández-Santos, 2017). Hartarska et al. (2012: 70) in their 
recommendations for future work said, “Our results suggest that there is a significant 
heterogeneity in co-operative MFIs and that future work may need to focus on a less aggregate 
level of analysis, e.g., on efficiency analysis in co-operative MFIs and their networks within a 
country. For this purpose, detailed data collection from smaller co-operative MFIs should be 
encouraged via their networks and other professional organizations”.  
It is in line with these findings and their recommendations that this paper contributes to the 
empirical literature on the trade-off by investigating whether or not CFIs in South Africa are 
socially and financially efficient. The study uses an unbalanced dataset from the Co-operative 
Banks Development Agency (CBDA) for the period 2010 to 2017. The questions we address 
are: (1) what could be the social and financial efficiency of CFIs in South Africa? and (2) what 
factors determine their social and financial efficiency? This study employed bootstrap Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to estimate social and financial efficiency of CFIs and 
bootstrapped truncated regressions in the second stage. DEA is a non-parametric linear 
programming-based efficiency analysis which constructs a piece-wise frontier from all best-
forming CFIs: thereafter the relative efficiency of individual CFIs is calculated against CFIs 
with similar characteristics located in the frontier as its benchmark(s). From an efficiency 
perspective, a CFI must strive for efficiency in its social and financial objectives. DEA enables 
different specifications to measure overall efficiency, social efficiency and financial efficiency 
(Widiarto and Emrouznejad, 2015; Wijesiri et al., 2017; Martínez-Campillo et al., 2016). 
The study is organized as follows: Section 5.2 gives the background and context of the study, 
Section 5.3 outlines empirical literature in efficiency in microfinance programs, Section 5.4 is 
the methodology, model and specifications. Results are explained in Section 5.5, with the 
conclusion and implications of the study in Section 5.6. 
5.2 CONTEXT OF THE STUDY AND CFIs IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The South African banking system is highly concentrated, with the big five banks collectively 
holding 90.7% of the total banking sector assets as at 31 December 2016. The entry of foreign 
banks and branches of international banks in the market failed to dilute the dominance of the 
big five banks as new entrants decided to focus on niche markets not dominated by the 
corporate banking divisions of the big five. Over the years the number of registered banks has 
decreased from 30 banks in 2002 to 17 in 2016 (see Mushonga et al., 2018). As a result, nearly 
8.5 million are still excluded from formal banking system according to FinMark (2016), and 
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the majority of those with bank accounts lack access to credit facilities. This proves Minsky 
(1993) right that with bank concentration big banks are concerned with big deals which leaves 
many households without access to adequate financial services. This has entrenched the high 
level of inequality in the country, which had a Gini coefficient of 62.8% in 2017 (up from 
59.3% in 1993), and18.6% of the population is in extreme poverty (World Bank, 2018), making 
South Africa one of the most unequal economies in the world. 
Efforts have been under way over the years to improve access to financial services for the 
general population with the introduction in 2004of the “Mzansi acoount”, a low-level entry 
bank account. But these efforts failed, partly because of no access to credit facilities. The 
government has been promoting CFIs to reduce financial exclusion through the Co-operative 
Act of 2005 and the Co-operative Banks Act of 2007. These Acts enabled the formation of the 
Co-operative Banks Development Agency (CBDA) in 2009 to formally regulate and provide 
capacity building to the industry. Previously, the regulation of the industry was fragmented 
with a lot of self-regulation association bodies. Since the CBDA started regulating the industry 
in 2011 the number of CFIs and membership has dropped from 121 and 59,394 to 30 and 
29,818 in 2017 respectively, see Table 5.1 below.  
Table 5.1: Information on South Africa CFIs (2010–2017)  
Period No. 
CFIs 
Members Savings 
(ZAR) 
Loans 
(ZAR) 
Assets 
(ZAR) 
2010 56 36 434 124,365,000 93,651,000 142,069,000 
2011 121 59,394 175,265,000 116,577,000 195,213,000 
2012 106 53,240 196,230,000 132,227,000 217,506,000 
2013 35 38,084 200,841,000 142,310,000 220,800,000 
2014 26 33,391 198,624,948 140,463,755 231,367,670 
2015 26   24,721 201,101,522 152,143,102 236,533,481 
2016 30 29,752 233,763,289 179,338,526 279,624,000 
2017 30 29,818 228,216,993 202,160,606 293,493,697 
% 2010-2017 -46.4 -18.2 83.5 53.7 51.6 
% 2011-2017 -75.2 -49.8 30.2 42.3 50.3 
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on CBDA and SARB Annual Reports 
However, despite the decrease in players and membership, savings, loans and assets show good 
performance. The decrease might be as a result of the minimum membership and capital 
contribution being pegged at 200 and R100,000 respectively, which might have pushed weak 
players out of the market. In the midst of these trends, South Africa has the lowest penetration 
rate in the world of 0.06% compared to Kenya (13.3%), Rwanda (13.8%), Togo (26.7%), 
Australia (17.6%), Canada (46.7%), United States (52.6%), Ireland (74.5%) and a world 
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average of 13.5% (WOCCU, 2016). This gives us the interest to investigate their social and 
financial efficiency. 
CFIs, being member-driven enterprises, pull members’ savings together for on-lending to the 
same members at competitive interest rates that ensure sustainability provided they are efficient 
in managing their costs, credit risk and generate sufficient revenue. They have the information 
advantage to circumvent adverse selection and moral hazard challenges prevalent in credit 
markets through peer selection and peer monitoring. In order to support CFIs’ self-help ethos, 
CBDA do not allow them to borrow more than 15% of their total assets.  
5.2.1 CFIs and double bottom-line objectives  
The success of CFIs rests within its actual performance to continue providing service to its 
members and its ability to grow and uplift its membership from poverty. This differentiates 
CFIs from commercial banks due to the dual objectives of financial sustainability and outreach 
(Bédécarrats et al., 2009; Cull et al., 2007). Outreach is the social value of CFIs outputs in six 
aspects: depth, breadth, length, scope, worth of users, and cost to users (Schreiner, 2002; 
Marwa and Aziakpono, 2016; Widiarto and Emrouznejad, 2015). Depth of outreach is the 
extent to which CFIs penetrate deeper to the poorest to recruit members, breadth is measured 
by the number of members assisted, length is the period of financial services delivered to a 
community, scope of outreach refers a variety of financial services provided (e.g. savings, 
loans, insurance, money transfer, financial literacy and others), worth of users is how much 
client value the services provided in meeting their needs, and cost to users is the total cost that 
member borrowers have to incur for the financial services provided (interest and fees) and other 
transaction costs. However, the focus of many empirical studies is on depth and breadth of 
outreach (Schreiner, 2002; Crawford et al., 2011; Gutiérrez-Goiria et al., 2017). Sustainability 
is the ability of the CFI to sustain its operations in the long term as a viable financial institution 
able to meet its own costs and surplus for its members (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 
2005; Hermes and Lensink, 2011; Quayes, 2012). It is important for social enterprises to 
operate for the long term to have a profound impact on its members. 
Investor-owned MFIs are often accused of mission drift by serving households that are either 
just below the poverty line (“the richest of the poor”) or just above the poverty line (“the poorest 
of the rich”) in order to make huge profits. The challenge seems also to be witnessed in some 
co-operative MFIs (Hartarska et al., 2012). There seems to be a trade-off in literature between 
financial efficiency and social efficiency. However, such trade-off in theory is expected to be 
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less profound in CFIs as they are member-owned compared to investor-owned MFIs which 
seem to be more concerned with profitability to derive value for their shareholders (Sinclair, 
2012; Bateman, 2010). Bateman (2010) and Sinclair (2012) accuse MFIs of mission drift in the 
search for profitability resulting in reduced lending to the poorest due to the high cost of 
lending. This is made worse by the individual lending approach now being pursued by MFIs 
moving slowly away from the group lending methodology which ensures that MFIs exploit 
social capital to reach out to more people at reduced cost as the case with CFIs. 
5.3 LITERATURE VIEW 
5.3.1 Theoretical motivation 
Farrel (1957) was the first to clearly identify the three main concepts of efficiency that are 
usually used in practice and research as technical efficiency, allocative efficiency and cost 
efficiency. Technical efficiency is defined as the ability of a firm to use resources productively 
in the most technologically efficient manner to produce a maximum quantity of outputs (output 
orientation) or the use of minimum resources to produce a given quantity of outputs (input 
orientation). Allocative efficiency reflects the ability of the firm to utilize a set of inputs in 
optimal proportion, given their prices and the available production technology. Cost efficiency 
refers to the combination of both technical and allocative efficiencies: a firm will only be cost-
efficient if it is efficient in both technical and allocative efficiencies. In line with previous 
literature, the current study focuses on technical efficiency which will be referred to as 
“efficiency”. Efficiency in production theory is concerned with optimal combination of inputs 
to produce maximum outputs or producing given outputs with least possible quantity of inputs, 
hence minimising waste (Banker and Cummins, 2010; Brown and O’Connor, 1995). 
5.3.1.1 Efficiency in the financial sector 
During the last two decades there have been rapid changes which have affected or shaped the 
financial sector in the way they deliver financial services to their customers. These ongoing 
changes are being necessitated by the financial market reforms resulting in the intensification 
of competition, intensified use of technology and continuous financial product innovation to 
meet customers’ evolving financial needs. All these sweeping changes have forced the financial 
sector to take efficiency measurement seriously as a way of improving their ability to survive 
in an increasingly competitive environment (Worthington, 2010; Martínez-Campillo and 
Fernández-Santos, 2017). In the financial sector efficiency is defined as the level of 
optimization attained in the use of physical, human and financial resources in providing various 
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financial services (Worthington, 2010; Piot-Lepetit and Nzongang, 2014; Martínez-Campillo 
and Fernández-Santos, 2017). Efficiency plays a crucial role in every financial institution as it 
is the road to survival (Gutiérrez-Nieto and Serrano-Cinca, 2007). 
5.3.1.2 Efficiency in the co-operative financial institutions 
Within the broader financial sector, CFIs are experiencing growing popularity due to their 
ability to achieve social and financial benefits for their members and local communities, unlike 
traditional banks that focus mainly on shareholder return maximization. Due to their dual 
mission, CFIs’ technical efficiency is related to the physical relation between their social and 
financial performance and the resources they use to produce such outputs (Martínez-Campillo 
and Fernández-Santos, 2017). Specifically, efficiency in the CFIs financial activity, referred to 
as financial efficiency, can be defined as a degree of optimization achieved in the use of 
physical, human and financial resources for providing different financial services. Being social 
enterprises, CFIs have important social objectives, and efficiency in their social activity, 
referred to as social efficiency, has to do with how effectively they achieve the social goals of 
their members and local community from their inputs which are mainly membership share 
contributions, savings and intermediation costs (Worthington, 2010; Bédécarrats et al., 2009; 
Gutiérrez-Goiria et al., 2017).  
In summary, the major objective of CFIs is to provide maximum financial and social returns 
given the avaialable resources. As such CFIs are considered to be efficient when they generate 
more financial and social returns from the given resources provided (inputs) (Wijesiri et al., 
2017; Bédécarrats et al., 2012). However, balancing the achievement of these dual objectives 
is not easy, raising the debate on the trade-off between social and financial sustainability. Some 
researchers claim that there is no trade-off between the two objectives, meaning that social 
impact could be achieved while the enterprise is financially efficient. Other researchers and 
practitioners point to the presence of a trade-off as financial sustainability will result in 
targeting the less poor and resulting in mission drift.  
5.3.2 Empirical evidence 
Few studies have been done focusing mainly on the efficiency of CFIs or trying to establish 
the existence of a trade-off between outreach and financial sustainability despite their growing 
popularity as sources of ethical and sustainable finance. According to Martínez-Campillo et al. 
(2016) the research gap might be due to their small weight in financial systems and the scarce 
information on them. In addition, assessing their performance is rather complex as in addition 
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to their financial performance, they are supposed to attain their social objectives or impact (Ory 
and Lemzeri, 2012; Barra et al., 2013; Bédécarrats et al., 2009). 
At the global level most of the studies on the efficiency of CFIs or credit unions have been 
carried out in Australia with some in the US, United Kingdom, Ireland and Turkey 
(Worthington, 2010; Brown and O’Connor, 1995; Esho, 2001; McKillop et al., 2005; McKillop 
et al., 2002; Pille, 2002; Wheelock and Wilson, 2013). Although quite a number of efficiency 
studies are being done in these countries, the area of social and financial efficiency is still 
receiving limited research in credit unions/CFIs even in Australia and Europe. The study of 
efficiency is of paramount importance for developing economies which recently initiated 
various economic and financial reforms with the aim of broadening and improving efficiencies 
of financial institutions to accelerate financial inclusion. The few studies that are focusing on 
Africa are on investor-owned MFIs with very scanty research on member-owned financial 
institutions (Marwa and Aziakpono, 2016; Piot-Lepetit and Nzongang, 2014; Wijesiri and 
Meoli, 2015). Recently, the debate among policymakers, practitioners and researchers has 
shifted to understand the trade-off between financial and social efficiency. However, results of 
these empirical studies seem to be mixed. See Table 5.2 below. 
5.3.2.1 No empirical evidence on the existence of a trade-off 
There is a growing amount of empirical literature which does not support the view that financial 
and social efficiency are substitutes. Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009) in a global study of 89 MFIs 
found that socially efficient MFIs were also financially efficient. However NGO-MFIs were 
found to be more highly efficient than any other MFI type. Bédécarrats et al. (2012), using 
survey data from 295 MFIs in 51 countries, found that financial and social performance can 
both be achieved as long as MFIs have a well-planned social performance management 
strategy. Piot-Lepetit and Nzongang (2014) investigated village banks (financial co-operatives) 
in Cameroon and showed that in almost half of these CFIs there was no trade-off between 
financial and social sustainability; in only 15% of the village banks they did find a trade-off.  
In 28 Vietnamese MFIs, Lebovics et al. (2016) found no evidence that a trade-off exists 
between financial and social efficiency. The study sample achieved an average financial 
efficiency of 94.15% and 73.75% social efficiency, and all MFIs were above 70% on both 
financial and social efficiency. However, subsidies help them to show high financial efficiency 
and attain social goals. In India Kar (2013) found no evidence for the presence of trade-off 
between financial and social efficiency in 87 MFIs. In a global study of 420 MFIs, Widiarto et 
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al. (2017) found that most MFIs are financially and socially inefficient. Older MFIs perform 
better than younger ones financially but are socially inefficient and Africa MFIs are the most 
inefficient. 
5.3.2.2 Mixed empirical evidence on the existence of a trade-off 
The are some studies which do not find clear evidence for the existence of a trade-off in MFIs. 
In a study of 231 MFIs in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Europe Asia Pacific 
(EAP) and South Asia (SA), Widiarto and Emrouznejad (2015) found that in 2009 Islamic 
MFIs (IMFIs) had lower financial efficiency than conventional MFIs (CMFIs) –  56.26% vs 
66.53%, and in 2010 61.7% to 67.56%, while on social efficiency CMFIs outperform IMFIs. 
Using data on Cambodian MFIs Crawford et al. (2011) found that profit-oriented MFIs are no 
less efficient at reaching the poor than non-profit ones, but they also observe that Cambodian 
MFIs are becoming less efficient at outreach over time while increasing their profitability.  
In Spain Martínez-Campillo et al. (2016) found no evidence of a trade-off in credit unions in 
the period 2008-2013, attaining 63.94% financial efficiency vs. 70.62% social efficiency. In a 
follow-up study, Martínez-Campillo and Fernández-Santos (2017) using a unbalanced dataset 
of 81 Spanish credit co-operatives covering the period 2008-2014 found that social efficiency 
had reduced to 66.42%, with second-stage analysis revealing that CFIs with a high percentage 
of branches in urban areas were socially less efficient. Those with a greater proportion of 
branches in urban areas are socially less efficient, whereas both their size and the number of 
service points had a positive effect. 
5.3.2.3 Empirical evidence on the trade-off between financial and social efficiency 
There are quite a number of studies that found convincing evidence for the view that financial 
and social efficiency are substitutes. Cull et al. (2007) were among the first to have investigated 
this trade-off. Using a dataset of 124 MFIs in 49 countries, they found that MFIs that used an 
individual lending approach focused more on weathier clients, resulting in better profitability 
performance, but scoring lower on the depth of outreach, an indication which points to a trade-
off between financial and social performance. Gonzalez (2007) showed that efficiency 
improvements are not driven by a higher quantity of loans per MFI staff member, but by 
increasing the average loan size, at the expense of the poorest clients. Hermes et al. (2011) 
found evidence that suggests that outreach is negatively related to efficiency of MFIs. More 
specifically, MFIs that have a lower average loan balance (a measure of the depth of outreach) 
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are also less efficient, whilst Amersdorffer et al. (2015) found that only credit co-operatives 
with sound financial performance can achieve a higher ranking in their social output.  
Annim (2012), who employed balanced panel data of 164 MFIs, Louis and Baesens (2013), 
who used panel data for 456 MFIs, and Abate et al. (2014), using data from Ethiopian MFIs, 
all found evidence that outreach is negative to cost efficiency. Cull et al. (2011) stressed that 
transforming MFIs into formalized banking institutions generates costs for MFIs, which in turn 
may negatively affect their outreach. In a global study of 1,146 MFIs, Bos and Millone (2015) 
found significant trade-offs between social and financial performance, but not necessarily 
affecting all MFIs in the same manner.  
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Table 5.2: Summary of empirical literature on social and financial efficiency  
Study Method Region Observations Period Social Eff var. Financial Eff var. Main Findings 
Gutiérrez-
Nieto et al. 
(2009) 
DEA and 
regression  
Global 89 MFIs using 
MIX dataset 
2003 Inputs: total assets, 
operating costs, no. of 
employees. Outputs: no. 
of women, the poorest,  
Inputs: total assets, 
operating costs, and 
no. of employees. 
Outputs: gross loans, 
and financial revenue  
With one exception, MFIs that are 
socially efficient are also financially 
efficient. NGOs-MFIs are more 
socially efficient than other MFI-
types (banks, NBFIs, credit unions) 
Hermes et al. 
(2011) 
SFA and 
regression 
Global 435 MFIs 
using 
unbalanced 
MIX dataset 
1997-2007 Inputs: total expenses per 
labour unit, interest 
expenses per unit of 
deposits. Outputs: avg. 
loan size, % of women 
Inputs: total expenses 
per unit of labour, 
interest expenses per 
unit of deposits. 
Outputs: gross loans  
Evidence show that outreach is 
negatively related to efficiency of 
MFIs. MFIs that have lower average 
loan balance (a measure of the depth 
of outreach) are also less efficient. 
Omri & 
Chkoundali 
(2011) 
Regression 
models 
Mediterran
ean 
16 MFIs using 
MIX dataset 
2001-2008 Independent variables: 
average loan size, average 
loan size/GNI per capita, 
women %, no. of 
outstanding loans as % of 
women borrowers. 
Dependent variables: 
profitability, 
efficiency and 
productivity 
indicators, portfolio 
quality  
Commercial viability increases with 
average loan size. Secondly, it also 
increases with the no. of loans per 
women. Neither targeting the poor 
nor targeting women affect the 
repayment default. 
Crawford et al. 
(2011) 
DEA Cambodia  14 MFIs using 
MIX and 
Cambodian 
Microfinance 
Association 
2003-2009 Inputs: personnel, 
operating expenses and 
equity. Outputs: no. of 
customers (savers and 
borrowers) 
Inputs: Personnel, 
operating expenses 
and equity. Outputs: 
savings and loans  
For profit MFIs are financially 
efficient but less social efficient 
than non-profit ones. MFIs are 
becoming less socially efficient over 
time while increasing profitability. 
Hartarska et al. 
(2012) 
Classical 
structural 
approach 
41 
countries 
Globally 
216 Co-
operative 
MFIs using 
unbalance 
MIX dataset 
2003-2010 Inputs: total costs, labour 
and financial costs. 
Outputs: no. of active 
borrowers and no. of 
depositors 
Inputs: total costs, 
labour and financial 
costs. Outputs: gross 
loan portfolio and 
deposits 
MFI co-operatives have increasing 
returns to scale, majority can lower 
cost if they become larger around 
$100m in lending and half of that in 
deposits 
Louis et al. 
(2013) 
Self-
organizing 
map approach 
6 regions 650 MFIs 
using MIX 
dataset 
2011 Average loan size/GNI 
per capita, and portion of 
women borrowers 
Real gross portfolio 
yield, profit margin, 
loans to total assets, 
cost per loan, PAR>30 
and debt/equity ratio 
Found evidence of significant, 
positive relationship between social 
efficiency and financial efficiency 
Piot-Lepetit & 
Nzongang 
(2014) 
Multi-DEA 
approach 
Cameroon  52 Village 
Banks with 
above 5 years, 
2009 Inputs: loans, operating 
revenue and other 
financial revenue. 
Inputs: equity, assets, 
personnel, financial & 
operating costs. 
Outputs: loans, 
Even if a trade-off exists for 15% of 
the village banks there is no trade-
off for 46% of them. No conclusion 
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Study Method Region Observations Period Social Eff var. Financial Eff var. Main Findings 
dataset from 
ADAF 
Outputs: nos. of clients, 
women and poor 
operating revenue and 
other financial revenue 
on 36% since they are both 
financially and socially inefficient 
Amersdorffer 
et al. (2015) 
DEA Bulgaria 15 Credit Co-
operatives 
using NCU 
dataset 
2000-2009 Inputs: target and 
outreach, adaptation of 
services, clients benefit, 
social responsibility. 
Outputs: SPI score x 
average no. of loans. 
Input: total operating 
expenses. Outputs: 
volume of loans, and 
share capital 
Credit co-operatives with sound 
financial performance can achieve a 
higher ranking in their social output 
Bos & Millone 
(2015) 
Output 
distance 
function 
Global  1,146 MFIs 
using 
unbalanced 
MIX dataset 
2003-2010 Inputs: All as % of total 
assets (financial, 
personnel, administrative 
expenses). Outputs: 
average loan balance/GNI 
per capita and no. of loans 
Inputs: All as % of 
total assets (financial 
personnel and 
administrative 
expenses). Outputs: 
loan portfolio yield % 
There are significant trade-offs 
between social and financial 
performance in microfinance. 
These trade-offs do not necessarily 
affect all MFIs the same manner 
Widiarto & 
Emrouznejad 
(2015) 
DEA and 
Two-stage 
regression 
analysis 
MENA, 
EAP, and 
SA 
231 MFIs 
using 
unbalanced 
MIX dataset 
2009-2010 Inputs: total assets, 
operating expenses, 
PAR30, and employees. 
Outputs: borrowers and 
inverse of average loan 
balance/GNI per capita 
Inputs: total assets, 
operating expenses, 
PAR30, and no. of 
employees. Outputs: 
financial revenue  
In 2009 Islamic MFIs (IMFIs) had 
lower financial efficiency than 
conventional MFIs (CMFIs) 56.26% 
vs. 66.53% in CRS and in 2010 
61.7% to 67.56%. On social 
efficiency CMFIs outperform IMFIs 
Pedrini & Ferri 
(2016) 
Linear Mixed 
Model 
Analysis 
Global 194 MFIs 
using 
unbalanced 
MicroFinanza 
dataset 
2001-2010 Social performance = 
outreach depth and 
breadth Control variables: 
average loan balance, 
lending type, staff 
Financial performance 
= ROA and ROE. 
Control variables: MFI 
type, MFI location, 
OSS, loan loss reserve,  
A trade-off exists between financial 
performance and outreach. Results 
show that mission drift positively 
impacts on financial performance 
but it reduces outreach. 
Lebovics et al. 
(2016) 
DEA Vietnam  28 MFIs using 
MIX, 
VMFWG, and 
MFIs obtained 
datasets 
2011 Inputs: total liabilities, 
operating costs, and no. of 
staff. Outputs: average 
loan balance to GNI and 
no. of borrowers 
Inputs: total liabilities, 
operating costs, and 
no. of staff. Outputs: 
gross loan portfolio 
and financial revenue 
MFIs are 94.15% financially and 
73.75% socially efficient, no 
evidence for a trade-off. Subsidies 
helps them to show high financial 
efficiency and attain social goals. 
Kaur (2016) DEA India  87 MFIs using 
MIX dataset 
2012 Inputs: total assets, 
operating cost, no. of loan 
officers. Outputs: no. of 
active women borrower 
and the poorest reached 
Inputs: total assets, 
operating cost, no. of 
loan officers. Outputs: 
revenue and gross loan 
portfolio  
No evidence found for the presence 
of trade-off between financial and 
social efficiency though average 
financial efficiency is 84.2% and 
social efficiency 32.5%. 
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Study Method Region Observations Period Social Eff var. Financial Eff var. Main Findings 
Martínez-
Campillo et al. 
(2016) 
Two-Stage 
bootstrap 
DEA 
Spain 446 
observations 
using 
unbalanced 
credit unions 
dataset from 
UNACC (65-
81 MFIs) 
2008-2013 Inputs: No. of employees, 
no. of branches and equity 
(members’ shares and 
reserves). Outputs: No of 
loans to customers/total 
members, no. of branches 
in municipalities 
having<25000 inhabitants 
/total branches (%), % of 
net profits allocated to 
social fund contribution 
Inputs: No. of 
employees, no. of 
branches and equity 
(members’ shares and 
reserves). Outputs: 
loan portfolio, deposits 
and security 
investments 
There was no trade-off between 
financial and social efficiency.  
Financial efficiency average 67.26% 
while social efficiency reaches 
72.02%. On second-stage analysis, 
age, and merger and acquisition has 
a positive and significant impact on 
financial efficiency but opposite on 
social efficiency, and belonging to a 
corporate group improve social 
efficient but not financial efficiency 
Wijesiri et al. 
(2017) 
Two-step 
DEA 
bootstrap and 
regression  
Global 420 MFIs 
using MIX 
dataset  
2013 Inputs: operating 
expenses, and no. of 
employees. Outputs: 
standardized average loan 
balance, and no. of active 
borrowers 
Inputs: operating 
expenses, and no. of 
employees. Outputs: 
gross loan portfolio, 
financial revenue  
The average efficiency scores are 
too low, most MFIs are financially 
and socially inefficient. Older MFIs 
are better financially than younger 
ones but socially inefficient. Africa 
MFIs are the worst inefficient. 
Gutierrez-
Goiria (2017) 
DEA and 
seemingly 
unrelated 
regression 
Global 403 MFIs 
using MIX 
dataset  
2012 Inputs: equity and 
external funding. Outputs: 
gross loan portfolio, no. 
of clients, no. of female 
borrowers, economic 
sustainability 
Inputs: equity and 
external funding. 
Outputs: profit and 
risk  
NGO-MFIs and NBFIs show best 
relative results in terms of social 
and economic efficiency accounting 
for 81% of most efficient MFIs, 
whilst credit unions and MFI banks 
were 7.7% and 3.8% respectively 
Widiarto et al. 
(2017) 
DEA and 
Tobit 
regression 
Global 628 MFIs from 
87 countries 
using 
unbalanced 
MIX dataset 
2003-2012 Inputs: total assets, 
operating expenses, no. of 
employees. Outputs: 
Inverse average loan per 
member/GNI per capita 
Inputs: total assets, 
operating expenses, 
and no. of employees. 
Outputs: interest 
revenue  
Group lending was found to be best 
method in achieving highest overall 
and social efficiency in Africa and 
MENA. NGO-MFIs show generally 
satisfactory financial efficiency  
Martínez-
Campillo and 
Ferna´ndez-
Santos (2017) 
Two-Stage 
bootstrap 
DEA 
Spain 490 
observations, 
unbalanced 
credit unions 
dataset from 
UNACC (65-
81 CFIs) 
2008-2014 Inputs: personnel 
expenses, amortisation 
expenses, and interest 
expenses. Outputs: loans 
to customers/ total no. of 
members and no. of 
branches in municipalities 
having<25000 inhabitants 
/total branches (%) 
Only estimated social 
efficiency  
Credit co-operatives reaches a social 
efficiency level of 66.42%. Those 
with a greater proportion of 
branches in urban areas are socially 
less efficient, whereas both their 
size and the number of service 
points have a positive effect. 
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5.3.3 Measurement of efficiency in CFIs 
Performamce measurement in an organization is very important, to understand whether the 
firm is doing well or badly so as to select the appropriate mixture of required resources (inputs) 
to produce optimal outputs. According to Paradi and Zhu (2013), Widiarto and Emrouznejad 
(2015) and San-Jose et al. (2014) the limitation of ratios and regression analysis have led to the 
developement of more advanced techniques for evaluating firm performance. The limitations 
are that a CFI might perform very well in one ratio but badly in others hence the difficulty in 
overall performance benchmarking (Paradi and Zhu, 2013; Marwa and Aziakpono, 2016). In 
addition various separate ratios cannot measure how different inputs concurrently affect 
multiple outputs in the transformation process (Widiarto and Emrouznejad, 2015). This makes 
financial ratios not adequate to comprehensively measure performance changes in a CFI’s 
social mission which differentiates it from conventional banking institutions.  
In recent years, research in this domain has increasingly focused on benchmarking techniques 
based models that can assess how well a decision making unit (DMU) performs relative to the 
best of their peers if they are doing business under the same operating conditions. An important 
class of benchmarking methods is the frontier efficiency methodology. According to Paradi 
and Zhu (2013), using this technique the best firms are identified from the dataset and they 
form the empirically efficient frontier. Efficiency in production theory refers to the optional 
combination of inputs to produce maximum outputs or producing given outputs with least 
quantity of inputs hence minimizing waste (Worthington, 2010; Amersdorffer et al., 2015; 
Widiarto et al., 2017; Martínez-Campillo et al., 2016). The main advantage of frontier 
efficiency over other indicators of performance is that it offers overall objective numerical 
efficiency scores with economic optimization mechanisms in complex operational 
environments and summarizes the performance in a single statistic. One such method is DEA. 
5.3.4 Data envelopment analysis 
DEA is the most widely used non-parametric technique developed by Charnes et al., (1978), 
advancing Farrell’s (1957) single input-output productive efficiency concept into an efficiency 
assessment of DMUs involving multiple inputs-outputs to calculate a best practice efficient 
production frontier, enveloping all data as a reference set or benchmark against which each 
DMU is assessed (Widiarto et al., 2017; Lebovics et al., 2016). DEA evaluates efficiency 
without an a priori assumption on the distribution and production as with Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) (Aigner et al., 1977) therefore applicable where multiple input-output 
relationship is not directly observable as in the context of CFIs. Their dual objectives is how 
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they utilize inputs to produce outputs related to outreach and sustainability, in comparison to 
their best performing peers (Ben Soltane, 2008; Lebovics et al., 2016; Widiarto et al., 2017).  
This method provides a measure of relative but not absolute efficiency. However, DEA does 
not handle measurement errors (Charnes et al., 1978), therefore we will do bootstrapping. 
Moreover, it imposes conditions on homogeneity, that is, it assumes that organizations are 
performing identical functions and producing similar outputs so that a common set of outputs 
can be defined; it also assumes that identical resources are available to all DMUs and that they 
operate in a similar environment (Lebovics et al., 2016). As recommended by Belkenhol and 
Hudon (2011) comparisons of efficiency are best conducted within a single country context.  
5.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
We apply a two-stage double bootstrap DEA procedure, specifically, the Algorithm 2 
developed by Simar and Wilson (2007). The procedures consists of estimating DEA scores of 
technical efficiency in the first stage, resulting efficiency scores are then regressed on a set of 
environmental variables in the second stage using the truncated regression with bootstrap. This 
is because of the presence of the inherent dependency among the efficiency scores and with 
the aim of reducing the inappropriative and misleading possible results because of the lack of 
independence within the sample. According to Martínez-Campillo et al. (2016) and Wijesiri et 
al. (2017) a two-stage approach makes econometric sense only if the variables included in the 
second stage are exogenous, that is, they do not participate in the production function but do 
affect efficiency. DEA is useful in achieving the first benchmark – identifying best performers. 
DEA produces an efficient frontier consisting of the set of the most efficient firms, allowing a 
direct comparison to the best performers. DMUs on the efficient frontier are peers that can be 
emulated by DMUs that are not on the efficient frontier. DEA is also useful in setting 
benchmarking goals that are measurable, attainable and actionable (Spendolini, 1992; Marwa 
and Aziakpono, 2016) 
5.4.1 First stage: Estimation of DEA efficiency scores  
The two DEA models are the Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), famously known as the 
CCR model after their names and the Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984), popularly known 
as the BCC model. The CCR model assesses technical efficiency under a Constant Returns to 
Scale (CRS) condition, hence the CRS model. Multiple inputs and outputs for a given DMU 
are linearly aggregated into single ‘virtual’ input and output in the following manner: 
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𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 𝑣1𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝑣1𝑥1 =  ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 = 𝑢1𝑦1 + ⋯ +  𝑢𝑟𝑦1 =  ∑ 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟
𝑠
𝑟=1
 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =
𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡
𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡
=  
∑ 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟
𝑠
𝑟=1
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1
  
Where 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑟 are weights for observed input 𝑥𝑖 and for observed output 𝑦𝑟, respectively. 
An efficiency score is assigned for each DMU in a way that maximizes the ratio of weighted 
output to weighted input. BCC modifies the CCR model by applying a more realistic 
assumption of the Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) wherein each DMU is allowed to exhibit 
different returns to scale due to a different environment, hence the VRS model. CRS is only 
valid if a DMU operates at its most productive scale size yet that is often not the case. So, we 
employ the DEA model under the VRS assumption because it is consistent with the 
environment of imperfect competition in which credit co-operatives operate (Brown, 2006; 
Martínez-Campillo and Fernández-Santos, 2017). Scale efficiency causes the difference 
between the VRS technical efficiency of a given DMU, that is, pure technical efficiency, to its 
CRS technical efficiency, that is, global technical efficiency (Widiarto and Emrouznejad, 
2015). 
Basic DEA models are based upon output-orientated and input-orientated strategy. The input-
orientated approach aims to maximize proportional input reduction whilst holding outputs 
constant, whilst the output-orientated approach maximizes the proportional outputs increase 
whilst maintaining inputs constant. CFIs are treated as financial intermediaries between the 
member savers and member borrowers as they seek to maximize the outputs (outreach, loans, 
investments and revenue) given the input levels (deposit, labour and expenses). Input 
orientation has been recommended for cost minimization focused policies, while output 
orientation has been recommended for impact maximization policies (Cooper et al., 2011). It 
is argued that the orientation choice must be chosen according to the quantities of inputs and 
outputs that the managers are able to control (Coelli et al., 2005). In our case, managers are 
more able to control the outputs (loans, investments, financial revenue) than the inputs, which 
are mainly deposits which they desperately need but which are subject to external economic 
and social forces. Therefore, the current study adopts the intermediation approach and output 
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orientation as CFIs mobilize members’ contributions and savings to give out loans (Hermes et 
al., 2011; San-Jose et al. 2014. See Equation (5.1). 
̂𝑖 =
𝑚𝑎𝑥
̂𝑖𝜆𝑖
{ > 0|̂𝑖𝑦𝑖 ≤ ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝜆𝑖;  𝑥𝑖 ≥  ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝜆𝑖; 
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜆𝑖; = 1; 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0
𝑛
𝑖=1
} ;  𝑖
= 1, … . , 𝑛DMUs                                                                                  … (5.1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖 is a vector of outputs, 𝑥𝑖 is a vector of inputs, 𝜆𝑖 is an n x 1 vector of constants 
measuring the weight used to compute the location of an inefficient DMU aiming to become 
efficient, and ̂𝑖 is the efficiency score for the 𝑖th DMU under the VRS assumption. If ̂𝑖 = 1, 
the 𝑖th DMU is fully efficient, and if ̂𝑖 < 1, the 𝑖th DMU is relatively inefficient.  
Despite the DEA having some advantages, it does not allow for statistical inference and 
consequently its results are biased because it ignores sampling and measurement errors. This 
study adopted the homogeneous bootstrap algorithm in the first stage of the analysis as initiated 
by Simar and Wilson (2000) which combines the conventional DEA model with the bootstrap 
technique to infer the statistical properties of efficiency scores. Bias-corrected efficiency scores 
are generated. However, according to Efron and Tibshirani (1993) the bias correction may 
introduce additional noise, whilst Simar and Wilson (2000) advise that bias-corrected 
efficiency scores should only be used when the following ratio 𝑟𝑖 is well above unity (Equation 
5.2). 
𝑟𝑖 =
1
3
(𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 ̂
2
𝐵
[ ̂(𝑥, 𝑦)]/?̂?2)                                    … (5.2) 
where 𝑟𝑖 is a statistical test value, which allows us to assess whether the bias correction might 
increase the mean square error, ?̂?2 is the variance of the bootstrap values, 𝐵 is the number of 
replications and  ̂ is the original efficiency estimate.  
5.4.2 Second stage: Bootstrap truncated regression 
Simar and Wilson (2007) criticized the use of censored (Tobit) regression in the second stage 
analysis although it has been widely applied. The reason is that, because explanatory variables 
(z) are correlated with the disturbance term (ε), the assumption that ε is independent of z 
becomes invalid and input and output variables are correlated with explanatory variables 
(Wijesiri et al., 2017). They address this issue by proposing an alternative double bootstrapped 
procedure (Algorithm 2) that permits valid inference while simultaneously generating standard 
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errors and confidence intervals for the efficiency estimates. DEA indices are bounded by 0 and 
1, a bootstrap truncated regression model is used in the second stage which provides consistent 
and non-biased estimates (Simar and Wilson, 2011; Martínez-Campillo and Fernández-Santos, 
2017) as where the bootstrap efficiency scores from the first stage are regressed on a set of 
explanatory variables using the following regression model: 
̂𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑧𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖      𝑖 =  1, … . . , 𝑛,                                            … (5.3) 
 
where 𝛼 is a constant term, 𝛽 is a vector of parameters to be estimated, 𝑧𝑖 is a vector of 
exogenous factors that are expected to affect the efficiency/inefficiency of the 𝑖th DMU, and 
𝜀𝑖 is an error term assumed to be N(0, 𝜎𝜀
2) distributed with right truncation at (1 – α - 𝛽𝑧𝑖). 
5.4.3 Research data sources 
Data used in this study was collected from CFI financial reports filed with the CBDA and from 
regulators’ annual reports (CBDA and SARB) for the financial years 2009/2010 to 2016/2017, 
ranging from 21 to 29 CFIs per financial year. This makes this study different from others 
which rely mostly on MIX database (see Table 5.2 above). Since the CBDA started regulating 
the industry it became mandatory for every CFI to file its audited annual financial statements. 
However, in the period pre-CBDA supervision financials could not be found as the previous 
regulators, SACCOL and SAMAF, had ceased operations and in addition, they were not strict 
with CFIs getting their financials audited and filed with them. Six observations with 
insufficient financials were removed from the study, remaining with a total of 206 observations 
over eight years.  
5.4.4 DEA input – output selection 
The challenge that applies in many studies of financial institution efficiency is the identification 
of inputs and outputs. According to Paradi and Zhu (2013) management should select variables 
that they see as reflecting the function of a DMU as this will help in the acceptance of the 
results. Taking that into consideration and being guided by the literature in Table 5.2 above, 
our input variables, financial outputs (relating to financial efficiency) and social outputs (social 
efficiency) are justified from the literature and context viewpoints on our understanding of the 
uniqueness of CFIs from the mainstream financial institutions or credit-only MFIs. The current 
study will use the output-orientated approach as CFIs are more concerned with reaching out to 
more member-borrowers by not limiting the mobilization of member share capital and savings 
as inputs. 
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The major role of financial co-operatives is to mobilize members’ financial resources, and in 
the process they incur intermediation costs in mobilizing savings and managing the loan 
portfolio. Poverty outreach as a measure for social efficiency focuses on the breadth (number 
of the poor clients reached or members in the case of CFIs) and the depth (the extent to which 
the poorest clients are reached). Following Crawford et al. (2011), Pedrini and Ferri (2016), 
and Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009) for outreach we take the inverse format of average loan 
balance per member, which is a widely used proxy to measure depth of outreach, standardized 
over gross national income (GNI) per capita. We use the inverse format so as to have 
characteristics as output where a larger value means better (Widiarto and Emrouznejad, 2015). 
On social indicator of breadth, instead of using the number of borrowers we use the number of 
members because CFI outreach to its members is by savings first and credit later, and other 
related financial services such as insurances or payments. 
Lastly, our financial output variables consist of the gross loan portfolio (GLP), investments and 
financial revenue. GLP includes all outstanding principals due, this includes current delinquent 
and negotiated loans, but not written-off loans or interest receivable. Investments include 
money with outside institutions to earn interest on a fixed period. However, they are debates 
around mobilizing the poor’s savings and investing outside their communities. Financial 
revenue include interest and fees income from the loan portfolio and investments. It is used as 
a proxy for sustainability since a CFI that cannot collect enough revenue will not be viable to 
operate in the long run by itself. Table 5.3 below gives a detailed analysis of the variables 
considered for this study with supporting literature and arguments.  
From the identified input and output variables, the overall, social and financial efficiency 
models are estimated using the same inputs but different outputs are as shown in Table 5.4 
below. According to Cooper et al. (2007), in order for the efficiency scores to be robust and 
reliable, the number of DMUs must be at least the maximum between m x s or (m + s)*3, with 
m and s being the number of input and output variables, respectively. In the current study, the 
efficiency models comply with this standard requirement. 
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Table 5.3: Summary and justification of DEA input and output variables 
Variables Definition Usage in literature Units CFI Objective 
(Efficiency) 
Represented 
Inputs     
Deposits Total savings by members held in the CFI. San-Jose et al. (2014). Most literature use it as 
output, but CFIs’ philosophy is savings first, 
everything later, making it an input in this study 
ZAR 000 Financial 
mobilization 
Operating 
expenses 
Total costs related to operations, e.g. all personal 
expenses, administrative expense, governance 
expenses and depreciation or amortization. They 
are used in the intermediation process, so they 
need to be managed to avoid waste. 
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009); Hermes et al. (2011); 
Crawford et al., (2011); Piot-Lepetit & Nzongang 
(2014); Amersdorffer et al. (2015); Widiarto & 
Emrouznejad (2015); Lebovics et al. (2016); 
Wijesiri et al. (2017); Widiarto et al (2017). 
ZAR 000 Intermediation costs  
Outputs     
Inverse of 
average loan 
borrower 
Inverse format of average loan balance per 
borrower, is a widely used proxy to measure 
depth of outreach, standardized over GNI per 
capita to remove currency and purchasing power 
parity difference. Inverse format usage is meant 
to have output where larger value means better. 
Omri & Chkoundali (2011); Kar (2013); Bos & 
Millone (2015); Widiarto & Emrouznejad (2015); 
Widiarto et al. (2017). 
% Outreach (Social 
Efficiency) 
No. of 
members 
The total number of members who benefiting 
from financial services be it savings or loans. 
Crawford et al. (2011); Hartarska et al. (2012) used 
total number of customers (savers and borrowers). 
Most literature use number of women borrowers, 
e.g. Hermes et al. (2011); Gutierrez-Goiria (2017); 
Kaur (2016) whilst some use number of borrowers, 
e.g. Wijesiri et al. (2017); Widiarto et al. (2017)  
Numerical Outreach (Social 
Efficiency) 
Financial 
revenue 
This comprise of revenue from loans and income 
from investment. It is an output in intermediation 
approach and proxy for sustainability since CFIs 
that cannot generate enough revenue will not be 
viable to operate in the long run by its self. 
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009); Kaur (2016); Piot-
Lepetit & Nzongang (2014); Lebovics et al. 
(2016); Widiarto & Emrouznejad (2015); Wijesiri 
et al. (2017)  
ZAR 000 Sustainability 
(Financial Efficiency) 
Gross loan 
portfolio 
These are total loans outstanding disbursed to 
members to generate interest revenue to the CFI. 
Hermes et al. (2011); Hartarska et al. (2012); Piot-
Lepetit & Nzongang (2014); Lebovics et al. 
(2016); Kaur (2016); Wijesiri et al. (2017);  
ZAR 000 Sustainability 
(Financial Efficiency) 
Financial 
investments 
Liquid financial investments with defined 
maturity date other than investments in fixed 
assets and loan portfolio 
Martínez-Campillo et al. (2016). Most literature do 
not use investments as outputs, our sample CFI are 
investing substantial funds 
ZAR 000 Sustainability 
(Financial Efficiency) 
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Table 5.4: DEA model variables 
Efficiency represented Inputs variables Outputs variables 
Overall Efficiency (OE) Deposits Gross loan portfolio 
 Operating expenses Investments 
  Financial revenue 
  No. of members 
  Inverse average loan balance per member/GNI per capita 
Financial Efficiency 
(FE) 
Deposits Gross loan portfolio 
 Operating expenses Investments 
  Financial revenue 
Social Efficiency (SE) Deposits No. of members 
 Operating expenses Inverse average loan balance per member/GNI per capita 
 
5.4.5 Explanatory variables 
Following previous literature six explanatory variables are used to examine the determinants 
of efficiency/inefficiency in the CFI industry in South Africa (Wijesiri et al., 2017; Widiarto 
and Emrouznejad, 2015; Worthington, 2010). Based on the literature the following explanatory 
variables will be used: age, size, ROA, average savings per member, capital adequancy and 
association. However, one would advocate for the inclusion of some macro-economic 
environment variables such as the country’s good governance, political stability, government 
effectiveness, inflation and so on. Since the study is not a cross countries research but a country-
specific study, our DMUs are being affected by these macro-economic factors in the same way, 
hence it is not necessary to include them in the present study.  
CFI age is measured in the number of years since inception, it is included as an indicator of 
experience and improved managerial ability with co-operative finance programs. Wijesiri et al. 
(2017) discussed the efficient of age on efficiency as twofold, with a group of researchers 
arguing that efficiency improves as the MFIs mature (Marwa and Aziakpono, 2015; Paxton, 
2007) due to their ability to manage their costs better through years of adjusting the business 
model to be efficient and their ability to cushion the short-term losses compared with younger 
CFIs. However Hermes et al. (2011) provide evidence that age is negatively associated with 
technical efficiency, which might be as a result of failing to respond to new challenges and 
innovations as the firm ages. In Sri Lankan MFIs, Wijesiri et al. (2015) found that mature MFIs 
though financially efficient, are socially inefficient. 
The size of a financial institution has been empirically proven to be an important source of 
efficiency as it reflects the strength of the firm to compete effectively in the market with rivals 
(Glass et al., 2014; Martínez-Campillo and Fernández-Santos, 2017). Size is also associated 
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with the ability to adopt new technology, pursue investment opportunities, diversify and enter 
into strategic alliances and the attractiveness to competent human capital to provide effective 
leadership. Normaly size is measured in the value of total assets.  
Return on assets (ROA) is widely regarded as a proxy of sustainability on how effectively the 
assets of a firm are being used to generate profit and if it is negative, it means the firm is not 
operating sustainably (Wijesiri et al., 2017; Marwa and Aziakpono, 2015; Schreiner, 2000). 
Other variables are average savings per member (AVSAV), which measures commitment of 
members to their co-operative: the higher the average savings the higher the expected 
efficiency as transactional costs are likely to be lower and improve the ability of the CFI to 
lend.  
Capital adequacy (CAP) is calculated as the proportion of equity to total assets: it is a measure 
of financial leverage in which the higher the ratio, the lower the financial leverage and the 
lower the financial risk (Martínez-Campillo and Fernández-Santos, 2017; Glass et al., 2014); 
the variable ASS (association) is made a dummy that takes the value of 1 when CFI belong to 
an association or a group, and 0 otherwise. The dummy seeks to understand the influence of 
associational bond under which a credit union is created (Worthington, 1999; Martínez-
Campillo and Fernández-Santos, 2017; Glass et al., 2014). From these environmental variables, 
two truncated regress models – social efficiency and financial efficiency models – are built to 
study the determinants of efficiency/inefficiency in CFIs. In the above models, the following 
specification is estimated: 
 
̂𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛(𝐴𝑉𝑆𝐴𝑉)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                                . . . (5.4) 
 
where the dependent variable ̂𝑖 refers to the bootstrapped efficiency score from the first stage 
of the ith DMU, 𝛼 is a constant term, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, … 𝛽6 are the parameters to be estimated, 𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is 
the return on assets of the ith DMU in period t, 𝐴𝑉𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the average saving per member of 
the ith DMU in period t, 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the firm age of the ith DMU in period t, 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
total assets of the ith DMU in period t, 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the capital adequacy of the ith DMU in period 
t, 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is members of a trade association/club/movement of the ith DMU in period t, and 𝜀𝑖is 
the error term. 
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5.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 5.5 below summarizes the main descriptive statistics for input and output variables and 
the determinant variables considered in the second stage analysis in the study. A quick look at 
the statistics of deposits, loans and number of members reveal that our DMUs comprise small 
and large/medium CFIs. Inverse of average loan borrower has a very wide range of 0.0376 to 
2,686.65. This is supported a trend in the CFI industry as shown in Table 5.1 with the number 
of members declining from 59,394 in 2011 to 29,818 in 2017, whilst the average loan balance 
per member is increasing rapidly from ZAR1,963 to ZAR6,780 respectively. As also shown in 
the Table below the variations of members is huge revealing that there are some outliers in our 
sample CFIs and DEA model. However, due to our limited sample removing these outliers will 
violate the DEA rule of thumb as already discussed in Section 5.4.4. The average capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) of the industry is at acceptable levels of 18% against the Basel III 
Acord’s minimum of 8%.  
Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics (Input and output variables in ZAR) 
N=206 DMUs Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Input variables     
 Deposits 7 611 092 15 166 800 1 000 96 353 394 
 Expenses 584 441 606591 1 406 3 571 892 
Output variables     
 Financial efficiency     
 Loans 5 700 301 11 743 945 1 477 72 441 095 
 Investments 2 482 658 4 903 603 13 087 30 805 624 
 Financial revenue 1 059 340 1 677 448 1 355 9 976 973 
 Social efficiency     
 Inverse of average loan borrower 60.589 229.221 0.0376 2686.650 
 Members 1194 1478 17 10777 
Efficiency determinants     
 ROA  -0.0668   0.3674  -3.0291   0.9129  
 Average Saving per Member  13497  31515   3.23  206022  
 Age  9.42   6.09           1   25  
 Capital Adequacy Ratio  0.1766   0.3848   -1.6798   0.9934  
 Association  0.4078   0.4926           -  1  
 Assets     8942096    16171929     15532  103408531 
 
Table 5.6 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between the efficiency determinants 
when measured using a continuous variable. Analysis of the variance inflation factors (VIF) is 
1.1 below 10 (Kleinbaum et al., 1998), confirming that multicollinearity is not a problem. 
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Table 5.6: Correlation coefficient between the efficiency determinants 
N = 206 DMUs ROA lnAVSAV lnAGE lnASSETS CAR ASS 
ROA 1.0000      
lnAVSAV 0.1731** 1.0000     
 0.0129      
lnAGE 0.1426** 0.2656*** 1.0000    
 0.0410 0.0001     
lnASSETS 0.3359*** 0.8201*** 0.3540* 1.0000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    
CAR 0.4577*** -0.3508*** -0.3165*** -0.1847*** 1.0000  
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0079   
ASS 0.0824 0.3350*** -0.2384*** 0.5029*** 0.0773 1.0000 
 0.2390 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.2695  
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
5.5.1 First-stage results: Social and financial efficiency measures 
In order to take care of some statistical noises in our DEA estimation, the bootstrap DEA was 
employed by using 2,000 replications with a confidence interval of 95%. In order to build a 
single efficient frontier, each CFI is regarded as a separate, different observation in each year 
of the study period of eight years (Curi et al., 2012; Moradi-Motlagh et al., 2015). Our 
estimation scores are shown in Table 5.7 below with the average, estimates of the original and 
bias-corrected efficiency scores of overall, social and financial efficiencies for the period 2010-
2017. Our results show numbers and percentage of CFIs that are fully efficient in each category. 
For interpretation purposes we focus on the bias-corrected scores as they are closer estimates 
to the real efficiency.  
The social efficiency mean score of South African financial co-operatives is very low at 8.94%, 
far below the tolerable value of above 50% (Cooper et al., 2007) and below what Martínez-
Campillo and Fernández-Santos (2017) found in credit co-operatives in Spain of 66.42%. South 
African CFIs have a very long way as to go as they need to increase their social output by 
91.06% given the resources at their disposal. Only 5.8% of DMUs are socially efficient above 
50%, which translates to only 12 of the DMUs out of the 206 observations and there is no fully 
efficient DMU. Social efficiency is also low with the average original score at 15.19% and a 
minimum close to zero (0.12%). This can also be partly explained by the descriptive statistics 
in Table 5.5 revealing a large variation in the number of members among the sample CFIs, 
with a minimum of 17, standard deviation of 1,478 and a maximum of 10,777. This can also 
be supported by Table 5.1 showing a trend in the CFI industry with members regressing from 
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59,394 in 2011 to 29,818 in 2017. On the other hand, average loan balance increasing 
significantly from ZAR1,963 to ZAR6,780 respectively. 
The performance of financial efficiency is better compared to social efficiency but still far 
below the performance of credit co-operatives in other countries. CFIs have a financial 
efficiency mean score of 38.43%, meaning the industry has the potential to increase its financial 
performance by 61.57% from the resources they are currently utilizing (deposits and operating 
expenses). Only 34.9% of the DMUs (72 observations) are financially efficient above 50%. 
This performance is lower than the 63.94% financial efficiency mean recorded in Spain for the 
period 2008-2013 (Martínez-Campillo et al., 2016) and 63% found by Barra et al. (2013) in 
Italian credit unions during the period 2006-2010. The overal technical efficiency combining 
social and financial variables has an efficiency score of 44.8% whilst 39.8% of DMUs (82 
observations) have an efficiency score above 50%. In summary, our sample CFIs are both 
financially and socially inefficient, meaning there is 55.2% technical inefficiency which points 
to a lot of input wastage in the intermediation process. To eliminate the technical inefficiencies 
the industry it is necessary to implement innovative business models that optimize the use of 
the available resources to increase outputs. 
Table 5.7: Social and financial efficiency scores 
 Overall Technical 
Efficiency 
 Social Efficiency  Financial 
Efficiency 
 Original 
eff 
Bias-
corrected 
 Original 
eff 
Bias-
corrected 
 Original 
eff  
Bias-
corrected 
Mean 0.5645 0.4480  0.1519 0.0894  0.4873 0.3843 
St. Dev 0.3118 0.2370  0.2619 0.1454  0.3300 0.2509 
Minimum 0.0304 0.0225  0.0012 0.0008  0.0304 0.0220 
Maximum 1.0000 0.8720  1.0000 0.5935  1.0000 0.8835 
Fully efficient DMUs # 40 0  12 0  32 0 
Fully efficient DMUs (%) 19.4 0.00  5.8 0.0  15.5 0.0 
Efficient > 50% DMUs # 106 82  19 12  86 72 
Efficient > 50% DMUs (%) 51.4 39.8  9.2 5.8  41.7 34.9 
 
To understand better whether South African CFIs are improving their social and financial 
efficiencies Table 5.8 below presents the mean efficiency scores for each year. The overall 
efficiency shows little progress from 46.91% in 2010 to 49.16% in 2017, the industry regressed 
from its highest of 51.54% in 2015. Throughout the years social efficiency has not shown any 
indications of improvement as a year of slight progress was followed by a swing. In a nutshell, 
the 2010 social efficiency score of 12.3% still remains the highest as there is no improvement 
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on the social impact. However, financial efficiency has been improving since 2010 from 
31.61% to 45.3% in 2017, meaning CFIs can still improve their financial performance by 
54.7% without the need for additional deposits and expenses. One major reason that could 
strongly explain insignificant and stagnant social efficiency is that, on average 37.7% of total 
assets are being invested in financial investments, crowding out credit to members. This is 
despite a low return of 8.5% as compared to a loan portfolio yield of 33.4% on average. This 
might mean that financial investments are not only contributing to social inefficiency but also 
enhancing financial inefficiency since assets that were supposed to benefit members are held 
in fixed investments and are not generating maximum potential returns for improved financial 
efficiency.  
Table 5.8: Social and financial efficiency estimates (2010-2017) 
  Overall Efficiency Social Efficiency Financial Efficiency 
 DMUs Original 
eff 
Bias-
corrected 
Original eff Bias-
corrected 
Original eff  Bias-
corrected 
2010 21 0.5744 0.4691 0.2093 0.1234 0.3787 0.3161 
2011 29 0.4529 0.3605 0.1485 0.0860 0.3586 0.2844 
2012 27 0.4478 0.3650 0.1086 0.0653 0.3636 0.2966 
2013 22 0.5583 0.4450 0.1386 0.0819 0.4869 0.3901 
2014 24 0.5912 0.4713 0.0940 0.0587 0.5667 0.4460 
2015 28 0.6573 0.5154 0.2034 0.1175 0.5946 0.4654 
2016 26 0.6040 0.4745 0.1296 0.0748 0.5356 0.4157 
2017 29 0.6351 0.4916 0.1824 0.1080 0.5978 0.4530 
 
Figure 5.1 below presents the social-financial efficiency (SFE) matrix based on biased-
corrected scores. Only 8 DMUs have their social and financial efficiency estimate scores above 
50% as shown in quadrant I, an indication that socially and financially the industry is 
performing below its potential as more DMUs are expected to be in this quadrant, indicating 
that CFIs are not achieving their outreach and financial objectives. In quadrant II, most CFIs 
are socially inefficient as their efficiency scores are below 50% whilst financially they seem to 
be doing relatively better. However, the bulk of South Africa’s CFIs are performing relatively 
poorly in both dimensions as shown by the many DMUs in quadrant III, whilst only four in 
quadrant IV are doing better on social efficiency at above 50% but they are financially 
inefficient. 
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Figure 5.1: Scatter plot of social and financial performance 
5.5.2 Second-stage results: Determinants of social and financial efficiency 
The results of the bootstrap truncated regression for financial and social models, where bias-
corrected DEA scores in the period 2010-2017 are regressed against a set of environmental 
variables, are presented in Table 5.9. The results show that the coefficient of age is negative 
and significant, meaning that as CFIs become mature they become inefficient in their activities. 
Although our results are not consistent with Martínez-Campillo et al. (2016), Marwa and 
Aziakpono (2016) and Paxton (2007) they are in agreement with Hermes et al. (2011) who 
provide evidence that age is negatively associated with technical efficiency.  
The ROA coefficient is negative but not statistically significant of financial efficiency (FE) but 
positive of social efficiency (SE), whilst AVSAV is positive and significant in the financial 
model, implying that an increase in average savings per member increases financial 
sustainability as more financial resources will be made available for lending to earn interest 
which is consistent with San-Jose et al. (2014). However, AVSAV is negatively and 
significantly correlated with social efficiency, implying an increase in average saving will 
affect the depth of outreach meaning that better-off members are joining the CFIs rather than 
the actual poor.  
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Table 5.9: Determinants of financial and social efficiency 
Variable 𝜷 Coefficients (bootstrap standard errors) 
 Financial Efficiency (FE) Social Efficiency (SE) 
Constant (𝜶) -1.7215*** 0.0144 
 (0.2450)  (1.6060) 
LnAge -0.7841*** -0.1255** 
 (0.0242) (0.1749)  
ROA -0.0124 0.0614 
 (0.0953) (0.3588) 
LnAVSAV 0.0272** -0.3813*** 
 (0.0136)  (0.2742) 
LnASSETS 0.1289*** 0.1791** 
 (0.0206) (0.1866) 
CAR 0.4138*** -0.4849*** 
 (0.0759) (0.4891) 
ASS 0.0004 -0.1930* 
 (0.0472) (0.4279)  
Sigma 0.1944*** 0.2286*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0595)  
Log-Likelihood 93.204 363.27 
R2 0.47867 0.30442 
LnAge age (in years); ROA return on assets; LnAVSAV average savings per member; LnASSETS total 
assets value (in ZAR); CAR capital adequacy ratio; ASS association belonging (dummy: 1=yes/0=non). 
Total number of replications = 2000 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
 
The coefficient for the relationship between total assets (LnASSETS), which is a measure of 
size in both models, is positive and statistically significant on both. This agrees with Glass et 
al. (2014), Martínez-Campillo and Fernández-Santos (2017) and Wijesiri et al. (2017). 
suggesting that larger CFIs are more efficient in terms of financial sustainability and poverty 
outreach, which can further be explained by their ability to reduce costs given their economies 
of scale through use of better technologies to deliver financial services. CAR, which measures 
financial leverage: the higher the ratio, the lower the financial leverage and the lower the 
financial risk (Martínez-Campillo and Fernández-Santos, 2017; Glass et al., 2014), has positive 
coefficient values and is statistically significant on financial and negatively statistically 
significant on social efficiency. This is expected since CFIs are self-funded enterprises with 
members’ savings as their major source of capital.  
Finally, regarding the ASS variable, our results suggest that the CFIs belonging or affiliated to 
an association such as a trade union, professional association or social club do not have any 
bearing on financial and social performance. Our results agree with the findings of Martínez-
Campillo et al. (2016) in Spain on financial efficiency but they differ on social efficiency as 
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they found that belonging to a group having a statistically positive coefficient at 10% indicated 
that Spanish CFIs belonging to a group managed their social activity better. 
5.6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
5.6.1 Conclusions 
The inefficiency in the intermediation process in the financial sector can affect its ability to 
generate sufficient income and reduce economic activities and economic development. This 
makes efficiency evaluation of importance not only to management but also to investors, policy 
makers, regulators and the general public. Efficiency measurement is important not only for 
mainstream banks but also for member-owned co-operative financial institutions to understand 
their progress in both their financial performance and their social performance. This research 
had two goals: to estimate the relative levels of social and financial efficiency of CFIs in South 
Africa between 2010 and 2017, and to analyze the major determinants of social and financial 
efficiency. 
With regard to the first goal, our research findings show evidence that South African CFIs 
achieved an overall technical efficiency of 44.8% between 2010 and 2017. As a result, the 
industry is 55.2% technically inefficient meaning there is a lot of resource wastage as the CFIs 
would increase their output by that margin if utilizing their deposits and operating costs (inputs) 
efficiently. On social efficiency, the industry achieved a relative efficiency level of only 8.94%, 
meaning that CFIs are generating 91.6%, far less the maximum level of social output expected 
if they used their savings and expenses in a more efficient manner. Similarly, they achieved a 
relative mean score of 38.43% in financial efficiency, meaning they need to increase their 
financial output by no less than 61.57% using the same amounts of deposits and expenses. The 
industry is operating below 50% minimum standard which puts into question their survival 
going forward if no action is taken. 
With regard to the second goal, our results indicate that age does not matter to social and 
financial efficiency, in fact as CFIs get older the less efficient they may be due to failure to 
embrace new technologies or more innovative ways of enhancing operations. ROA however 
does have a positive relationship with both financial and social efficiency, but it is not 
significant to explain the efficiency. These results are not surprising as the industry over the 
study period had -6.7% ROA. However, an increase in average loan per member will result in 
mission drift as the variable shows that the breadth of outreach on social efficiency is being 
affected as CFIs are targeting financially well-up members therefore affecting social efficiency 
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although financially it makes business logic to reduce transaction costs. These findings can be 
perfectly explained by Table 5.1 which shows that as membership declined from nearly 60,000 
to around 30,000, total savings increased from ZAR124 million to ZAR228 million from year 
2010 to 2017 respectively. As empirically proved, the size of the firm matters. In our case both 
financial and social efficiencies improve with CFI size, as the bigger the CFI the more attractive 
it becomes to quality human skills to provide effective leadership, making it better positioned 
to innovate, attract more members and have a strong balance sheet to disburse more loans and 
absorb some of the temporary losses. 
According to Marwa and Aziakpono (2015) a tight association bond might expose the 
institution to excessive systematic risk due to members’ homogeneity and might be a stumbling 
block towards further growth. This makes it necessary for the CFIs to diversify its membership 
base but also to exploit fully the benefits from members sharing a tight common bond. 
5.6.2 Managerial and policy implications 
The inefficiencies in the CFI industry are astronomically high due to the extreme sub-optimal 
outputs from available resources. Efforts to improve efficiencies in the industry require 
substantial collective efforts of policy makers, regulatory authorities, trade associations, CFI 
management and members to optimize resource utilization. From our findings a number of 
recommendations can be made to government, NACFISA and CFI management. Our 
recommendations cover the need to have an industry strategy, effective leadership, growth 
options and asset allocation strategy. Firstly, the industry lacks a strategic guideline as currently 
there is no developed co-operative banking strategy. A shared strategic vision for the industry 
is important to clearly map the role of co-operative banking in the transformation of the 
financial sector and how CFIs can be used as a tool to tackle poverty, unemployment and 
inequality in the country. Specifically, it should address how CFIs can be used as conduits to 
create synergies between the formal and informal sectors of the South African economy.  
Secondly, as the saying goes “Everything rises and falls with the leader”: the level of industry 
inefficiencies points to a lack of effective leadership to deliver value to members and their 
communities. The effective industry leadership seems to be lacking in building strong 
institutions, starting at association level and going down to CFI governance and management 
levels. If Canada, US and Australia can have vibrant CFIs, then why not South Africa, where 
more than 8.5 million adults are financially excluded and the Gini income inequality coefficient 
is 63%? CFIs also thrive in Kenya, reaching 6.2 million people – why not in South Africa? 
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What differentiates these countries from South African CFIs is strong leadership that 
understands that the industry exists to deliver social and financial value to its members and the 
society sustainably. In appreciating the importance of good co-operative business leadership, 
Kenya established the Co-operative University of Kenya which is dedicated to develop skills 
in co-operative leadership. In a study of 353 MFIs across the globe, Pascal, Mersland and Mori 
(2017) found that MFIs with CEOs who have a business qualification perform far better 
socially and financially than those with CEOs without business qualifications. Although South 
Africa is still in the nascent stage of development characterized by volunteering labor, decision-
making positions should be occupied by skilled and experienced personnel. 
After addressing the strategic vision and the need for strong and effective leadership, thirdly, 
the industry needs growth in membership and deposits. The inefficiencies are partly attributed 
to low and decreasing membership over the years, therefore there is a need to diversify the 
range of financial services to members such as offering insurance services to members, 
payment services, and acting as a monthly social grants conduit from government. Importantly, 
banking systems need to be implemented to facilitate improved efficiencies and revitalize 
physical branches. CBDA and NACFISA need to jointly provide technical assistance to CFIs 
to improve their performance. In addition, new CFIs which are either community- or 
association-based need also to be developed to contribute to the broader agenda of financial 
freedom. In 2011 there were 121 CFIs, of which many have disappeared from the regulatory 
environment into the informal economy: it will be necessary to identify them and provide them 
with much needed technical assistance to re-establish themselves in the formal economy. 
Establishing new CFIs might take time as their appreciation of the co-operative banking 
concept and its value proposition might take time compared to existing players in the shadow 
economy. It is widely speculated that there are 820,000 stokvels with 11.4 million members 
and R44 billion collective savings in stokvels. Given their economic significance, CFIs should 
engage them to do their business in a formal and regulated environment. Finally, the industry 
and the regulator need to reconsider the current financial investment approach on how it 
enhances or affects social and financial efficiency. From the previous chapter it seems that both 
financial and social returns from investments are low compared to loans.  
5.6.3 Limitation and areas of further research 
This study has some limitations despite its contributions. Lack of qualitative information on 
the level and type of qualifications of the CFI managers could have been used as one of the 
exogenous variables. Empirical literature has it that MFIs with CEOs with business 
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qualifications perform significantly better, socially and financially, than those MFIs managed 
by CEOs with other types of educational backgrounds. The usage of number of members as a 
measure of social indicator might be implausible compared again the norm in the MFI literature 
where number of female borrowers are used to capture depth. Besides a well-motivated reason 
for using total number of members in the context of financial co-operatives as outreach is 
through savings first and credit later, the study could not obtain the figures of borrowers or its 
disaggregation along gender. Hence it is another limitation of this study. The study of 
productivity change in South African CFIs is of future interest to determine if our results were 
due to variations in efficiency and/or technological change. In addition, future research might 
need to consider a larger sample and remove some outliers to determine if efficiency score 
might improve. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE OF SOUTH AFRICAN CO-OPERATIVE FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS12 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the recent years, financial inclusion has captured the attention of the international 
development community, governments, policymakers, and academics to find ways of 
broadening access to financial services and effective delivery channels. This is supported by 
theoretical and empirical studies which demonstrate a link between inclusive finance and 
economic growth (see Goldsmith, 1969; Levine, 1997; Beck et al., 2009). Therefore, 
unsurprisingly, the performance (allocative efficiency) of different types of financial 
institutions has attracted the interest of academic researchers and policymakers. The financial 
intermediaries’ performance has traditionally been assessed with financial ratios, but recently, 
there is a shift towards frontier efficiency estimations. Recent studies use either parametric (e.g. 
stochastic frontier analysis) or non-parametric (e.g. data envelopment analysis) to estimate the 
efficiency of financial institutions (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).  
However, a smaller strand of the literature focuses on productivity growth, which measures 
productivity change generated from technological progress and changes in efficiency over 
time. Understanding the productivity of financial institutions is important because financial 
institutions are responsible for the efficiency allocation of funds to enterprises to finance their 
investments. Therefore, improvements in their ability to transform efficiently inputs such as 
savings/deposits and operating expenses to outputs like loans and investments is vital not only 
to the institution, but to the economy as well.  
CFIs are membership-based community organisations that operate in communities where 
conventional financial intermediaries have failed or chosen not to operate. CFIs mobilizes 
savings from their members for on-lending to the same members. CFIs differ from commercial 
banks in various aspects. First, CFIs pursue social and economic development objectives by 
maximizing members’ value compared to the profit-maximization motives of commercial 
                                                          
12 This chapter is under review by the Journal of Business Research, manuscript titled “Productivity Change of 
South African Cooperative Financial Institutions: A DEA-based Malmquist Index Approach”.  
An earlier draft of the chapter was presented at the UCT/Imperial Business School/ERSA/Review of Finance 
Conference on “Financial Intermediation in Emerging Markets, 07-10 December 2016, University of Cape Town 
Graduate School of Business, South Africa, titled “Total Factor Productivity Change of South Africa Cooperative 
Financial Institutions: A DEA based Malmquist Index Approach”. 
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banks (Goddard et al., 2008). Second, financial cooperatives are different in terms of their 
corporate governance and ownership structure. For example, cooperative shares are only traded 
with the cooperative itself at the nominal value or transferred to existing members. 
Furthermore, irrespective of the number of shares a member holds, only one vote is allowed 
per member. This is known as the “one man-one vote” principle which means that the rights 
are granted in the membership and not in the share. Therefore, there is no tension between 
minority and majority shareholders as there are no opportunities from the concentration of 
decision-making. Consequently, the members of a CFI are in a better position to ensure that 
the organisation is managed in the general interest of all the owners, reducing the agency 
problem (Pasiouras & Sifodaskalakis, 2010).  
However, dispersed ownership can weaken the individual member’s desire to control the 
activities of management, because the benefits arising are distributed equally among all 
owners. Third, CFIs operate within the common bond geographical space and focus on specific 
individual membership, while they provide support and encourage the development of local 
enterprises. Although this results in some restrictions in volume of their operations, it allows 
them to provide competitive financial services accustomed to local conditions at low 
transactional costs due to low information opacity. The CFI model is characterized as friendly 
and flexible suitable to empower communities by taking banking to the people. During the 
global financial crisis, CFIs proved that they are resilient to economic shocks (see Birchall, 
2013; Kuc & Teply, 2015; Becchetti et al., 2016). Such resilience drew policymakers’ attention 
to understand their model, making a study of CFIs important to enhance their sustainable socio-
economic transformation.  
The cooperative financial industry in South Africa is of particular interest to investigate 
productivity change as it went through major regulatory changes and technological advances 
in recent years. The passing into law of the Cooperative Act of 2005, the Cooperative Banks 
Act of 2007 and the subsequent formation of the Cooperative Banks Development Agency 
(CBDA) in 2009 provided the sector with both threats and opportunities. The major cost of 
regulatory changes to CFIs was the pegging of the minimum membership and share capital 
requirements to 200 and R100,000 (equivalent to US$13,700 in 2010) respectively, whilst 
Cooperative Banks (CBs) minimum share capital was pegged at R1,000,000 (equivalent to 
US$137,000 in 2010). Whilst opportunities emanated from the CBDA in providing free 
capacity building to the industry to enhance efficiency, and strengthening of CFIs’ corporate 
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governance structures (CBDA, 2015). In addition, CFIs are trying to develop financial products 
suited for their communities and are slowly embracing technology to lower transactional costs.  
Previous studies investigated productivity of South African commercial banks (Okeahalam, 
2006; Ncube, 2009; Mlambo & Ncube, 2011; Maredza & Ikhide, 2013; Simbanegavi et al., 
2015). Okeahalam (2006) examined efficiency of 61 bank branches in the nine provinces using 
1999 financials and found every branch operating at increasing returns to scale. Mlambo and 
Ncube (2011) found that in the period 1999-2008 average efficiency in the South African 
banking was trending upwards but the number of efficient banks was falling. In the period 
2000-2010 Maredza and Ikhide (2013) employing the Hicks-Moorsteen index found that the 
four largest banks experienced a 16.96% productivity decline during the global financial crisis 
period compared to the pre-crisis period. The authors identified operational efficiency, non-
performing loans, size and non-interest income activities as the major bank productivity 
determinants in South Africa.  
Simbanegavi et al. (2015) found monopolistic competition in the South African banking sector 
though not acting as a cartel and recommend enhancing of contestability to improve efficiency 
required to create a fully functional credit system. The current study contributes in two different 
ways. CFIs are playing an important role in addressing credit market failure in the South 
African financial system and ensuring their efficiency and productivity will enhance 
contestability in the banking sector for improved financial services to the excluded. The 
importance of CFIs efficiency not only will it enhance overall economic efficiency and growth, 
but it enhances poverty reduction caused by low productivity as a result of lack of access to 
financial services. Lastly, recommendations are made to managers, practitioners and 
policymakers on areas of performance improvement thereby contributing to the finance 
cooperatives literature. 
The objective of the present study is to use the data envelopment analysis (DEA)-based 
Malmquist productivity index (MPI) bootstrap approach as propose by Simar and Wilson 
(1999). The approach allow us to estimate for the first time, the productivity change on an 
unbalanced and balanced panel dataset of South African CFIs over the period 2010-2017. By 
applying the bootstrap DEA-based MPI methodology, the study investigates the sources of 
productivity change of South African CFIs given the regulatory change in the industry. In the 
second stage we employ truncated bootstrap regression approach proposed by Simar and 
Wilson (2007) to examine impact of environmental variables on Malmquist Index (MI) and 
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technical efficiency change (TECH) for managerial implications. Our current research will a 
make contribution from the methodological points of view through use of double bootstrap on 
DEA-based Malmquist approach and truncated regression as proposed by Simar and Wilson 
(1999 and 2007). To the best of our knowledge, double boostrap method is for the first attempt 
employed to examine productivity change of CFIs as well as the use of both balanced and 
unbalanced datasets in a single study. 
The study is organised as follows: Section 6.2 provides a brief overview of the South African 
banking sector and the CFI industry. Section 6.3 reviews the main literature on microfinance 
and CFI productivity, while in Section 6.4 we outline the approaches to productivity 
measurement. Section 6.5 discusses the results, and finally we conclude with managerial 
implications in Section 6.6. 
6.2 BANKING SECTOR OVERVIEW AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
Contrary to most African countries, South Africa’s financial sector is regarded as developed 
by international standards. The World Economic Forum (2014) Competitive Survey Report 
2014-2015 ranked South African banks in terms of soundness at 6th position out of 144 
countries. However, South Africa’s banking sector is dominated by five big banks13, which 
collectively hold 90.7% of the total banking-sector assets (SARB, 2016). The entry of foreign 
banks that was expected to increase market competition failed as they chose to enter niche 
markets not dominated by the big five. Hence the sector still exhibits a high concentration and 
continues to behave in an oligopolistic manner. Economic theory suggests that the banking 
sector domination has an effect on efficiency and reduced lending to deserving projects as 
banks become too selective, as big banks like big deals (Minsky, 1993). This results in “too 
much finance” to the few, rather than increasing access to the broader population. The World 
Bank (2015) reports that South Africa’s domestic credit to private sector (% GDP) in 2015 was 
148.7%, up from 111.0% in 1994, indicating an increasing over-indebtedness but to the few. 
Although South Africa is a more industrialized economy than most of its African peers, it has 
the highest inequality in the world with a 63.4% Gini coefficient in 2011 from 59.3% in 1993 
(World Bank, 2013). Moreover, total financial inclusion is yet to be achieved, as shown by the 
results of FinScope (2015) which indicates that 8.5 million adults remain excluded from formal 
financial services. The country’s oligopolistic banking sector makes access to credit difficult 
                                                          
13 Standard Bank, FirstRand Bank, ABSA Bank, Nedbank and Investec Bank 
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for most households, rural areas, the informal sector and small to medium enterprises (SMEs). 
This is despite the belief that SMEs in South Africa account for 91% of formal businesses, 
contribute 57% of GDP and provide almost 60% employment (Groepe, 2015). FinScope (2010) 
survey reveals that 90% of small business owners lack access to credit and start-up finance, 
and one in two borrow business finance from family and friends. In an effort to build an 
inclusive and efficient financial system, the government is promoting the development of CFIs.  
6.2.1 South African CFIs and their role in financial inclusion 
The CFI industry has undergone through significant structural and institutional changes in 
recent years. Before the enactment of the new regulations, the regulation and supervision of 
the industry was fragmented, resulting in the proliferation of small CFIs with weak capital base 
due to lack of sufficient regulatory oversight. The small CFIs were believed to have been used 
as channels for development funding (grants) and donations, to the detriment of the CFIs as 
deposit mobilisation vehicles lending to its membership (CBDA and SARB, 2013).  
With the changes in the regulation and supervision, CFIs have gone through sweeping changes, 
mainly driven by policy and regulatory reforms, and also by some technological innovations, 
which together considerably altered the environment in which they operate. Following the 
introduction of formal registration in 2012, the number of registered CFIs dropped from 121 in 
2011 to 26 in 2015. It is understood the dropouts were either non-operational or did not meet 
the minimum requirements of 200 members or R100,000 in member shares (CBDA, 2016). 
Table 6.1 highlights the trend in the industry where the number of CFIs and membership 
dropped by 46% and 18% respectively from 2010 to 2017, while the quality of the institutions, 
as reflected in the savings and total assets, has improved, albeit at a slow pace. Figures from 
WOCCU (2016) reveal that South African CFI industry very small with the lowest penetration 
rate of 0.06% compared to Africa average of 8%, Kenya (13.3%) Togo (26.7%), Senegal (15%) 
and Mauritius (5.2%). This seems to confirm the findings of Perileux et al. (2016) that CFIs 
reach more members in countries where the banking sector is less developed. However, 
according to WOCCU (2016) the penetration rate in well developed financial markets is better 
than in developing and emerging markets for example Australia (17.6%), Canada (46.7%), US 
(52.6%) and Ireland (74.5%). This challenges the findings of Perileux et al. (2016).  
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Table 6.1 Trend in the South African CFIs industry 2010-2017 (in Rand) 
Period No. CFIs Members Savings (ZAR) Loans (ZAR) Assets (ZAR) 
2010 56 36,434 124,365,000 93,651,000 142,069,000 
2011 121 59,394 175,265,000 116,577,000 195,213,000 
2012 106 53,240 196,230,000 132,227,000 217,506,000 
2013 35 38,084 200,841,000 142,310,000 220,800,000 
2014 26 33,391 198,624,948 140,463,755 231,367,670 
2015 26      24,721 201,101,522 152,143,102 236,533,481 
2016 30 29,752 233,763,289 179,338,526 279,624,000 
2017 30 29,818 228,216,993 202,160,606 293,493,697 
% 2010-2017 -46.4 -18.2 83.5 53.7 51.6 
% 2011-2017 -75.2 -49.8 30.2 42.3 50.3 
Source: Authors’ computation from CBDA and SARB Annual Reports 
In an effort to support innovation and stability, the South African government issued CFI Retail 
Savings Bonds and is providing technical assistance to CFIs leadership to manage effectively 
(CBDA, 2015). If CFIs are to develop fully, they are likely to give competition to 
moneylenders, such competition is likely to push the production possibility frontier outward in 
a battle to increase outreach and sustainability, therefore reducing credit rationing (Manos and 
Yaron, 2009). CFIs in South Africa are collectively the Financial Service Cooperatives (FSCs) 
(Village Banks), Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs), and Cooperative Banks (CBs). 
The South African CFI model promotes the evolution of FSCs and SACCOs into CBs as the 
CBs were once SACCOs.  
6.3 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW  
There have been considerable research efforts to measure MFI efficiency (see Marwa and 
Aziakpono, 2016; Gutierrez-Nieto et al., 2007; Hermes et al., 2011; Wijesiri and Meoli, 2015; 
Paradi & Zhu, 2013), but very few empirical studies explore productivity change (see 
Gebremichael and Rani, 2012; Ben Soltane, 2014; Ben Soltane and Mia, 2016). This may be 
attributable to difficulties in obtaining panel data for individual CFIs as most of them do not 
submit their financial results to the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) database as is 
usually done by MFIs. 
A relative, although smaller, strand of the literature focuses on productivity growth, which 
measures productivity improvement generated from changes in efficiency and technological 
progress (Pasiouras and Sifodaskalakis, 2010). The majority of the literature on productivity 
has focused on the formal banking industry in various economies (see Worthington, 1999; 
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Tortosa-Ausina et al., 2008; Sufian, 2009; Portela and Thanassoulis, 2010; Matthews and 
Zhang, 2010; Maredza and Ikhide, 2013; Bahrini, 2015). The semi-formal microfinance sector 
has largely been overlooked, however, there are limited productivity analyses lately (see Ben 
Soltane, 2014; Aslam Mia and Ben Soltane, 2016; Azad et al., 2016). However, productivity 
assessment for CFIs is largely missing except for Pasiouras and Sifodaskalakis (2010). 
Although empirical research on MFI programs productivity analyses is still in its infancy, the 
number of studies increased during and after the global financial crisis.  
Among the handful of studies attempting to evaluate productivity change in MFIs are Ben 
Soltane (2014), who examined the productivity change of 33 MFIs operating in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region during the period 2006-2011 using DEA-based MPI. 
He finds an overall productivity gain of 4.9% annually attributed to technical efficiency change. 
On the other hand, Wijesiri and Meoli (2015) investigated the productivity movement using a 
balanced panel dataset of 20 Kenyan MFIs in the period 2009-2011 using bootstrap MI and 
find productivity progress of 7% per annum due to technological advances. However, matured 
MFIs had lower productivity than their young counterparts which are adopting innovative 
financial solutions. Studies by Gebremichael and Rani (2012), Ben Soltane (2014), Mia and 
Chandran (2016) and Azad et al. (2016) show evidence that seems to suggest that MFI 
productivity is contributed more by technical efficiency change than technological change. 
Table 2 below summarizes empirical studies on MFI productivity. 
Low utilization of innovative delivery channels in CFI operations, financial literacy and 
managerial capabilities seem to be the major contributors of low productivity. Kauffman and 
Riggins (2012) find that information communication technology (ICT) plays a very important 
role in mature MFIs sustaining their businesses in competitive operating environments. Despite 
the positive impact of ICT in MFIs, only a third of MFIs in Africa and South-East Asia have 
been computerised compared to two-thirds of their peers in East Europe, Central Asia and Latin 
America (Frankiewicz, 2004; Corvoisier and Gropp, 2009). However, the use of ICT by CFIs 
remains low compared to the modern banking sector. On the other hand, there are critics of 
higher technology use in MFIs, as large capital investment may affect the double bottom of 
CFIs due to the inherent labour intensiveness of their operations (Mia et al., 2015)
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Table 6.2 Summary of empirical literature on MFIs and CFIs productivity 
Study Method Country/Region Observation Period Indicators Used Main Findings 
Sufian (2007) Malmquist 
Productivity Index 
Malaysia Balanced panel 
dataset with 20 
NBFIs 
observations, 
Annual reports  
2000-2004 Inputs: total loans, interest income 
Outputs: total deposits, interest 
expense 
NBFIs exhibit productivity regress 
of 2.3% attributed to TCH (-5.9%) 
and TECH (+5.1%) i.e. 1.9% 
SECH and 3% PTECH  
Tortosa-Ausina 
et al. (2008) 
Bootstrapped 
Malmquist Index 
Spain Balanced panel 
dataset of 50 
Savings Banks 
with 350 
observations 
1992-1998 Inputs: labour, capital, and deposits 
Output: loans, core deposits, and 
non-interest income 
Productivity growth occurred due 
to improvement in production 
possibilities. The bootstrap reveals 
disparities in the original scores as 
some DMUs lessened greatly. 
Pasiouras & 
Sifodaskalakis 
(2010) 
Malmquist TFP Greece  Balanced panel 
dataset of 13 
Cooperative Banks 
with 65 
observations 
2000-2005 Intermediation approach (IA) and 
production approach (PA)  
Inputs: fixed assets, no. of 
employees, and deposits  
Outputs: loans and investments 
(deposits input in IA, output in PA) 
The results are mixed. IA indicates 
a small decrease of 3% whereas PA 
indicates an increase of 6.6% in 
TFPCH. 
Nawaz (2010) DEA and Malmquist 54 Countries Unbalanced panel 
dataset of 204 
MFIs with 383 
observations 
2005-2006 Inputs: total assets, operating costs, 
no. of staff, and total subsidies 
Outputs: loans, financial revenue, 
and subsidy revenue 
MFIs that cater for the poor are less 
efficient than with relatively well-
off clients. Lending to females is 
efficient only in subsidies presence. 
Productivity progress of 1.1% from 
TECH 8.1%, TCH regress by 6.5%  
Gebremichael 
& Rani (2012) 
Malmquist Index Ethiopia Balanced panel 
dataset of 19 MFIs 
with 114 
observations  
2004-2009 Inputs: operating expense/admin 
expense, and no. of employees 
Outputs: gross loan portfolio, 
interest and fee income, and loans 
outstanding 
Technical efficiency gain is the 
source of productivity growth, i.e., 
PTECH and SECH (8.9% and 
1.1% respectively) 
Twaha & 
Rashid (2012) 
Bayesian technique India Unbalanced panel 
of 64 MFIs, 292 
observations 
2005-2011 Variables: MFI age, no. of staff, 
offices, active borrowers, average 
loan size, and cost per loan  
Active borrowers (0.04%), and cost 
per loan (1.9%) correlate to the 
productivity  
Bairagi (2014) Stochastic Frontier 
Approach 
Bangladesh Balanced panel 
dataset of 10 MFIs 
2003-2011 Inputs: total assets, no. of staff, 
operating and financial expenses  
Output: loans, interest, & fees 
Productivity gain of 2.6% annually 
driven by 2.5% technological 
progress, and TECH of 0.1% 
Ben Soltane 
(2014) 
DEA-based 
Malmquist Index 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
Balanced panel of 
33 MFIs with 198 
2006-2011 Inputs: operating expense/admin 
expense, and no. of employees 
TFPCH progress of 4.9% p.a. 
TECH of 8% (5.4% PTECH and 
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Study Method Country/Region Observation Period Indicators Used Main Findings 
observations, MIX 
database 
Outputs: interest fee income, and 
gross loan portfolio 
2.4% SECH) drives performance, 
while -2.9% technological change 
has a detrimental impact.  
Tahir & Tahrim 
(2014) 
Dynamic Malmquist 
approach 
Cambodia Balanced panel 
dataset of 13 MFIs 
with 54 
observations 
2008-2011 Inputs: total assets, and operating 
expenses  
Outputs: no. of active borrowers, 
and gross loan portfolio 
Total productivity gain of 4.9% 
mainly attributed to technological 
change, while there is scale 
inefficiency 
Bahrini (2015) Bootstrapped 
Malmquist Index 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
Balanced panel 
dataset of 33 
Islamic banks with 
198 observations 
2006-2011 Inputs: labour, fixed assets, total 
deposits 
Outputs: total loans, investments, 
non-operating income 
Banks productivity decline of 0.4% 
due to PTE regress of 0.7% and 
scale inefficiency of 0.4%. TFP 
decrease mainly in the global 
financial crisis period 
Wijesiri & 
Meoli (2015) 
Bootstrapped 
Malmquist Index 
Kenya A balanced panel 
dataset of 20 MFIs 
with 80 
observations 
2009-2012 Inputs: total assets, operating 
expenses, and no. of employees 
Outputs: financial revenue and no. 
of active borrowers 
Productivity progress of 7% p.a. 
attributed to TCH advances of 
13.9%, whilst TECH regress by 
6.1% (PTECH -1.8% and SECH -
4.3%). Matured MFIs had lower 
productivity than young MFIs 
Mia & 
Chandran 
(2016) 
Malmquist Index Bangladesh Balanced panel 
dataset of 162 
MFIs with 972 
observations 
2007-2012 Inputs: no. of employees, operating 
expenses/average assets. 
Outputs: financial revenues/assets, 
average loan balance, no. of savers 
4.3% productivity advances 
attributed to TECH of 4.9% (2.5% 
SECH and 2.4% PTECH), whilst 
0.6% regress in TCH.  
Aslam Mia & 
Ben Soltane 
(2016) 
DEA Malmquist 
Productivity Index 
5 South Asia 
Countries  
Balanced panel 
dataset of 50 MFIs 
with 300 
observations 
2007-2012 Inputs: operating expense/ loan 
portfolio (%), total staff 
Outputs: financial revenue/ assets, 
no. of active borrowers, average 
loan balance/GNI per capita 
Productivity growth of 2.1% due to 
technical efficiency change 
(PTECH 0.6% and 1.5% SECH 
change with technological change 
remaining static 
Azad et al. 
(2016) 
Malmquist Index Bangladesh Balanced panel 
dataset of 15 major 
MFIs with 75 
observations 
2008-2012 Inputs: financial cost ratio (%), 
operating expenses 
Outputs: net savings, return on 
assets (%) 
MFIs experienced excellent TECH 
progress (93.5%) mainly driven by 
PTE (84%), SECH 2.2%, TCH 
3.7% and country’s best economic 
setting before 2008 
Azad et al. 
(2016) 
Meta-frontier 
Malmquist Index 
51 Countries in 
SSA, MENA, 
ESA, LAC, 
EECA 
Balanced panel 
dataset of 743 
MFIs with 7,430 
observations 
2004-2013 Inputs: cost per borrower, and cost 
per loan  
Outputs: borrowers per staff 
member, borrowers per loan 
officer, and depositors per staff  
There is productivity progress in 
ESA (0.5%), EECA (0.17%), and 
LAC (0.06%), while there is 
productivity regress in SSA 
(0.39%) and MENA (0.23%) 
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6.4 METHODOLOGY 
6.4.1 The Malmquist productivity index 
There are several methods that could be used to measure productivity change in the academic 
literature: Fisher, Törnqvist and the Malmquist indexes (MI) (Sufian, 2007; Ben Soltane, 
2014). The Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) was named after Professor Sten Malmquist 
(Malmquist, 1953) who pioneered the distance function idea in the field of economics, 
independent of each other with Shephard (1953). The MI was then introduced by Caves et al. 
(1982) as a theoretical index defined in terms of input and output distance functions, it was 
further extended by Färe et al. (1992) and is now widely utilized to measure the changes in 
performance over time in various firms.  
The Malmquist index has three main advantages relative to the Fischer and Törnqvist indexes. 
Firstly, it does not require the profit maximization (or cost minimization) assumption. 
Secondly, it does not require information on the input and output prices. Finally, it allows the 
decomposition of productivity change into two components: technical efficiency change (or 
catching up), and technical change (or changes in best practice). Therefore, the CFI’s 
productivity change can be attributed to either change in technical efficiency (i.e. whether CFIs 
are getting closer to the production frontier over time) or changes in technology (i.e. whether 
the production frontier is moving outwards over time), or both. The total factor productivity 
change (TFPCH) is the product of technical efficiency change (TECH) and technological 
change (TCH). TECH is further decomposed into pure technical efficiency (PTECH) and scale 
efficiency change (SECH). PTECH refers to the CFI’s ability to avoid waste by producing as 
much output as input usage allows or by using as little input as output allows, whilst SECH 
refers to the ability to work at optimal scale (Ben Soltane, 2014; Wijesiri & Meoli, 2015; 
Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 1996).  
TCH is the capacity of optimal mixture of inputs and outputs generated from capital equipment 
and better technology used in the production process (frontier shift over time). In the context 
of the present study, superior technology can be referred to incorporating ICT in operations, 
new products, new lending methodology, close proximity of services to members, 
comprehensive savings schemes, and so on. The use of latest innovation and devices in the 
financial intermediation channels shifts the DMU’s production frontier upwards and produces 
increased output from the same input levels or maintains output level from a reduced amount 
of inputs (Mia and Chandran, 2016). By so doing, productivity (TFPCH) either deteriorates or 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
151 
 
151 
 
improves. The main disadvantage of MPI is the necessity to compute the distance functions. 
However, the DEA technique can be used to solve this problem as developed by Farrell (1957). 
Despite the DEA having some advantages, it is criticized by researchers for not allowing for 
statistical inference and consequently its results are biased because it ignores sampling and 
measurement errors. This study adopted the homogeneous bootstrap algorithm in the first stage 
of the analysis as initiated by Simar and Wilson (2000) as discussed in section 6.4.2 below. 
 Given these reasons, among others, we have opted to choose the Malmquist productivity index 
(MPI) to estimate the productivity change of CFIs in South Africa. Following Fare et al. (1994), 
Fukuyama (1995), Jaffry et al. (2007) and Isik (2007) among others, the output-oriented MPI 
will be adopted for this study. Jaffry et al. (2007) point out that the output orientation is more 
appropriate given the objectives of a country’s financial industry. Output orientation refers to 
the emphasis on the equi-proportionate increase of outputs, within the context of a given level 
of input. Given that, this study follows Fare et al. (1994) and the output distance function is 
defined as: 
 𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓 {𝜃: (𝑥𝑡 ,
𝑦𝑡
𝜃
) ∈  𝑆𝑡}   … (6.1) 
      = (𝑠𝑢𝑝{𝜃: (𝑥𝑡 , 𝜃𝑦𝑡) ∈  𝑆𝑡}) − 1 
Equation 6.1 is defined as the reciprocal of the “maximum” proportional expansion of the 
output vectors 𝑦𝑡, given inputs 𝑥𝑡 that refer to technology. Furthermore, as we want to estimate 
the Malmquist index, the distance function in relation to time t + 1 is: 
 𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓 {𝜃: (𝑥𝑡+1,
𝑦𝑡+1
𝜃
) ∈  𝑆𝑡}                          … (6.2) 
 
This distance function (6.2) measures the maximal proportional change in outputs required to 
make (𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑡+1) feasible in relation to the technology at t. The output based TFP index, 
which is the ratio of the Malmquist output, and input quantity index extended by Bjurek (1996) 
is as follows: 
𝑚0
𝑡 (𝑦𝑠 , 𝑥𝑠 , 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡) =
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑦𝑡,𝑥𝑡)
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑦𝑠,𝑥𝑠)
                                        … (6.3)     
Following Fare et al. (1994) the Malmquist TFP change index between period s (the base 
technology period) and period t (the reference technology period), in that case, that t is the base 
technology and s is the reference technology (6.3) converts to:  
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𝑚0
𝑠(𝑦𝑠, 𝑥𝑠, 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡) =
𝑑0
𝑠(𝑦𝑡,𝑥𝑡)
𝑑0
𝑠(𝑦𝑠,𝑥𝑠)
                                     … (6.4) 
 
As Coelli, Prasada Rao, O’Donnell, and Battese (2005) point out, to circumvent the need of 
either imposing limitations or subjectively selecting one of the two technologies, the Malmquist 
TFP index is derived as the geometric mean of these two indices as follows: 
 
𝑚0(𝑦𝑠, 𝑥𝑠, 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡) = [
𝑑0
𝑠(𝑦𝑡,𝑥𝑡)
𝑑0
𝑠(𝑦𝑠𝑥𝑠)
×
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑦𝑡,𝑥𝑡)
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑦𝑠𝑥𝑠)
] 1/2                     … (6.5) 
 
A value of 𝑚0 greater than one indicates positive TFP growth from period s to period t, while 
a value less than one indicates TFP decline. An equivalent way of writing this index is: 
 
𝑚0(𝑦𝑠, 𝑥𝑠, 𝑦𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡)  =  
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑦𝑡,𝑥𝑡)
𝑑0
𝑠(𝑦𝑠,𝑥𝑠)
  ×   [
𝑑0
𝑠(𝑦𝑡,𝑥𝑡)
𝑑0
𝑠(𝑦𝑠𝑥𝑠)
×
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑦𝑡,𝑥𝑡)
𝑑0
𝑡 (𝑦𝑠𝑥𝑠)
] 1/2
 
      .. (6.6)          
     Technical Efficiency Change Technological Change 
 
Where the ratio outside the square brackets corresponds to the change in the output-oriented 
measure of Farrell technical efficiency between periods s and t. The remaining part of the index 
in equation (6.6) is a measure of technology shift between the two periods, evaluated at 𝑥𝑡 and 
also at 𝑥𝑠. Hence, we have: 
 
         𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐶𝐻 = 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 × 𝑇𝐶𝐻                                                … (6.7) 
 
Where TFPCH is the TFP change, TECH is technical efficiency change (under CRS 
technology), and TCH is the technological change. A gain in TCH shows a shift in the best 
practice frontier, while improvement in TECH resembles the catching-up (i.e. greater than one) 
or productivity stagnation TECH if equal to one. 
As highlighted above, if the production technology exhibits CRS there are only two sources of 
productivity growth: technical change and efficiency change. However, if the production 
technology exhibits variable returns to scale (VRS) there are two additional sources of 
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productivity growth: scale efficiency (SECH) and pure technical efficiency (PTECH). PTECH 
is specified as: 
 𝑃𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 =
𝑑0𝑣
𝑡 (𝑦𝑡,𝑥𝑡)
𝑑0𝑣
𝑠 (𝑦𝑠,𝑥𝑠)
                                              … (6.8) 
 
and SECH is specified as: 
 
             𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐻 = [
𝑑0𝑣
𝑡 (𝑦𝑡,𝑥𝑡)/𝑑0𝑐
𝑡 (𝑦𝑡,𝑥𝑡)
𝑑𝑜𝑣
𝑡 (𝑦𝑠,𝑥𝑠)/𝑑0𝑐
𝑡 (𝑦𝑠,𝑥𝑠)
×
𝑑0𝑣
𝑠 (𝑦𝑡,𝑥𝑡)/𝑑0𝑐
𝑠 (𝑦𝑡,𝑥𝑡)
𝑑0𝑣
𝑠 (𝑦𝑠,𝑥𝑠)/𝑑0𝑐
𝑠 (𝑦𝑠,𝑥𝑠)
]
1/2
 
                         … (6.9) 
 
SECH is actually the geometric mean of two-scale efficiency change measures, the first relative 
to the period t technology, and the latter relative to the period s technology. Subscripts v and c 
refer to the VRS and CRS technologies respectively. Hence, we have: 
 
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 = 𝑃𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 ×  𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐻                                  … (6.10) 
 
Which results in equation (6.7) being re-specified as: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐶𝐻 = 𝑃𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 ×  𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐻 ×  𝑇𝐶𝐻                         … (6.11) 
The above formula shows that CFIs will experience improvement in their productivity due to 
technological investments and advances (TCH>1) and/or closure of the performance gap 
between the best and worst practice CFIs owing to better resource management (PTECH>1) 
and/or movement towards their optimal size (SECH>1). The importance of this decomposition 
lies in the fact that, in practice, CFIs face either economies or diseconomies of scale because 
of imperfect competition, constraints of finance and so on. Thus, it is possible that they are 
technically efficient but not scale efficient. This means that CFIs can produce their current level 
of output with fewer inputs (under an input-oriented approach) or expand their output with the 
same inputs (under an output-oriented approach) if they operate at the right size.  
6.4.2 Bootstrapping Malmquist indices 
Despite the DEA having some advantages, it does not allow for statistical inference and 
consequently its results are biased because it ignores sampling and measurement errors (Simar 
and Wilson, 2000). Given the estimation of TFPCH, TECH and TCH are based on conventional 
DEA, it is not clear whether these changes indicate real change or are artificial of sampling 
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noise (Simar and Wilson, 2000; Wijesiri and Meoli, 2015). Simar and Wilson (1998, 1999) 
introduced the bootstrap techniques, which allow for determining the statistical properties of 
non-parametric frontier methods and, hence, for constructing confidence intervals and 
correcting the estimation bias for efficiency scores and Malmquist productivity indices. The 
bootstrap was introduced by Efron (1979) as a computer-based method considered as a 
resampling procedure that makes inferences about a sampling distribution by resampling the 
sample itself with replacement. This study adopted the homogeneous bootstrap algorithm in 
the first stage of the analysis as initiated by Simar and Wilson (1998). See Simar and Wilson 
(1998, 1999, 2000) for technical details on bootstrap algorithm employed in this study. This 
study performs 2000 bootstrap number of replications (B=2000). 
6.4.3 Data sources 
This study is employed secondary data extracted from CFIs audited financial statements filed 
with the CBDA for SACCOs and FSCs, and the SARB for CBs covering the period 2010-2017. 
The study period is characterized as an era of regulatory changes and is also determined by 
data availability. When the CBDA started regulating the industry, submission of CFI annual 
financial statements became mandatory as compared to the approach of previous regulators. 
Our study is different from similar empirical work, which usually utilize the (Microfinance 
Institutions eXchange (MIX) database which usually collection financial information on MFIs. 
However, the MIX database usually does not have data for CFIs, which makes empirical 
research on these grassroots economic actors very limited.  
Due to variations in number of CFIs in the period under study, the number of CFIs submitting 
their annual financial statements also varies: 21 in 2010, 29 (2011), 27 (2012), 22 (2013), 24 
(2014), 28 (2015), 26 (2016) and 29 in 2017. Given the level of variation due to the frequency 
of entry and exit in the first stage analysis of productivity unbalanced panel dataset with a total 
of 192 observations was used to estimate productivity and its sources in the period 2010-2017. 
This makes our study one of the few studies to employ an unbalanced panel data to estimate 
total factor productivity (see Nawaz, 2010; Twaha & Rashid, 2012). 
Due to high frequency of entry and exit a sample of CFIs that managed to survive from 2010 
to 2017 was identified to understand their productivity compared to the high frequency 
consolidated sample. 15 CFIs (i.e. two CBs, six SACCOs, and seven FSCs) managed to submit 
their financials with CBDA and SARB consistently from 2010 to 2017. Before the 
advancement of measurement techniques, the Malmquist total factor productivity approach 
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requires all the DMUs to have their inputs and outputs without any missing data according 
(Coelli et al., 2005). In summary, the second analysis is based on a balanced panel dataset of 
15 DMUs with 120 observations over 8 years. Our study sample contributes 99.9% of the CFI 
industry’s total assets in 2017 making the sample equal to the population. 
The sample sizes are considered sufficient for the purpose of this study considering previous 
empirical studies and the rule of thumb by Charnes et al. (1990) and Cooper et al. (2007). Of 
particular interest to this study is a study by Drake (2001) who used a sample of nine banks to 
estimate technical and scale efficiency and productivity gains in the UK banking sector. 
Pasiouras and Sifodaskalakis (2010) used 13 cooperative banks in Greece on a productivity 
study covering the period 2000 to 2005. Maredza and Ikhide (2013) employed SFA estimate 
productivity change of four major commercial banks in South Africa for the period 2000 to 
2010 to investigate the impact of the global financial crisis on banks’ productivity. According 
to Charnes et al. (1990) and Cooper et al. (2007), in order for the efficiency scores to be robust 
and reliable suggest the minimum sample size required for a DEA study is three times the sum 
of total number of inputs (X) and total number of outputs (Y), that is, N=(X+Y) *3. Cook et al. 
(2014) posits that, the large numbers of inputs and outputs compared to the number of DMUs 
may diminish the discriminatory power of DEA. Therefore, we consider our sample size to be 
appropriate based on empirical literature and best practice. 
6.4.4 Selection of inputs and outputs 
In measuring productivity of financial institutions, the most challenging problem lies in, 
defining the outputs and inputs of such institutions, and this remains a controversial issue in 
the literature (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Gebremichael and Rani, 2012). However, there are 
two common approaches to this problem: the production approach and the intermediation 
approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Athanassopoulos, 1997). Under the production 
approach, financial institutions are regarded as producers of deposits and loans, while the 
number of employees, physical capital and operating costs used to perform these transactions 
are considered as inputs. Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Sufian (2011) advise that the 
production approach might be more suitable for branch efficiency studies, as at most times 
bank branches process customer documents and bank funding, while investment decisions are 
for the most part not under the control of branches. This makes this approach not likely to be 
appropriate for the current study. The intermediation approach considers financial institutions 
as playing an intermediary role of transferring resources from savers to borrowers. Under this 
approach, inputs are measured as deposits collected, funds borrowed from financial markets, 
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and operating expenses incurred in playing the intermediary role such as staff salaries and 
administration costs, whereas outputs are the loans, investment, interest income.   
CFIs play an intermediary role between member savers and member borrowers, who in most 
instances are the same. Given this, we consider that CFIs produce three outputs: Loans to 
members (𝑌1), Investments (𝑌2) and Financial Revenue (𝑌3). Investments includes liquid term 
investments with commercial banks, and investment securities held to maturity, such as CFI 
bonds. By producing these outputs, CFIs employ two inputs: Deposits/members savings (𝑋1) 
and Operating expenses (𝑋2) incurred in the intermediation role. In addition, the choice for 
inputs and outputs is guided by their frequent use in literature (see Table 6.2 above) and our 
understanding of the role of CFIs on the inputs they need and how the outcome of their role is 
usually revealed. Bahrini (2015) used total deposits as inputs whilst total loans, investments, 
and non-operating income were outputs. Pasiouras and Sifodaskalakis (2010) selected fixed 
assets, number of employees and deposits as inputs, and loans and investment as outputs under 
the intermediation approach. In a more recent study, Aslam Mia and Ben Soltane (2016) used 
two inputs which are operating expenses/loan portfolio, and number of staff, whilst three 
outputs were financial revenue/assets, number of active borrowers, and average loan 
balance/GNI per capita. According to Paradi and Zhu (2013), a more practical approach is to 
choose variables that the researcher sees as representative of the DMU’s model as this tends to 
help with acceptance of the results. 
6.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we first present and discuss the descriptive statistics of inputs and outputs to 
have a better understanding of the variables and the size variability of the CFIs in the sample. 
This is followed by the results found by applying the bootstrap DEA-based MPI approach to 
an unbalanced and balanced dataset of CFIs over the period 2010-2017 and finally, bootstrap 
truncated regression results are discussed. 
6.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
It is apparent from Table 3 below that over the study period, the standard deviation values vary 
greatly for both inputs and outputs. This is attributable to the difference in CFI size in our 
sample, being small, medium and large entities especially if one takes a closer look into the 
pooled means and standard deviations of loans and deposits. The average total loans per CFI 
has been on the increase from R4.3 million in 2010 to R7.1 million seven years later, supported 
by the growth in total deposits from R6 million to R8.5 million respectively. However, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
157 
 
157 
 
operating expenses increased by nearly 37% to an annual average of closer to R0.7 million per 
CFI, which might have a negative impact on productivity and funds available for lending. 
Although financial revenue doubled in the period 2010 to 2017, some firms are not generating 
significant revenue when considering the minimum values. An analysis by CFI type, shows 
CBs, SACCOs and FSCs with deposits averaging R34.8 million, R10.3 million and R1.7 
million respectively over the period. Their size variation also stimulates the interest to 
understand the productivity differentials of these sub-groups so that appropriate managerial 
recommendations are suggested. 
Table 6.3 Summary statistics of input and output variables (Figures in Rand) 
Variable  Year  Mean   Std. Dev.   Min   Max  
Deposits 2010          6 039 113              9 023 588  153 154  32 000 151  
 2011          5 843 585           10 833 125  11 600  41 331 634  
 2012          7 038 004           12 802 830  70 884  48 986 108  
 2013          8 561 941           15 140 935  132 676  54 436 314  
 2014          8 261 121           16 288 773  20 550  68 789 571  
 2015          7 636 351           16 547 632  1 000   77 205 992  
 2016          9 057 669           19 107 685  15 305  86 737 120  
 2017          8 469 882           19 379 334  3 240  96 353 394  
      
Expenses  2010             491 127                 504 970         61 613  2 058 917  
 2011             507 451                 526 802  32 840   2 088 966  
 2012             536 525                 523 035  16 289  1 974 050  
 2013             658 367                 576 928  15 700   2 016 018  
 2014             550 102                 570 572  3 647  1 879 698  
 2015             565 974                 632 621  1 406  2 490 510  
 2016             684 684                 681 957  5 695  2 885 438  
 2017             673 910                 789 872  1 474   3 571 892  
      
Loans 2010          4 318 619              7 441 807        15 563   24 625 118  
 2011          3 716 808              7 990 720  11 000   29 442 227  
 2012          4 909 780           10 121 471  98 416  36 382 616  
 2013          6 285 666           12 227 951  15 780  44 091 910  
 2014          6 200 488           12 191 920  10 500  45 608 419  
 2015          5 758 532           11 808 518  1 477   50 435 065  
 2016          7 185 075           14 559 427  2 164    61 711 154  
 2017          7 174 907           15 725 774  5 000  72 441 095  
      
Investments 2010          1 584 027              1 819 040        35 345  7 565 783  
 2011          1 972 633              3 405 318  13 087  13 405 931  
 2012          2 083 486              3 598 702  22 077  14 087 812  
 2013          2 813 042              4 095 917  109 000  15 859 855  
 2014          2 973 400              6 236 444  74 000  29 189 427  
 2015          2 619 053              6 212 228  53 078  30 805 624  
 2016          3 048 988              6 324 797  13 179  29 608 583  
 2017          2 718 858              5 559 207  79 625  27 952 287  
      
Financial Revenue 2010             713 987                 982 586  31 553    3 243 761  
 2011             719 167              1 114 519  13 511     4 443 451  
 2012             729 562              1 176 346  10 529   5 168 035  
 2013          1 228 506              1 498 644  4 435  5 877 222  
 2014          1 076 646              1 560 177  3 364     6 234 776  
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 2015          1 163 921              1 802 405  3 011  7 444 019  
 2016          1 402 013              2 114 734  4 439    8 227 851  
 2017          1 405 777              2 448 229  1 355  9 976 973  
Pooled      
Deposits 2010-2017          7 611 092           15 203 748          1 000  96 353 394  
Expenses 2010-2017             584 441   606 591  1 406   3 571 892  
Loans 2010-2017          5 700 301           11 772 554  1 477    72 441 095  
Investments 2010-2017          2 429 374              4 855 456       13 087  30 805 624  
Financial Revenue 2010-2017          1 059 340              1 677 448           1 355  9 976 973  
Source: CFIs annual reports and authors’ calculations 
6.5.2 Productivity changes of South African CFIs 
In this section, we present and discuss the results found by applying bootstrap DEA-based 
Malmquist index approach over the period 2010-2017 following Fare et al. (1994) output-
oriented productivity change on unbalanced and then balanced datasets. Secondly, we analyse 
the performance of individual CFIs and then their sub-groups to understand their individual 
and sub-group productivity change. In this study, we report these indices following Casu and 
Girardone (2004), Pasiouras and Sifodaskalakis (2010), and Azad et al. (2016). The 
productivity scores are reported in Tables 6.4 and 6.5. As explained earlier, index values below 
1 indicate productivity decline whist above 1 represents progress. Table 6.4 below present the 
productivity change on unbalanced panel dataset. The results show an annual productivity 
regress of 3.9% in the period 2010-2017. Since 2013 the industry has been experiencing 
productivity regress with a huge productivity decline of 22.5% in the period 2015-2016. This 
huge drop is attributed to the deregistration of two big DMUs and failure of another DMU to 
fully utilize its improved deposits mobilized to generate more loans, investments and financial 
revenue. This is clearly unpacked in Section 6.5.4. 
Table 6.4 Productivity change on unbalanced panel (Geometric means) 
YEAR TECH TCH PTECH SECH TFPCH 
2010-2011 0.841 1.172 0.940 0.895 0.985 
2011-2012 1.043 0.975 1.028 1.015 1.017 
2012-2013 0.829 1.283 0.843 0.984 1.063 
2013-2014 0.815 1.201 0.870 0.937 0.978 
2014-2015 0.943 1.022 1.008 0.957 0.986 
2015-2016 0.589 1.316 0.806 0.731 0.775 
2016-2017 1.217 0.778 1.127 1.080 0.947 
2010-2017  0.877 1.091 0.940 0.937 0.961 
TECH, technical efficiency change; TCH, technology change; PTECH, pure efficiency change; SECH, 
scale efficiency change; TFPCH, total factor productivity change (MPI). 
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The major source of productivity decline is the technical efficiency change (TECH) regress of 
12.3% which is the failure of CFIs to move closer to the production frontier over time. The 
only period CFIs managed to experience the catching-up or progress is the period 2011-2012 
and 2016-2017. The results suggest that CFIs lack the managerial capability to catch-up with 
the best performers by implementing managerial strategies to improve the performance of CFIs 
over time. By decomposing the catching-up effect into pure technical efficiency change and 
scale efficiency change provide further evidence that CFIs are being affected by both the pure 
technical (-6%) and scale inefficiency changes. A scale efficiency change regress of 6.3% 
indicate that the industry is operating below its optimal scale and the gap can be closed through 
efficient use of deposits and operating costs to minimize unnecessary excesses or expenditures.  
CFIs are doing well on the technological advancement with an annual gain of 9.1% on average. 
This indicate that the industry is trying to embrace use of technology and developing some 
improved financial services. Compared to what Wijesiri and Meoli (2015) observed in Kenya 
where MFIs experienced a 13.9% technological gain annually, there is still need for further 
improvement. The World Economic Forum (2017) ranked South Africa and Kenya at position 
35 and 36 respectively on innovation out of 138 economies as they have over the years 
witnessed a rapid growth in technological advancement and financial innovation compared to 
other African and Asian countries. The industry requires urgent managerial upskilling to drive 
the performance of poorly productive CFIs. In addtion, South African CFIs are not operating 
closer to their optimal scale operations as shown by a scale inefficency of 6.3%. Closing this 
gap require improving organizational processes and managerial knowledge to help the 
inefficient financial co-operatives to get closer to the production frontier over time and to catch-
up with those on the efficient frontier. 
6.5.3 Productivity growth by CFI 
To analyse further the productivity changes, we show the individual CFIs, in an attempt to find 
the best performers and what can be learnt by the industry from them to improve performance. 
Presented in Table 6.6 below is the geometric means of productivity change and its components 
by CFIs over the study period. From the Table we observe that, 18 CFIs experienced 
productivity progress, whilst 19 experience a productivity decline. Only one CFI has its average 
annual productivity growth above 20%, six has 10 – 20% productivity progress, whilst 11 has 
productivity change increase of less than 10%. On productivity regress six has an annual 
productivity decrease of 0-10%, with seven experiencing productivity declines ranging 
between 10-30% and six with productivity regress of more than 30% annually over the period. 
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CFI15 exhibit the highest productivity gain of 25.5%, whilst CFI5 witnessed the highest 
productivity regress of 90.7% annually in its two years of operations. Productivity of CFIs is 
being driven more by embracing new innovative interventions resulting in the frontier shift 
overtime than from improvement in managerial capabilities. However, few financial co-
operatives are able to catch-up with those on the frontier through improving their managerial 
allocative efficiencies as well as optimizing their economies of scale as displayed by CFI1, 
CFI17 and CFI28.  
South African CFIs are suffering more from scale inefficiency as 29 CFIs exhibit a scale 
efficiency regress compared to two with scale efficiency progress, whilst six are static. On the 
other hand, seven DMUs are experiencing progress resulting from efficiency improvements in 
operations and management activities, eight are static and 18 are experiencing managerial 
inefficiency regress to catch-up with those on the efficient frontier. Although the CFIs are doing 
generally better on technological advances with an overall 9.1% progress, 12 out of 37 CFIs 
experienced technological change regress. The worst performing CFIs need to learn from the 
best-in-class CFIs to catch-up and also try to be on the technological frontier of the industry. 
Table 6.5 Productivity growth by CFI and rankings based on TFPCH 
DMU  Rankings TECH TCH PTECH SECH TFPCH 
CFI1 26 0.868 1.007 0.962 0.902 0.874 
CFI2 27 0.841 0.992 0.861 0.977 0.835 
CFI3 19 1.035 0.929 1.200 0.863 0.962 
CFI4 13 1.008 1.033 1.026 0.983 1.041 
CFI5 1 1.003 1.252 0.689 1.456 1.255 
CFI6 5 1.000 1.132 1.000 1.000 1.132 
CFI7 16 1.080 0.947 0.944 1.144 1.023 
CFI8 17 0.901 1.131 0.960 0.939 1.019 
CFI9 21 1.000 0.935 1.000 1.000 0.935 
CFI10 15 0.841 1.222 0.940 0.894 1.028 
CFI11 2 1.000 1.191 1.000 1.000 1.191 
CFI12 18 0.971 1.045 0.994 0.977 1.014 
CFI13 3 0.921 1.287 0.962 0.957 1.186 
CFI14 24 0.813 1.114 0.819 0.993 0.906 
CFI15 28 0.839 0.994 0.859 0.977 0.834 
CFI16 9 0.860 1.246 0.914 0.941 1.071 
CFI17 20 0.642 1.480 0.780 0.824 0.950 
CFI18 32 0.792 0.863 0.867 0.914 0.684 
CFI19 14 1.000 1.031 1.000 1.000 1.031 
CFI20 22 0.833 1.111 0.849 0.981 0.925 
CFI21 30 0.726 1.005 0.808 0.899 0.730 
CFI22 4 0.915 1.254 1.000 0.915 1.147 
CFI23 6 1.229 0.916 1.230 0.999 1.126 
CFI24 29 0.876 0.941 1.077 0.813 0.824 
CFI25 7 0.961 1.147 1.025 0.938 1.102 
CFI26 36 0.581 0.763 0.928 0.626 0.443 
CFI27 31 0.565 1.037 0.693 0.977 0.702 
CFI28 12 1.000 1.045 1.000 1.000 1.045 
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CFI29 11 0.990 1.061 1.031 0.960 1.051 
CFI30 23 0.841 1.081 0.955 0.881 0.909 
CFI31 10 0.919 1.155 0.991 0.927 1.061 
CFI32 35 0.408 1.476 0.640 0.637 0.602 
CFI33 33 0.558 1.152 1.496 0.373 0.642 
CFI34 25 1.000 0.883 1.000 1.000 0.883 
CFI35 34 0.843 0.756 1.000 0.843 0.637 
CFI36 37 0.298 0.313 0.915 0.326 0.093 
CFI37 8 0.893 1.204 0.927 0.964 1.075 
Geometric mean  0.877 1.091 0.940 0.937 0.961 
 
6.5.4 Productivity growth by CFI type 
We categorize CFIs into three sub-groups: CBs, SACCOs and FSCs. The classification is not 
arbitrary, although other criteria could be used such as size (Worthington, 1999; Pasiouras & 
Sifodaskalakis, 2010; Alhassan & Biekpe, 2015) or age (De Sousa-Shields & Frankiewicz, 
2004; Bogan, 2012; Bayai & Ikhide, 2018). The sub-groups are purely based on South Africa’s 
CFI type (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion). CBs operating under the regulation of the 
SARB and are more professionally managed. Whilst SACCOs are concentrated in towns and 
townships catering for the need of both working class, such as workers’ unions, and the 
informal sector. FSCs also known as Village Banks are mostly townships, peri-urban and rural 
communities based, they were initially formed as an alternative financial systems to reduce 
financial exclusion of the non-white race caused by the apartheid system through technical 
assistance from The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (see Genesis 
Analytics, 2014; Meagher and Wilkinson, 2002). Given their different taget communities and 
history, they differ on their product offerings and taget membership. Table 6.7 presents the 
geometric means of TFPCH by CFI type.  
We observe varying productivity change across all CFI type with CBs experiencing 3.2% 
productivity gain, whilst SACCOs and FSCs are witnessing an annual TFPCH regress of 6.8% 
and 3% respectively. Productivity change progress for CBs is coming from substantial gains in 
the technological frontier-shift of 8.8%, whilst technical efficiency change decrease by 5.1%. 
A similar technological progress trend is also being experienced in SACCOs and FSCs of 3.6% 
and 11.9% respectively. It is surprising that FSCs which are mainly located in most 
disadvantage communities are becoming more technologically and innovation driven than CBs 
and SACCOs which are mainly located in townships, towns and cities. FSC might be investing 
in new technology and delivery channels to reduce transactional costs and improve 
convenience leading to productivity change improvement (see Beck et al., 2013; Srairi, 2011). 
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In addition, the CBDA has been rolling out a banking system to CFIs since 2014 but 
implementation has been low. 
Table 6.6 Productivity by CFI type (unbalanced panel) 
CFI TYPE TECH TCH PTECH SECH TFPCH 
Cooperative Banks      
2010-2011  0.938   1.013   1.000   0.938   0.950  
2011-2012  0.962   1.058   1.000   0.962   1.018  
2012-2013  1.082   0.988   1.000   1.082   1.069  
2013-2014  0.844   1.244   0.944   0.894   1.049  
2014-2015  0.826   1.143   0.954   0.865   0.944  
2015-2016  0.983   1.185   0.953   1.032   1.164  
2016-2017  1.036   1.009   1.009   1.026   1.045  
Geometric Mean  0.949   1.088   0.980   0.969   1.032  
SACCOs      
2010-2011 0.839 1.116 0.995 0.844 0.937 
2011-2012 0.977 1.119 0.993 0.984 1.094 
2012-2013 0.941 0.961 0.851 1.106 0.905 
2013-2014 0.981 1.109 1.177 0.834 1.088 
2014-2015 0.808 1.046 0.911 0.887 0.845 
2015-2016 0.892 1.065 0.974 0.915 0.950 
2016-2017 0.874 0.860 1.003 0.872 0.752 
Geometric Mean 0.900 1.036 0.982 0.916 0.932 
FSCs      
2010-2011 0.822 1.277 0.870 0.945 1.050 
2011-2012 1.136 0.827 1.073 1.059 0.939 
2012-2013 0.728 1.606 0.810 0.899 1.170 
2013-2014 0.700 1.268 0.675 1.036 0.887 
2014-2015 1.050 0.993 1.076 1.014 1.084 
2015-2016 0.441 1.493 0.713 0.619 0.659 
2016-2017 1.601 0.691 1.252 1.279 1.107 
Geometric Mean 0.862 1.119 0.903 0.959 0.970 
      
Cooperative Banks  0.949   1.088   0.980   0.969   1.032  
SACCOs 0.900 1.036 0.982 0.916 0.932 
FSCs 0.862 1.119 0.903 0.959 0.970 
 
However, some players are trying to broaden their financial services offering (CBDA, 2016) 
through issuing debt cards, structured credit facilities and various investment instruments that 
tries to address members’ financial needs. However, the adoption of mobile money in South 
Africa is still low compared to Kenya, this explains a 13.9% leapfrog in technology progress 
in MFIs (Wijesiri and Meoli, 2015). The results are at variance from what was observed in 
European cooperative banks in the period 1996-2003 where 4 to 8% productivity gains were 
due to better managerial practices (Molyneux and Williams, 2005). The differences might be 
due to changing times, whereas in the current period there is a lot of technological innovation 
driving business growth compared to the period 1996-2003 when productivity was mainly due 
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to improvement in management competences, allocative efficiencies and economies of scale 
through increased branch networks.  
Across all CFI types, managerial efficiency has regressed by 5.1% in CBs, 10% in SACCOs 
and 13.8% in FSCs. The results reveal that managerial deficiencies are more severe in FSCs 
followed by SACCOs but less acute in CBs. The decomposition of managerial inefficiency 
show that all CFI types are not fully utilizing the optimal mixture of inputs or producing as 
much loans, investments and financial revenue from available deposits and expenses being 
incurred as well as operating below optimal scale. FSCs experiencing the highest PTECH 
decline of 9.7% which represent inefficiency in their operations and management activities. In 
the period 2015-2016 FSCs experienced a huge productivity decline of 31.62% which is mainly 
due to technical efficiency change regress of 55.69% and scale inefficiency of 38.1%. This 
massive drop is attributable two large CFIs with substantial deposits which were dissolved and 
another CFI which suddenly increased its deposits mobilization by 361% but could not 
managed to convert them into loans and investments to generate more financial revenue 
resulting in massive productive regress during that period.  
On the other hand, SACCOs are facing a huge challenge of scale efficiency decline of 8.4% 
yearly. Closing the managerial competencies deficit require management training to improve 
decision-making capabilities, whilst there is also need to improve allocative efficiency to 
operate at sub-optimal scale in SACCOs, however, CBs and FSCs need also reduce scale 
inefficiencies of 3.1% and 4.1% respectively.   
6.5.5 Productivity change on 15 CFIs based on balanced panel (2010-2017) 
Table 6.7 presents results of balanced panel of 15 CFIs that operated fully throughout the study 
period. The results reveal that our balanced panel of CFIs exhibit a nearly static productivity 
change but however had a minor 0.2% productivity regress attributable to TECH regress of 
9.7% annually. Since the period 2012-2013, productivity has been on a seesaw with 
productivity advance being followed by a regress in the following year. PTECH and SECH 
regress by 5.5% and 4.4% respectively which points out for improvement in business decisions 
and better utilization of wasted resources. 
Our balanced panel CFIs are failing to realise economies of scale through adopting appropriate 
technologies to produce even beyond tradition scale. Casu et al. (2004) reported scale 
inefficiencies in Italy, France and Spain and interpret it as “wasted expenditure” attributed to 
uneconomical scale size but use of appropriate technology make them produce beyond scale. 
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Table 6.7 Productivity change on balanced panel (Geometric means) 
YEAR TECH TCH PTECH SECH TFPCH 
2010-2011 0.890 1.159 0.937 0.950 1.031 
2011-2012 1.025 0.996 1.041 0.984 1.021 
2012-2013 0.907 1.220 0.881 1.031 1.108 
2013-2014 0.702 1.249 0.863 0.813 0.876 
2014-2015 0.940 1.076 0.971 0.969 1.012 
2015-2016 0.732 1.246 0.895 0.817 0.912 
2016-2017 1.228 0.852 1.042 1.178 1.047 
2010-2017  0.903 1.105 0.945 0.956 0.998 
 
6.5.6 Productivity change comparison of unbalanced and balanced panels 
To improve our understanding and analysis Figure 6.1 below presents a comparative trend of 
productivity change on unbalanced and balanced panels.  
Figure 6.1 Comparative productivity change trend for the period 2010 – 2017 
 
The results suggest that a balanced panel performs productively better than the unbalanced 
panel throughout the study period except in the period 2012-2013. This seem to suggest that as 
CFIs gain some experience they perform better than new entrants which call for further analysis 
on the determinants of productivity.   
6.5.7 Second-stage: bootstrap truncated regression analysis 
After the Malmquist productivity indices are estimated, the bootstrap truncated regression 
analysis suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007) is used to determine the effects of the initial 
efficiency change (IEFFCH), financial self-sufficiency index (FSS), number of members, cost-
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to-income ratio (CIR) and AGE on MI and TECH. Simar and Wilson (2007) criticized the use 
of censored (Tobit) regression in the second stage analysis though it has been widely applied. 
The reason is that, because explanatory variables are correlated with the error term, the 
assumption that error term is independent of explanatory variables becomes invalid and input 
and output variables are correlated with explanatory variables (Wijesiri et al., 2017). Simar and 
Wilson (2007) addressed this issue by proposing an alternative double bootstrapped procedure 
that permits valid inference while simultaneously generating standard errors and confidence 
intervals for the efficiency estimates.  
The current study employed the bootstrap procedure proposed by Simar and Wilson (1998) to 
derive the unbiased estimates of the determinants of MI and TECH. Following Odeck (2009) 
and Wijesiri and Meoli (2015:119), technical efficiency scores for the base year (IEFFCH) is 
included as one of the determinants of productivity change is “conditional on the initial level 
of efficiency from which change occur”. So we investigate the effects of base efficiency change 
on productivity and technological advances. FSS was employed as a measure of sustainability 
on how well generated revenue from loans and investments cover expenses (Cull et al., 2007; 
Ayayi and Sene, 2010). Number of members is included as Groeneveld (2012) observes that 
the strength of co-operatives are in their members and if members are not willing to put savings 
in their financial institutions, it will fail. As a measure of cost efficiency, CIR is included as a 
firm that fails to manage its operating costs will face productivity decline. In addition, AGE is 
used as an indication of years of experience. The estimation specifications are as follows:  
𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛(𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5ln(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖                                                                                                                                    … (6.12) 
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛(𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5ln(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖                                                                                                                                    … (6.13) 
Where, 𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡 are productivity and technological change, respectively. 𝛼 is a 
constant term; 𝛽1, 𝛽2, … 𝛽5 being the parameters to be estimated and explanatory variables as 
already explained. 
Table 6.8 below give some summary statistics of explanatory variables used in the second stage 
and the correlation matrix. Our correlation coefficients are less than 0.70 which Kennedy 
(2008) proclaims to be the value above which the regression estimates would suffer from 
multicollinearity challenges. 
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Table 6.8 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of model constructs  
 IEFFCH FSS CIR Members Age 
Mean 1.001 1.072 1.194 1292 10.662 
St.Dev  0.639 1.333 1.525 1522 5.777 
Minimum 0.298 -1.829 0.154 34 2 
Maximum 4.834 14.397 18.254 10777 25 
      
Correlation matrix      
IEFFCH 1.0000     
FSS -0.0597 1.0000    
CIR -0.1101 -0.1745** 1.0000   
Members -0.1313 -0.0173 -0.0546 1.0000  
Age -0.1861** -0.0565 -0.1029 0.1362* 1.0000 
 
6.5.8 Second-stage results: Double bootstrap truncated regression 
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 6.9 below. IEFFCH contributes 
positively to MI and negatively to TCH but not statistically significant in both aspects, 
suggesting that initial efficiency has no influence on MI and TCH during the sample period. 
The results confirm with the findings of Wijesiri and Meoli (2015) in Kenya MFIs but differ 
from Odeck (2009) who found that Norwegian grain producers with greater initial efficiency 
had larger increases on the MI than otherwise.  
Table 6.9 Truncated bootstrap regression (2000 iterations) 
Variable Coefficients (bootstrap standard errors) 
 Malmquist Index (MI) Techological Change (TCH) 
Constant (𝜶) 0,8904* 0.8364** 
 (0.4679)  (0.3672) 
IEFFCH 0.6071 -0.0342 
 (0.1368) (0.1082)  
FSS 0,1674** 0.2022*** 
 (0.1246) (0.1081) 
LnMembers 0.0699 0.0521 
 (0.0532)  (0.0486) 
CIR -0.1909 -0.0899 
 (0.1620) (0.0706) 
LnAge -0,1482* -0.0898 
 (0.1117) (0.0969) 
Sigma 0.3646*** 0.3302*** 
 (0.0907) (0.0991)  
Log-Likelihood -45.471 -32.463 
R2 0.16348 0.17001 
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FSS has a positive and significant impact on productivity and technological progress signifying 
that good financial performance of CFIs enhances productivity and that financially sustainable 
financial institutions are more likely to invest more in technology and innovation. The results 
are once again consistent with the findings of Wijesiri and Meoli (2015) who find ROA having 
a strong influence on productivity and technological change. On the other hand, the number of 
Members has a positive but insignificant impact on MI and TCH whilst CIR has a negative but 
insignificant influence on productivity and technological change. This suggest that in as much 
as the number of members and CIR influence productivity change and the catching-up effects 
in an expected way their impact in the study period is not felt but not necessarily mean that 
they are not important.  
The results show that AGE has a negative significant impact on productivity but insignificant 
on technological advances. These results seem to suggest that young CFIs are aggressive in 
embracing technology and innovation than mature ones though not statistically significant, 
similar to what Wijesiri and Meoli (2015) found out. These results are consistent with Barron 
et al. (1994) who studied the growth and mortality of credit unions in New York City in the 
period 1914 – 1990 and found evidence that suggests that as credit unions age they become 
less able to respond to new challenges, innovation and thereby become less productive. Similar 
findings were also recently found by Bakker and Josefy (2018) who studied the impact of age 
by reviewing over 350 prominent studies that included age. They find evidence that seem to 
suggest that, organizations are becoming more fluid and temporary and far fewer organizations 
live to reach old age making age not much important. 
6.6 CONCLUSIONS  
The present paper investigates the productivity change of South African CFIs from 2010-2017 
using bootstrap DEA-based Malmquist index. The total factor productivity change is further 
decomposed into technical efficiency change (managerial acumen/catching-up) and 
technological change (innovation frontier-shift) to identify sources of productivity change. 
Empirical findings reveal CFIs’ productivity regressed by 3.9% annually, driven by the 
inability of CFIs to adopt industry best practices as shown by the catching-up regress of 12.3%, 
although technological change progressed by a 9.1% annually. Worryingly, productivity has 
been on a decrease over the years since the period 2012-2013 without any sign of stagnation 
or rebound. On a balanced panel of 15 CFIs there was a productivity decline of 0.2% annually 
emanating from technical efficiency change regress whilst there was much progress in 
innovation frontier-shift. By CFI type, only CBs had a productivity gain of 3.2%, whilst 
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SACCOs and FSCs experience productivity decline of 6.8% and 3% respectively, driven 
mainly by technical efficiency change. Overall, the CFI industry needs to improve its 
managerial acumen, and scale optimization for full resources utilization especially in SACCOs 
and FSCs. 
The bootstrap second stage regression results suggest that financial sustainability is very 
important in driving productivity growth and technological advancement in CFIs. Younger 
CFIs appear to be experiencing better productivity progress than mature ones, the same as in 
technological advance but not at a significant level. Growth in members also revealed as having 
positive influence on technological and productivity progress but not a significant level in the 
study period. Meanwhile, CFIs need to take advantage of their strong roots in their 
communities and their good knowledge of the local entrepreneurial environment to reduce 
information asymmetries, monitoring costs, and reduce adverse selection and moral hazard. 
This study has extended our understanding of the productivity dynamics in CFIs while 
empirically providing insights of sources of inefficiencies. Comprehensive in-depth 
investigation among the best performing CFIs has produced further insights into the innovation 
dynamics in the industry after changes in the regulatory environment to assist weak performers 
to catch-up with best industry performers. The major contribution of this research is the use of 
double bootstrap Malmquist productivity index methodology by Simar and Wilson (1999) in 
the co-operative finance industry. The additional contribution is the use unbalanced and 
balanced panel data in a single study of productivity change. Further studies could engage CFI 
experts to understand the qualitative drivers of performance among CFIs and suggest possible 
growth strategies. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DRIVERS, INHIBITORS AND THE FUTURE OF CO-OPERATIVE FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA14 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Financial markets failure is one of the challenges facing many economies as large banks tend 
to engage in credit rationing of small to medium enterprises (SMEs) and marginal communities 
citing information asymmetry and transaction cost challenges. The situation has worsened in 
the past two decades due to mergers and acquisitions which reduced the number of banks 
(Leyshon and Thrift, 1993; Berger et al., 2001). Ryan et al. (2014) found that increased bank 
market power results in increased financing constraints for SMEs across 20 European 
countries. Similarly, in Spain Carbó-Valverde et al. (2016) found that credit-constrained SMEs 
depend on trade credit, but not bank loans, and that the intensity of this dependence increased 
during the financial crisis. In a recent banking market structure study in Poland, Hasan et al. 
(2017) found that cooperative banks facilitate access to bank financing, lower financial costs, 
boost investments, and favour growth for SMEs. They found that regions where cooperative 
banks hold a strong position are characterized by the rapid pace of new firm creation, whilst 
the opposite effects appear in the majority of cases for local banking markets dominated by 
foreign-owned banks. Unlike traditional banking institutions, Co-operative Financial 
Institutions (CFIs) are member-focused deposit taking and loan granting institutions, and are 
efficient in generating borrower-specific information, which can address ‘informational’ 
distance. The role of CFIs in the provision of ethical and social finance is a loud call for 
research to understand their qualitative performance drivers and inhibitors by engaging co-
operative finance experts to enhance their performance.  
Recently, a number of studies have started looking at how CFIs, which are a grassroot 
innovation, have performed during and after the global financial crisis compared to investor-
owned banks (Birchall, 2009, 2013; Kuc and Teply, 2015; Becchetti et al., 2016). Globally, 
Crear (2009) observed that not a single financial co-operative has received government 
                                                          
14 This chapter has been published by the journal Technological Forecasting & Social Change (2018) Volume 
133: 279-293. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2018.04.028 titled “Drivers, Inhibitors and the Future of Co-
operative Financial Institutions: A Delphi Study on South African Perspective”. 
An earlier draft of the chapter was presented at the Economic Society of South Africa (ESSA) 2017 Biennial 
Conference, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa, 30 August – 01 September 2017 titled “Cooperative 
financial institutions in South Africa at cross roads: Facing reality and the future”. 
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recapitalization following the recent global financial crisis. Statistics from the World Council 
of Credit Unions, a global trade association for credit unions and financial co-operatives, shows 
CFIs’ total assets reached $1,8 trillion and serving 236 million members in 2016, up from $1,2 
trillion and 177 million respectively in 2007 (WOCCU, 2016). The one member one vote 
system ensures CFIs serve common needs rather than the needs of a handful of individuals as 
in the case with traditional banks (Davis, 2001; McKillop and Wilson, 2015; Jones and Kalmi, 
2015). However, effective governance depends more on the willingness of members to exercise 
their ownership rights to express their views to the board of directors and to hold them 
accountable for value creation. CFI performance should be targeted towards value 
maximization (Keating and Keating, 1975), cost minimization, service maximization – whether 
for savers or borrowers (Keating and Keating, 1975; McGregor, 2005), and profit maximization 
for sustainability (Keating and Keating, 1975; Davis, 2001; Goddard et al., 2014).  
The CFI penetration rate in South Africa is the lowest in the world at 0.06% compared to Kenya 
(13.3%), Rwanda (13.8%), Togo (26.7%), Australia (17.6%), Canada (46.7%), United States 
(52.6%), Ireland (74.5%) and the worldwide average of 13.5% (WOCCU, 2016). Over recent 
years, there has been a decrease of South Africa’s CFIs and membership from 121 and 59,394 
in 2011 to 30 and 29,818 respectively in 2017 (CBDA, 2017). The decrease can be partly 
explained by the CBDA’s prescribed minimum membership and share capital contribution at 
200 and R100,000 respectively. In 2007, South Africa passed the Co-operative Banks Act and 
formed the Co-operative Banks Development Agency (CBDA) in 2009 with a mandate to 
formally regulate, supervise and develop the sector. The implementation of the regulation could 
have been harsh to small but growing CFIs, forcing them out of the regulatory environment.  
The study employed the ranking-type Delphi technique to gather expert opinions from those 
working in or with financial co-operatives. The major objectives of the study were, first, to 
properly understand the qualitative performance drivers and inhibitors of CFIs, and through a 
SWOT analysis to identify internal and external factors determining performance. Second, to 
forecast future developments that must happen in the co-operative finance industry to drive 
high-performance in the next 10 years and help craft growth strategies. We chose a forecasting 
period of 10 years because multiple organizations align their goals closer to the South Africa’s 
“National Development Plan 2030”, a socio-economic policy, and the United Nations’ 
Sustainable Development Goals 2030. These ambitious plans target to end poverty and reduce 
inequality by 2030 through inclusive growth, hence the need to bring our year 2027 forecast 
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closer to the national and global visions. The need to build robust inclusive financial services 
is necessary, as access to finance (A2F) appears to be highly correlated with poverty reduction 
(Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008). The contribution of CFIs towards members’ financial well-
being cannot be overlooked, hence the need to understand their performance drivers. A 
contribution to a better understanding through rigorous research is of value not only to 
researchers, CFI practitioners and members, but also to policymakers and regulators. 
To our knowledge, there are no studies that have examined the drivers and inhibitors to CFI 
performance or tried to develop alternative futures using hybrid Delphi-SWOT analysis. The 
Delphi method is suitable for exploratory research, theory building and forecasting involving 
complex and multi-disciplinary issues. The only previous attempt was by Marwa (2015) who 
used a case study mixed approach to understand what drives the performance of savings and 
credit co-operatives (SACCOs) in Tanzania. Most studies using Delphi focus on energy, 
automotive, information technology, agriculture, health, manufacturing and big data analytics 
(see Tavana et al., 2012; Campos-Climent and Apetrei, 2012; Förster, 2015; Worrell et al., 
2013; Obrecht and Denac, 2016; Vidgen et al., 2017).  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 provides an overview of financial inclusion in 
South Africa, whilst section 7.3 critique the literature on CFI performance drivers and 
inhibitors. Section 7.4 provides the data analysis on the convergence of consensus, followed 
by findings based on the final rankings by experts in section 7.5. Finally, we conclude with 
managerial implications and recommendations for future research in section 7.6. 
7.2 FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE ROLE OF CFIs 
In South Africa nearly 8.5 million adults are excluded from the formal financial system 
(FinMark Trust, 2016). In total, 77% of all adults have a bank account. However, if the social 
grant beneficiaries (nearly 5.1 million) are excluded, only 58% are banked. About 51% of 
adults are borrowing from various sources to supplement their limited resources, 46% from 
non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), while only 14% are borrowing from banking 
institutions. On the ‘quality’ aspect, the narrative for developmental credit is becoming the 
norm as only 5% are using credit for developmental reasons. In 2016, 33% of adults were 
saving, with 15% saving through banks, 14% saving with NBFIs, 8% with informal institutions 
and 11% saving at home. Previous attempts to increase financial inclusion through the Mzansi 
account (an entry-level national bank account targeting the mass population in 2004) failed, 
due to lack of quality of access to finance. Kostov et al. (2015) confirmed that Mzansi accounts 
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are perceived as not meeting the aspirations of those aiming to climb up the financial services 
ladder, making CFIs a suitable alternative. 
CFIs helps to bridge the financial exclusion gap by pooling members’ financial resources 
together for on-lending to the same members (Frame et al., 2002; McKillop and Wilson, 2015; 
Périlleux and Szafarz, 2015). As member-driven organizations operating within a common 
bond, they are better placed to reduce informational opacity and high transaction costs which 
usually result in credit rationing in credit markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). This enables 
members to break the poverty trap caused by lack of economic opportunities and low 
productivity due to lack of access to financial services. Since CFIs are owned and operated by 
members, they have an objective of maximizing services provided to members. This 
immediately suggests that profit maximization is not an ultimate objective, since there are no 
non-member suppliers or customers to exploit (Fried et al., 1993).  
7.3 LITERATURE REVIEW: PERFORMANCE DRIVERS AND INHIBITORS 
There are seven streams of empirical papers dealing with the performance dynamics of CFIs: 
industry professionalization (governance), policies, technology diffusion, social capital, 
outreach, economic trends and sector perception. Several studies reveal that co-operatives 
established with the social purpose of serving poor communities have the real possibility of 
becoming sustainable and effective, if and only if they adopt a radical commercial approach to 
organizational development. Professionally managed CFIs are found to be attractive to middle-
income earners (Jones, 2008; Crear, 2009; Goddard et al., 2009; Jones and Kalmi, 2015; 
McKillop and Wilson, 2015). Campos-Climent and Apetrei (2012) find human capital related 
factors as top priorities in overcoming challenges in Mediterranean co-operatives. McKillop 
and Wilson (2003) argued that if CFIs were to achieve social goals, they first had to achieve 
their economic ones. McKillop et al. (2007) found CFIs that concentrate solely on serving the 
needs of the financially excluded to be inherently weak and not sustainable in the long term. 
CFIs were advised to formulate policies and outreach strategies to draw members from a cross-
section of the population to achieve a balanced mix of funding and membership (Jones and 
Kalmi, 2015; McKee and Kagan, 2016).  
CFIs are driven by the social trust among people sharing a common bond much needed in 
building social capital and community relations. Putnam (1993) and Knack and Keefer (1997) 
posit that social capital supports growth and development through a number of channels, such 
as the reduction in uncertainty, transaction costs and contracts enforcement, thereby enhancing 
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efficiency. A survey by Sabatini et al. (2014) in Italy found that unlike any other type of 
enterprise, cooperatives have a particular ability to foster the development of social trust. In a 
similar study using a 2003-2011 dataset to understand the relationship between the market 
share of Italian credit cooperative banks and some measures of trust, Catturani et al. (2016) 
found that cooperatives require high levels of social capital to be successful. Trust is one of the 
pillars of well-functioning markets as the more the trust, the less the transaction costs. 
In addition, CFIs need to appeal to a broader spectrum of people to correct the perception that 
they are just the poor people’s banks rather than community banks serving a wider cross-
section of the society. McKillop et al. (2011) found that a CFI with mixed outreach to the poor, 
working poor, working class and middle class has the capacity to reach greater numbers of 
people living in poverty than an institution that exists to serve only the poor. Such CFIs have 
reduced exposure to concentration risk as loans and deposits of the relatively wealthier 
members drive growth, profitability and sustainability of the institutions, enabling them to 
provide affordable financial services to poor members while keeping costs low (Crear, 2009). 
McKillop et al. (2011) advocated for further legislative changes in the UK to promote CFIs to 
a broader population mix.  
In the UK the legislative review in 1996 provided an opportunity for credit unions to grow and 
extend their scale and scope of services to members including the affluent society (McKillop 
and Wilson, 2003). The reforms allowed CFIs to drive membership by relaxing the common 
bond restrictions to multiple bonds (Frame et al., 2002; Hinson and Juras, 2002; Jones, 2008). 
Even though the regulation changes transformed the structure of the industry, credit unions that 
switched from single-bond institutions to broader field-of-membership types were believed to 
be operating with a greater risk of bankruptcy. This is due to high information asymmetries 
through the broadening of the common bond and the likelihood of breaching regulatory 
standards (Frame et al., 2002; Ely, 2014). The introduction of a deposit insurance, the emphasis 
on effective risk management, and the opportunity to offer diverse innovative financial services 
were applauded (McKillop and Wilson, 2003). However, there were warnings of the likelihood 
of a decline in players through mergers. 
The overall consequence of deregulation brought changes in the patterns of growth across 
different types of credit unions (Goddard et al., 2016). Larger credit unions in the UK tended 
to grow faster than their smaller counterparts. Externally generated growth also took place via 
mergers and acquisitions, whereby larger, well-capitalized and technologically-advanced credit 
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unions acquired smaller, less capitalized counterparts that failed to adopt interactive banking 
technologies. Between 2003 and 2013, the number of credit unions reduced by approximately 
3% per year. In 1994, there were 7,848 credit unions with over US$10 million in assets; by the 
end of 2012 this number had declined to 2,489, a 68% decline (McKee and Kagan, 2016). 
Consequently, there has been a rapid growth in credit union asset size. In 2013 the average 
credit union had US$160.9 million assets compared to US$65.6 million in 2003 (McKillop and 
Wilson, 2015). However, Goddard et al. (2014) found other growth sources via diversification 
into non-interest activities, although this did not lead to enhanced returns for members. In 
Finland, Jones and Kalmi (2015) found a positive relationship between membership growth 
and financial co-operative performance. In the US, Leggett and Strand (2002) observed that, 
as CFIs add unrelated groups and expand, the prospects for separation between ownership and 
control increases, creating potential agency control problems. Management is apparently able 
to channel residual earnings away from members (higher net interest margins) toward itself 
(higher salaries and operating expenses). Second, as membership expands, each member can 
feel disempowered as many members no longer exercise their ownership rights and 
responsibilities in overseeing management (Leggett and Strand, 2002). Eventually this creates 
strategic defaults as members no longer see themselves as owners, resulting in high 
delinquency which weakens CFI balance sheets as observed in Czech (Kuc and Teply, 2015).  
Most CFIs are small and their capital stock in absolute value combined with risky assets puts 
pressure on their stability. Mathuva (2016) found size, capital base, loan to assets ratio, 
leverage and cost to income ratio were financial performance drivers in Kenya SACCOs. In 
similar study by McKee and Kagan (2016), of the US credit unions with assets below US$10 
million in 1994, only a third were still operational by 2011. De Carvalho et al. (2011) examined 
the causes of credit union failures in Brazil between 1995 and 2009, and their results suggest 
that the size of credit unions plays a key role in their survival and longevity. Goddard et al. 
(2014) found that in the US, relatively low membership and assets limits the capacity to attract 
deposits, adopt product marketing, process loans, adopt new technology and distribute 
regulatory compliance costs effectively. Technological innovation is often cited as the main, if 
not the most, influential driver of change in the banking industry. Technology has become the 
major game-changer in disrupting business models in delivering value (Bradley and Stewart, 
2002; Chandio et al., 2017). The decision to adopt technology is usually associated with asset 
size and the diversity of the credit union’s product offerings (McKillop and Quinn, 2015).  
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McKillop and Wilson (2003) warned policymakers not to provide too many policy incentives 
to support the development of CFIs as this will hinder their self-help cornerstone and weaken 
the future development of the movement. In US CFIs are tax exempt, with this status justified 
by their role in providing financial services to those of modest means. Investigations carried 
by Hinson and Juras (2002) and Chang et al. (2016) to understand which stakeholders benefit 
from tax exemption found that members do not receive the benefit in terms of lower loan rates, 
higher deposit rates or lower service charges as tax exemption benefits are directed to support 
inefficient operations.  
From the literature review, we summarize that each of the seven forces can be either a driver 
or inhibitor depending on its strength or weakness in influencing CFI performance as depicted 
in Figure 7.1 below. CFIs thrive on community’s social capital: if social ties are weak that will 
affect their performance. Social networks and technology enable financial innovation at 
grassroots and swift financial solutions delivery in a cost-effective manner, while its low 
adoption raises costs and restricts convenience. A wider membership outreach is important for 
meaningful capital and savings mobilization, while small CFIs have high chances of failure. In 
addition, professionally managed co-operatives attract membership as institutions with weak 
governance structures and incompetent staff perform poorly. 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Forces that drive and inhibit CFI performance 
Government policies and regulations as enablers have an important role to promote the 
formation and performance of CFIs, whilst unfavorable regulations affect growth and 
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performance and promote informality. Arun (2005) recommends appropriate country 
specificities for a regulatory framework to support sustainable delivery of inclusive financial 
services. On the other hand, perceptions on CFI value proposition is a major determinant of 
outreach. Lastly, the economic performance can either pull or push people to or from CFIs 
depending on the circumstances. We posit that each of these forces can be a driver or inhibitor 
depending on its strength or weakness. 
7.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
7.4.1 The Delphi method: an overview 
Quite a number of studies have compared traditional surveys and the Delphi method regarding 
their strengths and shortcomings (see Rowe and Wright, 1999; Okoli and Pawlowski, 2004; 
Förster, 2015). From these studies, we judge the Delphi method to be a stronger methodology 
to carry out a rigorous inquiry from co-operative finance experts on complex questions 
requiring collective judgement. Rather than attempting to assemble a statistically 
representative sample, the Delphi method utilizes a purposely selected panel of experts to 
comment on a problem or situation. The rationale for this design choice is that a non-
representative sample of experts is more equipped to arrive at a correct decision than a 
representative sample of non-experts (Rowe and Wright, 1999; Okoli and Pawlowski, 2004; 
Worrell et al., 2013).  
The effectiveness of Delphi method is enhanced in this study through a panel diversity as well 
as integrating Delphi with SWOT analysis for scenario development with a view to 
harmonising their potentialities and reducing their limitations (see Landeta et al., 2011). By 
building on the experts’ opinions, appropriate strategies are proposed using SWOT analysis as 
a methodological examination of the environment in which the sector operates. SWOT analysis 
is based on the identification of (a) internal organization/sector characteristics (Strengths and 
Weaknesses) and (b) external environment characteristics (Opportunities and Threats) (see 
Kotler, 1988). It constitutes an important method for learning about a situation and designing 
future propositions that can be considered necessary to enable strategic thinking by engaging 
with knowledgeable field experts (Barney, 1995; Dyson, 2004; Li et al., 2016). However, 
empirical literature that combines the Delphi method with SWOT analysis (hybrid Delphi-
SWOT) are very limited (see Dyson, 2004; Terrados et al., 2009; Li et al., 2016; Campos-
Climent and Apetrei, 2012; Tavana et al., 2012). None of the studies applied hybrid Delphi-
SWOT in financial co-operatives. 
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The Delphi method was originated in the 1950s at the RAND Corporation, a California-based 
think-tank in the US to come up with group opinions and to develop consensus on future 
developments among a group of experts (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963). It was first applied in the 
US Air Force for systematically and asynchronously capturing expert input to understand 
accurately current and future development pertaining to national security via iterations of 
questionnaires (Linstone and Turoff, 1975; Landeta, 2006). The method became popular only 
after it was published in 1963 by Dalkey and Helmer for non-military purposes after being kept 
confidential for 12 years (Landeta, 2006; Helmer and Quade, 1963). As a result of the Delphi 
declassification by the American forces from its secrecy category, its use spread rapidly 
(Landeta, 2006; Förster, 2015; Rowe and Wright, 2011; Rowe and Wright, 1999). The seminal 
work by Linstone and Turoff (1975) characterized the further growth of interest in Delphi. An 
examination of recent literature reveals how widespread the use of Delphi is, with applications 
in areas as diverse as the automotive industry (see Förster, 2015), energy (see Obrecht and 
Denac, 2016), agriculture co-operatives (see Campos-Climent and Apetrei, 2012), technology 
(see Worrell et al., 2013), internet banking (see Bradley and Stewart, 2002), financial markets 
(see Kauko and Palmroos, 2014), sharing economy (see Barnes and Mattsson, 2016) and 
business analytics (see Vidgen et al., 2017). The major strengths of Delphi are based on 
knowledgeable experts, anonymity of experts, controlled group feedback and iteration whereby 
the group of experts review and evaluate alternatives through several controlled phases. 
However, the method has also received criticism that is not due to itself but to deficient 
application by researchers, such as lack of selection of rigorous panelists, questions and 
problems badly formulated, and insufficiently analyzed outcomes (Landeta, 2006; Winkler and 
Moser, 2016). 
To address some of these concerns many types of the Delphi method have been proposed. The 
four main techniques extensively used are the classical Delphi, the policy Delphi, the decision 
Delphi and the ranking-type Delphi (Schmidt, 1993; Linstone and Turoff, 1975; von der 
Gracht, 2012). Although these techniques share some important features (such as feedback and 
an iterative process), they vary in terms of their specific objectives and approaches (see Table 
7.1). According to Paré et al. (2013), although the quality standards vary with the assumptions 
of each Delphi method, we feel that a comparison between the different techniques is not as 
meaningful or useful as exploring the extent to which the studies that adopt a particular 
technique demonstrate methodological rigour. 
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Table 7.1: Comparison of Delphi types 
 Classical Delphi Policy Delphi Decision Delphi Ranking-type Delphi 
Focus Facts Ideas Decisions that 
influence future 
directions 
Rankings 
Goal Create consensus Define and 
differentiate views 
Prepare and 
support decisions 
Identify and rank key 
issues 
Panelists Unbiased experts Lobbyists Decision makers Experts 
Participation Need many panelists 
(in relation to the 
complexity of the 
questions being 
asked) 
Consider all 
relevant groups 
with many 
participants 
Cover a high 
percentage of the 
relevant decision 
makers 
Number of panelists 
should not be too 
large (in order to 
facilitate consensus) 
Common uses In the natural sciences 
and engineering 
where underlying 
physical “laws of 
nature” guide experts’ 
answers 
In social and 
political contexts 
to analyze policy 
issues 
In contexts where 
a small, well-
defined group have 
decision making 
power 
In business to guide 
future management 
action or research 
agendas 
Source: Paré et al. (2013) 
To limit the scope of this review and to permit meaningful comparisons between similar 
studies, we decided to restrict our assessment to ranking-type Delphi, which is by far the most 
commonly used Delphi technique in the business field (see Worrell et al., 2013 for detailed 
studies applying this technique in information systems; Bradley and Stewart, 2002 in internet 
banking; Kauko and Palmroos, 2014 in financial markets and Obrecht and Denac, 2016 in 
energy development). The ranking-type Delphi is used to try to reach a group consensus about 
the relative importance of a set of issues by utilizing three steps: brainstorming, narrowing-
down, and ranking. However, Landeta (2006) reminded that Delphi is a research technique 
facilitating reliable group options not forcing consensus. More importantly, it is acknowledged 
that there is no one “right” future but alternative futures. 
Although the Delphi method in general is relatively simple to administer, design choices made 
before administering the questionnaire directly impact the rigor and relevance of the results 
(Worrell et al., 2013). The study design consists of four phases: (1) assembling experts, (2) 
brainstorming alternatives, (3) narrowing alternatives, and (4) ranking alternatives. 
7.4.2 The process of assembling expert panel  
The selection of experts is the most critical requirement to improve the credibility and the 
validity of the process (Okoli and Pawlowski, 2004). However, the process is very challenging, 
making a Delphi survey rather complicated and very time-consuming (Grupp and Linstone, 
1999; Obrecht and Denac, 2016). We divided experts into four panels: CFI management, 
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regulators, CFI associations, and consultants or capacity builders. The advantage of multi-panel 
Delphi studies is that they account for multiple expert perspectives in complex and multi-
dimensional problems (Worrell et al., 2013). Following literature recommendations there are 
two to 18 experts in each panel (see Bradley and Stewart, 2002; Campos-Climent and Apetrei, 
2012; Kauko and Palmroos, 2014; Barnes and Mattsson, 2016). We ended up with 36 experts 
of which 50% were CFIs managers. Boje and Murnighan (1982) found no relationship between 
panel size and effectiveness in decision making.  
The identification of experts was done with the assistance of the CBDA who provided the 
initial list of important organizations and key experts in the CFI sector. Following the 
guidelines suggested by Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) and Worrell et al. (2013), the present 
study used a multiple-step iterative approach to identify and select experts through a knowledge 
resource nomination worksheet (KRNW) detailed in Figure 7.2 below, which took a month to 
compile.  
Step 1: 
Prepare KRNW 
• Relevant stakeholders were identified: practitioners, regulatory authorities, 
representative bodies, and consultants  
• Stakeholder organizations were identified 
• Identified relevant academic and practitioner literature 
 
Step 2: 
Populate KRNW with 
names 
• Populated the name of individuals in relevant panels  
• Identified individual names in relevant organizations and do internet check 
for experience and qualifications (company websites and LinkedIn profiles) 
• Write in names of individuals, experience and qualifications 
 
 
Step 3: 
Rank Experts 
• Create four sub-lists, one for each discipline 
• Categorize experts according to appropriate list 
• Rank experts within each list based on their experience and qualifications 
 
 
Step 4: 
Invite experts 
• Invite experts for each panel corresponding to each discipline and ask to lead 
to other experts where possible 
• Invite experts in order of their ranking within their discipline sub-list 
• Target 18 CFI managers and a minimum of 2 for other disciplines 
• Stop soliciting experts after each panel size is reached 
Figure 7.2: Procedure for selecting experts (adapted from Okoli and Pawlowski, 2004) 
Our experts are quite mature, averaging 44.7 years old with 10.8 years working experience in 
the CFI sector. Their self-rating averaged 8.3 out of 10 in terms of their knowledge of CFIs 
compared to 3.7 in agricultural co-operatives, which is the most dominate co-operative type in 
South Africa. Most experts had Masters degrees, Bachelor’s degrees and diplomas, except for 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
187 
 
187 
 
four with post-secondary school certificates, but on average they had 14.9 years CFI sector 
experience.  
7.4.3 Data collection procedures 
7.4.3.1 Questionnaire design 
Besides questionnaire quality control checks among researchers and pilot testing, the data 
collection procedures were reviewed and guidance provided by the Senior Research Consultant 
of the University of Stellenbosch Business School and then by its Departmental Ethics 
Screening Committee. Following the advice of Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) and Delbecq et al. 
(1975), the first questionnaire was emailed to experts the very day they gave their consent to 
participate, feedback was also via email to aid communication records. Although explained to 
experts telephonically, experts were required to read and sign an informed consent declaration 
which explains the study and their rights. The questionnaires contained a maximum of six 
questions to avoid overburdening experts considering their time constraints but also to try to 
get the best use of their knowledge. In order to minimize expert fatigue, data collection ran for 
two and half months with panelists given seven days to respond with reminders towards last 
two days. It took on average two weeks per round. In the last round, fatigue was evident as it 
took three weeks to receive feedback. At the end of the study we shared our findings report 
with the experts as an acknowledgement of and in thanks for their participation.  
7.4.3.2 Administration procedure 
Following the recommendations of Okoli and Pawlowski (2004), the administration of the 
ranking-type Delphi involved three general steps: (1) brainstorming of factors; (2) narrowing 
down the original list to the most important ones; and (3) rounds of ranking important issues. 
However, other studies (see Worrell et al., 2013) modified the brainstorming to allow for a 
seed of factors generated from literature. Our brainstorming comprised open-ended questions 
giving leeway to our knowledgable experts to give their opinions freely. Our study followed 
the procedure outlined in Figure 7.3. Round I questionnaire was sent on the 15th May 2017 on 
the very day each expert agreed to participate. To make the study more inclusive, there was an 
Afrikaans translated version of the questionnaire throughout the rounds for non-English 
speaking participants. All the issues generated by experts in Round I were put into a spreadsheet 
and coded independently by two researchers into core themes to reduce the number of similar 
responses from experts as per guidance from Miles and Huberman (1994). 
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Round 1: Brainstorming 
(# 36 Experts) 
15th May 2017 
• Open questions: respondents were asked to provide four of the drivers, 
inhibitors and future developments to CFI performance, along with 
comments 
• Items from experts for the three questions were consolidated by researchers 
• Final list contained 54 items for drivers (29 strengths and 25 opportunities), 
51 inhibitors (24 weaknesses and 27 threats) and 27 future developments 
 
 
Round 2: Narrowing 
Down 
(# 35 Experts) 
29th May 2017 
• Respondents were asked to give 1-7 Likert scale ratings for items on each 
question based on the consolidated lists from Round 1 
• List was reduced based on a criterion of mean ≥5 and at least 70% of 
respondents rating the item ≥5 
• Final lists contained 31 items for drivers (14 strengths and 17 opportunities), 
32 for inhibitors (17 weakness and 15 threats) and 22 future developments 
 
 
Round 3: First Ranking 
(# 29 Experts) 
14th June 2017 
• Experts were presented with random lists of items based on the final lists 
from Round 2 
• Experts were asked to rank items for the three questions and offer comments 
• Items were placed into mean-rank order 
 
 
Round 4: Second 
Ranking 
(# 29 Experts) 
10th July 2017 
• Respondents were presented with mean ranked data from Round 3 
• Experts were offered opportunity to change rankings and offer comments 
• Stop criterion: Wilcoxon Ranked Pairs Signed-Rank test on respondents for 
Rounds 3 and 4 
Figure 7.3: Process flow of the Delphi study followed 
The questionnaire for Round II was sent to panelists on the 29th May 2017 for narrowing down 
through the use of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (where 4 = neutral) Likert scale 
rating the issues according to their importance (drivers), their impact (inhibitors) or priority of 
implementation (future developments). The Likert scale assists in identifying issues that are 
regarded as important, thus reducing the long list. Following Barnes and Mattsson (2016), two 
criteria were used to measure the importance of the issue: firstly, the issue should have been 
rated as important (i.e. ≥5) by at least 70% of the panel, and secondly, should have a mean 
score of not less than 5.00. One expert opted out.  
Experts were presented with random-order items in their categories that received consensus in 
Round II for their ranking in Rounds III and IV according to their importance (drivers), impact 
(inhibitors) and importance (future developments). Experts were also given an option to justify 
their rankings. The questionnaire for Round III was sent on the 14th June 2017, and six experts 
opted out due to fatigue. The mean scores were calculated for the remaining 29 experts, 
resulting in sending the questionnaire for Round IV on the 10th July 2017. Experts were 
presented with the group average scores and their initial individual rankings from Round III 
for each item and requested to reconsider their rankings considering the average ranking of 
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others. All the 29 experts responded in Round IV. We then use the Wilcoxon Ranked Pairs 
Signed-Rank Test recommended for Delphi studies to assess convergence across two rounds 
(Kalaian and Kasim, 2012; von der Gracht, 2012).  
7.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
The overall results are mixed but show strong evidence that experts were able to reconsider 
their rankings whilst some items did not change significantly. From Tables 7.2a to 7.2e below 
the Z statistic values indicate that our experts’ round IV rankings were statistically different 
from round III rankings, indicating that experts collectively revised their rankings in round IV. 
The asymptotic p-value (2-tailed test) of less than 0.05 or 5% indicate a significant change in 
the rankings in round IV compared to round III, whilst an asymptotic p-value of more than 0.05 
or 5% indicates insignificant change (not significantly different from zero). This indicates that 
there is little change in the responses from the two consecutive rounds (Kalaian and Kasim, 
2012). In summary, issues with a Z score close to or above -2.000 had their asymptotic p-value 
less than 0.05 or 5%, indicating a significant change over the two rounds. There was no 
significant change on 34 out of 85 items (40%) considering the p-value of above 0.05, whilst 
the ranking of 51 items changed significantly across rounds (60%) with a p-value of less than 
0.05. On 34 issues with insignificant change, experts had relatively similar views already and, 
in some cases, they decided to maintain their views regardless of differences in their views 
with some justifying their rankings. We decided to stop further rounds for two reasons: there 
was little evidence from experts that they would change their rankings further after a telephone 
discussion with some. Secondly, the long response times in the last round were seen as signals 
of fatigue which could compromise the quality of our findings in further rounds. The complete 
issues raised in Round I have been removed to keep this article at reasonable length, however 
they are available on request. 
Given the overview interpretation of the results above, results on strengths in Table 7.2a below 
are mixed as six items did not change significantly: an indication that the experts had relatively 
similar views already, and in some cases, they decided to maintain their views regardless of 
differences in their views. The ranking of eight items changed significantly from the two 
consecutive rounds as some experts reviewed their rankings downwards considering the 
ranking of others. 
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Table 7.2a: Wilcoxon Ranked Pairs Signed-Rank Test for Rounds III and IV – Strengths  
Item 
 
Z Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Result (at 
p<0.05) 
Pooling more savings together for on-lending to members  -2.375 0.018 IV<III 
Able to strengthen the community bond for development  -2.492 0.013 IV<III 
Improved savings culture through CFI formal mechanisms  -2.327 0.020 IV<III 
CFIs are creating community businesses through A2F  -0.492 0.623 No change 
Easy access to credit for CFI members compared to banks  -0.847 0.397 No change 
CFIs are meeting community financial needs at low cost  -0.071 0.944 No change 
CFIs are pooling capital together for on-lending profitably  -2.156 0.031 IV<III 
Members enjoy ownership and control of CFIs effectively  -1.131 0.258 No change 
Competitive pricing of loans compared to moneylenders  -1.992 0.046 IV<III 
Improving financial literacy among CFI members  -2.530 0.011 IV<III 
Positive economic impact as members’ well-being improves  -2.071 0.038 IV<III 
Growth in membership and savings from organized groups  -1.175 0.240 No change 
Helping to fight the debt trap caused by moneylenders  -2.816 0.005 IV<III 
Capacity building support from CBDA on CFI governance  -1.944 0.052 No change 
Table 7.2b below indicates that there were no significant changes on all items in the top five 
opportunities: altogether seven items changed and 10 remain significantly unchanged. The only 
issue that did not change completely was “Help members out of moneylenders’ debt trap” with 
a Z statistic of zero (0.000) and an asymptotic p-value of 100%. However, there was a strong 
realization that “Free capacity building from CBDA and the Banking Sector Education and 
Training Authority (BankSETA) can be further exploited to enhance performance, whilst the 
re-ranking of “Favorable legislation allowing registration as a cooperative bank (CB) or 
secondary cooperative bank (SCB)” did not change significantly among other issues. 
Table 7.2b: Wilcoxon Ranked Pairs Signed-Rank Test for Rounds III and IV – Opportunities 
Item 
 
Z Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Result (at 
p<0.05) 
Ability to diversify financial services to meet member needs  -0.946 0.344 No change 
CFIs create opportunity for the community to own their bank  -1.334 0.182 No change 
CFIs are expanding by incorporating informal savings clubs  -1.793 0.073 No change 
Adopting financial technology to improve efficiencies  -1.753 0.080 No change 
Able to reduce poverty, unemployment, and social inequality  -0.912 0.362 No change 
Potential expansion market to the unbanked  -2.386 0.017 IV<III 
Improving discipline in the community on financial matters  -1.969 0.049 IV<III 
Potential to dominating in financial excluded areas  -1.026 0.305 No change 
Improved governance of the CFI as member are owners  -2.555 0.011 IV<III 
Avoid exploitative neoliberal bank charges  -2.003 0.045 IV<III 
Opportunity to receive social grants on behalf of members  -1.904 0.057 No change 
High interest rates on savings  -2.243 0.025 IV<III 
Possibility of issuing transactional cards for convenience  -1.755 0.079 No change 
Free capacity building from CBDA and BankSETA  -2.371 0.018 IV<III 
Help members out of moneylenders’ debt trap   0.000 1.000 No change 
Ability to create a middle class through improved A2F  -3.077 0.002 IV<III 
Favorable legislation allowing registration as a CB or SCB  -1.357 0.175 No change 
In Table 7.2c below, only four weaknesses did not significantly change whilst experts 
significantly revised their ranking on 13 issues downwards giving their justifications. Experts 
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reconsidered remarkably their ranking of “Unattractive premises appealing to middle and upper 
class” followed by “Weak membership and savings growth” and “Weak corporate governance 
structures”. 
Table 7.2c: Wilcoxon Ranked Pairs Signed-Rank Test for Rounds III and IV – Weaknesses  
Item 
 
Z Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Result (at p<0.05) 
Low adoption of technological banking systems  -2.263 0.024 IV<III 
CFIs have weak capital base which cannot absorb credit risk  -1.409 0.159 No change 
Low managerial skills to lead CFIs profitably and sustainably  -2.077 0.038 IV<III 
Poor marketing of the CFI concept to the greater public  -2.325 0.020 IV<III 
Lack of strong cooperative movement, the sector is fragile  -2.392 0.017 IV<III 
Poor savings culture among members  -2.405 0.016 IV<III 
Lack of participation on the National Payment System (NPS)  -2.508 0.012 IV<III 
Inability to retain talent through competitive market salaries  -1.122 0.262 No change 
Weak membership and savings growth  -2.675 0.007 IV<III 
CFIs are banking with banks so risk losing members  -0.271 0.786 No change 
Weak corporate governance structures  -2.692 0.007 IV<III 
Weak risk management systems  -2.257 0.024 IV<III 
Tight cash flow positions  -2.616 0.009 IV<III 
Low innovation to develop appropriate financial products  -2.043 0.041 IV<III 
Poor activism by members in the governance system  -2.524 0.012 IV<III 
No deposit insurance guarantee protection to members  -1.057 0.291 No change 
Unattractive premises appealing to middle and upper class  -2.812 0.005 IV<III 
Our experts did not significantly change their rankings as nine items remain significantly 
unchanged in Table 7.2d below whilst six threats significantly changed.  
Table 7.2d: Wilcoxon Ranked Pairs Signed-Rank Test for Rounds III and IV – Threats 
Item 
 
Z Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Result (at 
p<0.05) 
Stagnant membership growth due to poor public perception  -2.494 0.013 IV<III 
Failure rate of CFIs is high affecting community confidence  -1.543 0.123 No change 
Wrong perception that CFIs are for the poor only  -2.207 0.027 IV<III 
Policymakers have interest in banks, not giving CFI attention  -0.282 0.778 No change 
High unemployment affecting ability to save  -0.768 0.443 No change 
Economic challenges affecting savings  -2.38 0.017 IV<III 
Competition from loan sharks over-indebting members  -0.849 0.396 No change 
Weak performance of the economy affect savings  -1.367 0.172 No change 
High cost of banking system which CFI will not afford  -2.68 0.007 IV<III 
Competition from informal schemes and pyramid schemes  -1.615 0.106 No change 
Competition from commercial banks on member savings  -0.341 0.733 No change 
Inability to attract qualified staff due to poor perception  -1.995 0.046 IV<III 
No special tax rate for social enterprises such as CFIs  -2.814 0.005 IV<III 
High insolvency of CFIs  -1.692 0.091 No change 
Lack of deposit insurance to attract middle and upper-class  -1.219 0.223 No change 
In Table 7.2e below, the ranking of 17 out of 22 future developments changed significantly, 
which suggests that our experts are more concerned with the sector’s future therefore giving it 
much attention by reconsidering their previous rankings after learning from each other. 
“Strengthening of the National Association of CFIs in South Africa (NACFISA) to advocate 
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for CFIs agenda” had its ranking significantly changed with the highest Z statistic of -3.066 
and the lowest p-value, indicating that experts seriously reconsidered the importance of having 
an effective sector association. 
Table 7.2e: Wilcoxon Ranked Pairs Signed-Rank Test for Rounds III and IV – Future 
Developments 
Item 
 
Z Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Result (at 
p<0.05) 
Adoption of technology to improve convenience, efficiencies  -2.371 0.018 IV<III 
Effective publicity of CFIs real social impact in communities  -1.156 0.248 No change 
CFI specific qualifications for the leadership and staff  -2.398 0.016 IV<III 
Improve transparency through internal and external audits  -1.18 0.238 No change 
Enabling CFIs to participate in the NPS to appeal to all  -2.803 0.005 IV<III 
Improving corporate governance structure through training  -2.497 0.013 IV<III 
Creating a common national CFI brand such as Volksbank  -2.028 0.043 IV<III 
Diversification of financial services that appeal to all  -2.67 0.008 IV<III 
Improving member’ saving culture through financial literacy  -2.807 0.005 IV<III 
National campaigns to encourage people to join local CFIs  -1.602 0.109 No change 
CFIs financial sustainability to attract stakeholder interest  -2.668 0.008 IV<III 
Improving CFI location appearance to appeal to all  -2.209 0.027 IV<III 
National CFI sector strategy to guide players  -0.365 0.715 No change 
Tax exemption status for CFIs as they are social enterprises  -2.214 0.027 IV<III 
Rebranding CFI concept to appeal to all classes  -2.379 0.017 IV<III 
Targeting organized groups to boost membership  -2.371 0.018 IV<III 
Gvt entities to also save in CFIs as juristic members  -1.547 0.122 No change 
Strengthening the NACFISA to advocate for CFIs agenda  -3.066 0.002 IV<III 
The establishment of SCB to act as CFIs’ bank of last resort  -2.032 0.042 IV<III 
Strengthening capital base through member contributions  -2.057 0.040 IV<III 
Performing economy and political stability are necessary  -2.081 0.037 IV<III 
CFIs to contribute for the deposit insurance protection  -2.176 0.030 IV<III 
 
7.6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
To understand the current forces driving or hindering performance we employed the ranking-
type Delphi technique by engaging 36 CFI experts who identified alternative strategies using 
the SWOT analysis developed by Kotler (1988). The hybrid Delphi-SWOT method proved to 
be effective in properly understanding the current sector issues and suggesting alternative 
futures. We find the panel size to be appropriate in effectively identifying and discussing 
important issues.  
In this section, we detail the study findings considering the final rankings of the mean score (x) 
in Rounds III and IV as shown in Tables 7a-7e. All issues are ranked based on Round IV mean 
scores, starting with the lowest mean score, that is, ranked as the most important in descending 
order. Mean scores in Round IV are lower than Round III: an indication that collectively experts 
revised their rankings downwards considering the opinion of others as expected in a Delphi 
study (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963; Linstone and Turoff, 1975). The standard deviation (SD) 
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illustrates how divergent the experts’ opinion are from the shared common view (x). As shown 
across all the tables, in Round IV the SD was lower than in Round III: an indication that our 
experts were moving towards consensus. The same also applies to the standard error (SE), 
which in Round IV reveals that the sample mean (x) is moving closer to the population mean, 
and points towards attaining consensus.  
Our discussion of the results is supported by qualitative comments from experts when 
validating propositions, whilst analyses are aligned to the factors identified from the literature 
review. Experts did revise some of their rankings in Round IV as revealed by the Wilcoxon 
Tests. Drivers, inhibitors and future developments are discussed separately below.  
7.6.1 Drivers of CFIs’ performance 
The identified drivers (strengths) to CFI formation and performance are quite diverse. 
However, from Table 7.3a below the major drivers seem to be leveraging on social capital to 
eradicate poverty. Members are motivated to “Pooling financial resources together” (1st) so 
that they can lend back to members profitably (7th), in a social way where “members enjoy 
ownership and control of the CFI effectively” (8th) and are thereby “able to strengthen the 
community common bond for social development” (2nd) through “improved savings culture” 
(3rd) to “help fight the debt trap caused by moneylenders” (13th). Social capital is regarded as 
the tie that binds in co-operative finance as members are comfortable working with people they 
know better (Frame et al., 2002; McKillop and Wilson, 2015). These findings are similar to 
what Catturani et al. (2016) found in Italy. 
Economic factors also rank highly, as “CFIs are creating community businesses through 
improved access to finance” (4th) as there is “easy access to credit for members compared to 
commercial banks” (5th) for the economically marginalized. Moreover, there is more 
“competitive pricing of loans than from moneylenders” (9th) which have “positive economic 
impact as members’ well-being improves” (11th). This means CFI lending is more ethical than 
exploitative. The economic factors support the dual objective of CFIs which is to achieve 
economic and social mission (Jones and Kalmi, 2015; Périlleux and Szafarz, 2015). The 
“growth in membership and savings from organized groups” (12th) such as rotating savings and 
credit associations (ROSCAs) or Stokvels as they popularly known is South Africa, workers 
unions and associations seem to drive outreach due to strong social bonds. This is unsurprising 
for South Africa where there are an estimated 800,000 Stokvels, given the historical 
background where black people were denied access to formal banking facilities during the 
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apartheid era (DTI, 2012). “Capacity building support from CBDA on CFI governance and 
trainings” (14th), although important, is lowly ranked as driving performance. 
Table 7.3a: Mean rank of Rounds III and IV final ranking – Strengths 
Rank Item III    IV   
  x SE SD  x SE SD 
1 Pooling more savings together for on-lending to members 4.28 0.67 3.63  3.45 0.54 2.93 
2 Able to strengthen the community bond for development 6.72 0.91 4.88  5.10 0.67 3.60 
3 Improved savings culture through CFI formal mechanisms 6.17 0.67 3.63  5.31 0.54 2.89 
4 CFIs are creating community businesses through A2F 5.86 0.69 3.69  5.62 0.51 2.73 
5 Easy access to credit for CFI members compared to banks 6.21 0.74 3.98  5.86 0.67 3.60 
6 CFIs are meeting community financial needs at low costs 5.86 0.60 3.23  6.07 0.57 3.08 
7 CFIs are pooling capital together for on-lending profitably 7.10 0.68 3.64  6.14 0.55 2.95 
8 Members enjoy ownership and control of CFIs effectively 6.55 0.71 3.82  6.34 0.65 3.48 
9 Competitive pricing of loans than from moneylenders 7.28 0.73 3.92  6.66 0.70 3.76 
10 Improving financial literacy among CFI members 8.72 0.70 3.76  7.52 0.58 3.14 
11 Positive economic impact as members’ well-being improves 8.28 0.71 3.84  7.52 0.63 3.42 
12 Growth in membership and savings from organized groups 8.90 0.68 3.64  8.21 0.56 3.00 
13 Helping to fight the debt trap caused by moneylenders 9.69 0.73 3.96  8.59 0.67 3.61 
14 Capacity building support from CBDA on CFI governance 9.79 0.79 4.28  8.76 0.80 4.31 
As per Table 7.3b below, unexploited potentials (opportunities) for CFIs performance are 
dominated by social, governance and economic drivers. On the social front is an “opportunity 
for communities to have ownership of the institution serving them if fully harnessed” (2nd). 
There are opportunities to reach out to more people sharing the common bond in “informal 
savings clubs” (3rd) and in unbanked or underbanked markets (6th). There are economic 
opportunities in improving “financial discipline in communities” (7th), “help members out of 
moneylenders/loan sharks’ debt trap” (15th) as CFIs “avoid exploitative neoliberal bank 
charges” (10th) through paying “high interest rate on savings than banks” (12th). CFIs have 
great scope to “diversify financial services to meet members’ needs” (1st) and heal social and 
economic ills given their “ability to reduce poverty, unemployment, and social inequality” (5th). 
This is important for South Africa given the brutal colonial era that ended in 1994 leaving an 
unequal society with black people in extreme poverty. Rwanda made great progress in using 
cooperatives to contribute to conflict recovery, peace-building, re-building relationships, 
restoring trust and encouraging cooperation along ethnic groups after the 1994 genocide 
(Okem, 2016). Opportunity is also on “improving governance as members are owners” (9th) 
provided governance rights are exercised, similar to what Jones (2008) find in UK. 
Table 7.3b: Mean rank of Rounds III and IV final ranking – Opportunities. 
Rank Item III    IV   
  x SE SD  x SE SD 
1 Ability to diversify financial services to meet member needs 3.62 0.77 4.14  3.00 0.57 3.08 
2 CFIs create opportunity for the community to own their bank 5.52 0.68 3.64  4.93 0.53 2.85 
3 CFIs are expanding by incorporating informal savings clubs 6.41 0.90 4.87  5.41 0.64 3.44 
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4 Adopting financial technology to improve efficiencies 7.41 0.87 4.68  6.45 0.76 4.08 
5 Able to reduce poverty, unemployment, and social inequality 7.03 0.96 5.16  6.66 0.81 4.34 
6 Potential expansion market to the unbanked 8.10 0.87 4.71  6.86 0.75 4.04 
7 Improving discipline in the community on financial matters 9.07 0.81 4.34  8.10 0.65 3.52 
8 Potential to dominating in financial excluded areas 8.79 0.83 4.45  8.24 0.76 4.07 
9 Improved governance of the CFI as members are owners 8.86 0.55 2.97  8.24 0.50 2.67 
10 Avoid exploitative neoliberal bank charges 9.24 0.96 5.16  8.45 0.93 4.98 
11 Opportunity to receive social grants on behalf of members 9.76 0.97 5.21  8.59 0.88 4.73 
12 High interest rates on savings 9.69 0.85 4.57  8.66 0.71 3.81 
13 Possibility of issuing transactional cards for convenience 9.45 0.86 4.65  8.66 0.76 4.08 
14 Free capacity building from CBDA and BankSETA 10.31 0.97 5.22  8.76 0.85 4.57 
15 Help members out of moneylenders’ debt trap 9.10 0.88 4.72  8.86 0.82 4.42 
16 Ability to create a middle class through improved A2F 10.97 0.98 5.25  9.14 0.80 4.30 
17 Favorable legislation allowing registration as a CB or SCB 9.86 0.68 3.66  9.31 0.56 3.02 
Great opportunities are technological factors through “Adopting financial technology to 
improve efficiencies” (4th) enabling the “possibility of issuing transactional cards for financial 
services convenience” (13th). Improved innovative financial access coupled with other 
interventions can “create a middle class through enhanced productivity” (16th). This is 
supported by the findings of Frame and White (2004) that technological change has impacted 
dramatically on the economics of financial services provision, design and delivery. Technology 
enhances the bottom-line, that is, profitability either through increased revenue from service 
charges or lower processing costs. Policy opportunities are “free capacity building from CBDA 
and BankSETA” (14th), and “favorable legislation environment allowing registration of CFIs 
from FSCs and SACCOs to Co-operative Banks and Secondary Co-operative Banks” (17th). 
Furthermore, technology will position CFIs as a channel of receiving monthly government 
social grants for 17-million people (11th).  
7.6.2 Inhibitors of CFIs’ performance 
The inhibitors to CFI performance are split into internal (weaknesses) and external (threats). 
The major inhibitors are technological, economic, governance, social and perception factors. 
In Table 7.3c below, the major internal weakness is “low adoption of technological banking 
systems” (1st). Related is “lack of participation on the National Payment System” (7th) which 
limits the interaction between CFIs and other formal financial players. The low technology 
diffusion is resulting in “low innovation to develop appropriate financial products” (14th). 
Some said that “Lack of operations automation place wrong perceptions in people to think CFIs 
are for the poor only”, and “The adoption of IT in operations enables financial innovation to 
offer easily accessible financial services”. However, Frame and White (2004) find that high 
set-up costs, redundancy of existing legacy systems and lack of suitable information technology 
skills are inhibiting factors, particularly in CFIs. 
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The second ranked weakness is “weak capital base which cannot absorb more credit risk.” This 
puts CFIs on “tight cashflow positions” (13th). Governance factors are third due to “Low 
managerial skills to lead CFIs profitably and sustainably”, as some rely on untrained voluntary 
labour. Similarly, is “Inability to retain talent through competitive market salaries” (8th) due to 
weak balance sheets. There are also “weak corporate governance structures” (11th), made worse 
due to “poor activism by members in the governance system” (15th). Lack of members’ 
activism and board oversight “weakens risk management systems” (12th) which exposes CFIs 
to solvency risk. Some experts said that “members [most of the times] they do not exercise 
their voting powers when not happy with CFI governance, they just withdraw their investments 
and membership”, and “In addition to training directors, members training is essential to 
exercise their governance rights”. 
Perception factors are fourth due to “Poor marketing of the CFI concept to the greater public” 
resulting in “weak membership and savings growth” (9th) as CFIs have “unattractive premises 
to appeal to the middle and upper classes” (17th). This is opposite to what McKillop et al. (2011) 
found in Great Britain in the period 2003-2009 where although the number of credit unions 
dropped, membership increased by 300,312 (59.6%) from 503,838 to 804,150 due partly to 
trained staff and refurbished premises, which increased their attractiveness to potential 
members. “No deposit insurance guarantee protection to members” was ranked second from 
last. 
Table 7.3c: Mean rank of Rounds III and IV final ranking – Weaknesses. 
Rank Item III    IV   
  x SE SD  x SE SD 
1 Low adoption of technological banking systems 5.79 0.98 5.30  4.90 0.83 4.46 
2 CFIs have weak capital base which cannot absorb credit risk 5.90 0.94 5.04  5.28 0.80 4.29 
3 Low managerial skills to lead CFIs profitably & sustainably 6.86 0.85 4.56  5.76 0.69 3.73 
4 Poor marketing of the CFI concept to the greater public 6.86 0.72 3.89  5.97 0.56 2.99 
5 Lack of strong co-operative movement, the sector is fragile 7.79 1.03 5.54  6.17 0.91 4.91 
6 Poor savings culture among members 7.90 0.98 5.27  6.28 0.77 4.15 
7 Lack of participation on the National Payment System 8.00 1.00 5.37  6.31 0.70 3.79 
8 Inability to retain talent through competitive market salaries 7.14 0.97 5.25  6.48 0.79 4.26 
9 Weak membership and savings growth 9.10 0.96 5.16  7.21 0.78 4.20 
10 CFIs are banking with banks so risk losing members 7.48 0.85 4.56  7.59 0.79 4.26 
11 Weak corporate governance structures 9.21 0.87 4.70  7.72 0.77 4.17 
12 Weak risk management systems 8.86 0.88 4.76  7.72 0.77 4.14 
13 Tight cash flow positions 9.72 0.89 4.79  8.38 0.81 4.35 
14 Low innovation to develop appropriate financial products 10.11 0.90 4.86  8.90 0.83 4.46 
15 Poor activism by members in the governance system 10.14 0.86 4.63  8.93 0.78 4.19 
16 No deposit insurance guarantee protection to members 9.48 1.00 5.38  9.00 0.88 4.72 
17 Unattractive premises to appeal to the middle & upper class 10.83 0.95 5.13  9.00 0.84 4.50 
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Apart from internal inhibitors, CFIs face external threats as detailed in Table 7.3d below. The 
sector is being affected by poor perception. “Stagnant membership growth due to poor public 
perception” (1st) “that CFIs are there to serve the poor only” (3rd). Perceptions result in the 
“inability to attract qualified staff” (12th) which affects performance. These sentiments are 
shared with McKillop et al. (2011) who found that credit unions’ penetration in the UK was 
becoming difficult due to perceptions that they were poor people’s banks; therefore, advocate 
for further deregulation to attract membership from a wider cross-section of the society. The 
fourth major threat is that “Policymakers have interest in commercial banks, not giving CFIs 
attention.” More related to policy inhibitors is “Lack of special tax rate for social enterprises 
such as CFIs” (13th). One respondent said, “CFIs are being treated as for-profit business-like 
banks whose objective is profits maximizing, whereas CFIs’ surpluses are ploughed back for 
communities’ development.” However, a recent study by Chang et al. (2016) reveal that tax 
exemption status in the US seems not to benefit members but inefficiencies. Ranked fifth is 
economy-related being “high unemployment affecting ability to save” which is currently 
estimated at 27.7% (SARB, 2017: 24) due to “Economic challenges affecting savings” (6th and 
8th). 
Table 7.3d: Mean rank of Rounds III and IV final ranking – Threats. 
Rank Item III    IV   
  x SE SD  x SE SD 
1 Stagnant membership growth due to poor public perception 6.03 0.70 3.77  4.83 0.50 2.67 
2 Failure rate of CFIs is high affecting community confidence 5.41 0.84 4.52  4.93 0.74 3.97 
3 Wrong perception that CFIs are for the poor only 6.38 0.81 4.34  5.72 0.73 3.92 
4 Policymakers have interest in banks, not giving CFI attention 5.79 0.79 4.24  5.79 0.72 3.89 
5 High unemployment affecting ability to save 6.34 0.84 4.53  5.83 0.72 3.86 
6 Economic challenges affecting savings 7.18 0.85 4.60  5.89 0.67 3.63 
7 Competition from loan sharks over-indebting members 6.79 0.74 4.00  6.48 0.68 3.66 
8 Weak performance of the economy affect savings 7.17 0.83 4.45  6.62 0.74 3.97 
9 High cost of banking system which CFI will not afford 8.03 0.81 4.37  6.72 0.64 3.42 
10 Competition from informal schemes and pyramid schemes 7.28 0.90 4.87  6.86 0.79 4.26 
11 Competition from commercial banks on member savings 7.24 0.78 4.22  7.07 0.70 3.77 
12 Inability to attract qualified staff due to poor perception 8.07 0.88 4.73  7.17 0.84 4.50 
13 No special tax rate for social enterprises such as CFIs 8.72 0.91 4.90  7.21 0.79 4.24 
14 High insolvency of CFIs 8.79 0.80 4.29  7.86 0.66 3.53 
15 Lack of deposit insurance to attract middle and upper-class 10.24 0.82 4.40  9.76 0.81 4.35 
Other economic factors are many competing financial services providers, mostly targeting the 
employed or government social grant recipients. Seventh is “Competition from loan sharks is 
over-indebting members” (7th). These are consistent with Koku and Jagpal’s (2015) findings 
that payday lenders in US are pushing the working class into a debt-trap due to astronomically 
high interest rates. One expert said “due to low financial literacy [some] members borrow again 
from loan sharks at excessive rates, therefore, failing to make meaningful savings as they get 
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stuck in a debt trap, making financial literacy training necessary especially in worker-based 
CFIs.” Ranked tenth is “Competition from informal and pyramid schemes”, as members are 
easily tempted to invest in get-rich-quick schemes that are sold as “can’t lose” propositions 
which will inevitably collapse. Our experts ranked “Competition from commercial banks on 
member savings” eleventh: although people lack access to credit facilities they are attracted to 
traditional banks due by the good ambience compared to CFIs.  
7.6.3 Future developments to drive CFIs’ performance over the next 10 years 
From Table 7.3e below, our experts provided the largest and most diverse set of factors of the 
most important strategic propositions over the next decade. The propositions highly suggested 
are those that are technological, marketing, human, policy, environmental and economic in 
nature. Technology as an enabler was ranked first: “Technology adoption to improve 
convenience and efficiencies.” Ranked fifth was “Enabling CFIs to participate on the national 
payment system to appeal to all”, which would enable “Diversification of financial services 
that appeal to all” (8th). An expert said “use of banking system will enable CFIs to effectively 
monitor member savings behavior, easy loan portfolio monitoring and reduce operating costs.”  
This is followed by CFI brand awareness campaigns through “Effective publicity of CFIs real 
social impact in communities” (2nd). Another way to position CFIs is “Creating a common 
national CFI brand” (7th). Ranked tenth is “National campaigns to encourage people to join 
local CFIs”. Similarly, the need for “Improving CFI location appearance to appeal to all” (12th) 
and “Rebranding CFI concept to appeal to all classes” (15th) are seen as areas to enhance 
growth. This is consistent with Attuel-Mendès et al. (2014) recommendations in the Austrian 
case that credit unions have to pay attention to the identity they create and disseminate through 
their communication. One participant suggested that: “There is need for the establishment of a 
common CFI brand such as Volksbank in Germany, recognized as a single identity, yet owned 
mutually and co-operatively by their members in each village or town.” Thereafter, “Target 
organized groups to boost membership” (16th). 
The third most ranked in the top ten are people factors given that strategy implementation 
requires competent people. Ranked third is the need for “CFI specific qualifications for the 
leadership and staff” and “Improving corporate governance structure through training” (6th). 
Ranked fourth is the need to “Improve transparency through internal and external audits” which 
is crucial to improve members’ confidence on savings safety. One expert said “There is need 
to enforce minimum university qualifications on co-operative banking for CFI leadership 
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similar to those from a university in Kenya [The Co-operative University of Kenya].” A survey 
by Fullbrook (2015) on a sample of 145 US credit unions reveal that although in principle 
directors are volunteers, in larger credit unions they are compensated. Credit unions that 
compensate their boards perform, on average, better than those that do not. That does not mean 
compensation causes better performance, but at least it does not seem to have large adverse 
effects. He recommends that boards maintain skills diversity and conduct board evaluations to 
identify areas of improvement. In nascent countries like South Africa, CFI volunteerism is still 
strong making board compensation debatable compared to mature countries where there is high 
commercialization. The need for “Improving members’ savings culture through financial 
literacy training” was ranked in the top ten. 
Table 7.3e: Mean rank of Rounds III and IV final ranking – Future developments. 
Rank Item III    IV   
  x SE SD  x SE SD 
1 Technology adoption to improve convenience & efficiencies 6.21 0.98 5.30  4.38 0.53 2.83 
2 Effective publicity of CFIs’ social impact in communities 5.79 1.25 6.70  5.14 1.05 5.68 
3 CFI specific qualifications for the leadership and staff 7.48 1.13 6.07  5.76 0.89 4.82 
4 Improve transparency through internal and external audits 7.31 1.18 6.38  6.07 0.89 4.80 
5 Enabling CFIs to participate in the NPS to appeal to all 9.55 1.17 6.28  6.76 0.73 3.92 
6 Improving corporate governance structure through training 9.38 1.21 6.51  6.93 0.70 3.79 
7 Creating a common national CFI brand such as Volksbank  8.38 1.24 6.66  7.07 1.02 5.50 
8 Diversification of financial services that appeal to all 9.72 1.16 6.23  8.03 0.94 5.04 
9 Improving member’ saving culture through financial literacy 10.59 1.04 5.58  8.93 0.96 5.18 
10 National campaigns to encourage people to join local CFIs 10.31 1.21 6.50  9.07 0.98 5.28 
11 CFIs financial sustainability to attract stakeholder interest 10.93 1.13 6.08  9.17 1.00 5.39 
12 Improving CFI location appearance to appeal to all 11.28 1.23 6.63  9.48 0.94 5.05 
13 National CFI sector strategy to guide players 11.55 1.18 6.34  9.55 1.01 5.42 
14 Tax exemption status for CFIs as they are social enterprises 11.34 1.33 7.17  9.66 1.20 6.47 
15 Rebranding CFI concept to appeal to all classes 11.38 1.10 5.94  9.76 0.90 4.85 
16 Targeting organized groups to boost membership 10.86 0.97 5.21  10.00 0.94 5.06 
17 Gvt entities to also save in CFIs as juristic members 11.38 1.21 6.49  10.48 1.08 5.81 
18 Strengthening the NACFISA to advocate for CFIs agenda 12.97 1.31 7.05  10.69 1.06 5.71 
19 The establishment of SCB to act as CFIs’ bank of last resort 12.41 1.12 6.06  11.59 1.07 5.74 
20 Strengthening capital base through member contributions 13.41 1.34 7.23  12.03 1.16 6.26 
21 Performing economy and political stability are necessary 13.52 1.24 6.69  12.10 1.08 5.83 
22 CFIs to contribute for the deposit insurance protection 14.69 1.14 6.15  13.79 1.12 6.02 
Ranked below the top 10 are the need to achieve “Financial sustainability to attract stakeholder 
interests” (11th). This is vital given the high failure rate of CFIs: to win confidence there is need 
to ensure the institutions have permanency. In the context of microfinance programs, Schreiner 
(2000) mentioned that unsustainable programs might help the poor now, but they will not help 
the poor in the future because the program will be long gone. This suggest that even if CFIs 
are non-profit maximizers they need to preserve and grow their capital by making surpluses. 
The suggested “National CFI sector strategy to guide players” (13th) is crucial to provide 
guidance to players in addition to regulatory oversight from CBDA to ensure their permanency. 
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Although “Tax exemption status for CFIs as social enterprises” is ranked 14th it has an average 
mean-ranking of 9.66 making it a necessary priority. To show government’s commitment to 
the CFI agenda as a matter of policy “Government and its entities should become CFIs juristic 
members” (17th). One expert mentioned that “this will become necessary if CFIs themselves 
have proven to be sustainable and their local communities restore confidence in them.” Most 
of the environment factors were ranked low though important. One such is the need for 
“Strengthening the NACFISA to advocate for CFIs agenda.” One panelist said: “A more 
vibrant and effective [national] association of CFIs is needed to push for certain agendas, 
currently we have a weak, fragile CFI sector as the national association is inactive.” Ireland 
and New Zealand are examples of countries with well-functioning trade associations 
contributing to the developing higher standards of credit unions and spearheading technology 
adoption (see Sabbald et al., 2002). 
Other future developments include “The establishment of a Secondary Co-operative Bank 
(SCB) to act as CFIs bank of last resort” (19th). This is to ensure CFIs do business with co-
operative businesses to strengthen the co-operative movement. “Strengthening capital base 
through member contributions” (20th) as capital contributions and savings are currently low for 
meaningful lending. The need to have “Performing economy and political stability” (21st) are 
seen as vital to maintain the social fabric essential for CFIs existence. Whilst the need for “CFIs 
to contribute for the deposit insurance protection” was ranked last, it is nevertheless vital to 
safeguard the hard-earned savings of the poor. In the US, Ireland and New Zealand, deposit 
insurance mechanisms are improving members’ confidence and stability of credit unions (see 
Sabbald et al., 2002). 
7.6.4 Strategy development for CFIs’ high-performance by 2030 
Following Vidgen et al. (2017) the analysis shown in Table 7.4 below indicates that, based on 
an average rank per category, ‘technology’, ‘people’ and ‘marketing’ are the most important 
future developments to move the sector to high performance. Although most of the items fit 
comfortably in one area, some may be in more than one such as “Diversification of financial 
services that appeal to all” under technology also fits in marketing, but from experts’ comments 
diversification is possible with the adoption of technology as an enabler. While the absolute 
number of technology issues is low, all three items are ranked highly in importance (an average 
value of 4.7), with “Adoption of technology to improve convenience and efficiencies” ranked 
first as the most important future development. 
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Table 7.4: Strategic focus for the next 10 years. 
Category Rank/Average Item Rank 
Technology (3) 1 (4.7) Technology adoption to improve convenience and efficiencies 1 
  Enabling CFIs to participate in the NPS to appeal to all 5 
  Diversification of financial services that appeal to all  8 
People (4) 2 (6.0) CFI specific qualifications for the leadership and staff 3 
  Improve transparency through internal and external audits 4 
  Improving corporate governance structure through training 6 
  CFIs financial sustainability to attract stakeholder interest 11 
Marketing (6) 3 (10.3) Effective publicity of CFIs real social impact in communities 2 
  Creating a common national CFI brand such as Volksbank 7 
  National campaigns to encourage people to join local CFIs 10 
  Improving CFI location appearance to appeal to all 12 
  Rebranding CFI concept to appeal to all classes 15 
  Targeting organized groups to boost membership 16 
Culture (2) 4 (14.5) Improving members saving culture through financial literacy 9 
  Strengthening capital base through member contributions 20 
Policy (3) 5 (14.7) National CFI sector strategy to guide players 13 
  Tax exemption status for CFIs as they are social enterprises 14 
  Government entities to also save in CFIs as juristic members 17 
Environment (3) 6 (19.7) Strengthening the NACFISA to advocate for CFIs agenda 18 
  The establishment of SCB to act as CFIs’ bank of last resort 19 
  CFIs to contribute for the deposit insurance protection 22 
Economic (1) 7 (21.0) Performing economy and political stability are necessary 21 
People issues are ranked highly in importance (an average value of 6.0), indicating the need 
for quality human capital to lead organizations with excellency. Although the marketing 
category has six issues, which is more that any category, on average the items are ranked high 
slightly above 10, making perception transformation and brand visibility important priorities, 
while the culture category contains only two items averaging 14.5 followed by three policy 
issues averaging 14.7. Environment and economic issues were ranked low, averaging 19.7 and 
21.0 respectively, as CFIs lack much control on them, especially economic and political 
developments. To move the sector forward there is need to have strategies on technology, 
people, marketing, culture shift, policy engagement, environment and economic which can be 
consolidated into a grand strategy. These strategies can be further grouped into internal and 
external strategies (priorities). The internal priorities are issues within the control of CFIs 
(technology, people, marketing and culture issues), while CFIs can influence external priorities 
(policies, environment and economic issues).  
From our study, CFI performance is being driven by social capital, economic empowerment, 
enabling policies, members’ self-governance and some outreach from organized groups, while 
inhibitors are forcefully impacting the growth and performance through poor sector perception, 
low technology adoption, low outreach, poor governance, low economic performance and 
some unfavorable policies. However, there is still a future for the sector given 22 future 
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developments that can be explored to unlock value: of these, 15 strategic options are within the 
control of CFIs whilst seven can be influenced collectively to improve performance. The 
sector’s future is to be driven by technology innovation, having competent people, CFI 
marketing, members’ culture transformation, enabling policies, conducive operating 
environment and a performing economy. 
Our study results can be summarized in Figure 7.4 below showing performance of CFIs being 
a coevolution of different forces affecting each other at the same time. The width of the arrows 
reflects the response weights, with the largest being the most important. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4: CFI performance ecosystem with arrow width indicating level of importance 
7.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
This paper explores the CFI performance drivers and inhibitors as well as future alternatives to 
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becomes clear that the sector is at a crossroads facing diverse issues which require collective 
stakeholder efforts to move the sector forward. As can be seen in Figure 7.4, the major drivers 
for CFI formation and performance are social ties and the need for economic empowerment 
followed by outreach from organized groups and the members’ need for organization self-
governance. Given the social networks in stokvels, the common bond is strong, making it easier 
for the formation and growth of CFIs. Given the history of South Africa characterized by 
exclusion, CFIs are seen as one of the instruments for economic empowerment through 
improved access to financial services. Members feel equally empowered to govern their CFI 
without the dominance of certain individuals. Although policies do not appear to be more 
important in driving performance, they do provide an enabling regulatory environment for the 
formation and performance of CFIs. 
On the other hand, negative perceptions of the sector and low technology adoption has been 
identified as the biggest inhibitors to CFI performance. CFIs are not currently viewed as an 
alternative banking solution for a cross-section of the society but for the poor. Negative 
perceptions hinder them from penetrating affluent market segments, a situation worsened by 
low technology adoption which would enable them to offer members cost-effective diversified 
financial solutions. Further outreach is also affected by the poor appreciation of the CFI concept 
and its value proposition. Whilst poor governance structures and practices and restrictive 
policies seem to have moderate impact on performance, however when left unattended they 
will have a huge effect. The sector needs to address deficiencies in corporate governance, 
technology and negative perceptions as a matter of urgency to attract a mixture of membership 
from the broader population. 
The second objective was to identify strategies that can be implemented to position CFIs in 
where to play and how to play going into the future as it is the future that remains uncertain 
and important. Our experts managed to clearly identify and agree on seven strategic alternatives 
to focus on in the next decade in the following order: technology, people, marketing, culture 
shift, policy, environmental and economic. These strategies should be implemented in their 
order of importance as ranked by experts. Since technology was identified as the second most 
inhibitor to performance, it is ranked as the most urgent priority for implementation followed 
by having competent human capital from the board of directors to floor staff. Perception 
transformation can be achieved through effective marketing and brand awareness campaigns 
to the entire country. Economic fortunes are unlikely to improve quickly given the current 
drought in its third year in South Africa, high unemployment, weakening exchange rates and 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
204 
 
204 
 
rising food prices. However, the resignation of president Jacob Zuma on the on the Valentine’s 
Day in 2018 might restore some confidence in the economy given the loss of confidence by the 
investing community in his leadership. Early signals are that, the day after he resigned, the 
South African rand rallied to R11.66/US$, levels last seen in more than two and half years, 
with a similar trend also witnessed on the stock market. Recently, a team of four respected 
financial heavyweights was appointed to head an ambitious investment drive and reforms 
aimed at attracting at least US$100 billion in new foreign direct investments over the next five 
years. Environmental issues such as having a vibrant NACFISA and setting up a deposit 
insurance scheme are unlikely to be achieved soon. The implications might be that the sector 
will remain unattractive to the middle-class, and policies advocacy is difficult given an ill-
funded association body. There is need to pay attention to these issues including having a 
lender-of-last resort for liquidity support. However, culture transformation is likely to require 
more effort to build better capitalized and more responsive CFIs which are member-centric 
through targeted financial literacy programs. Beyond 10 years culture transformation and 
environmental issues are likely to be more vital given their role in building a resilient sector. 
The Delphi method and SWOT analysis can separately lead to limitations. However, the hybrid 
Delphi-SWOT method leads to a more efficient approach for integrating subjective judgments 
with complex multi-criteria problems. Having mentioned that, as in any Delphi study, the 
outcomes reflect the experts involved. That is why a panel selection is key in a Delphi study 
and the current study paid much attention to that through the rigorous selection of experts. In 
addition, the outcomes also strongly reflect the important position of the Delphi process 
managers to make the right questions and the right interpretations between the rounds and 
present the final results. The researchers are knowledgeable in using the Delphi techniques, 
managing complex surveys and in operational research, making them well equipped to 
effectively carry out the study. Although our final results were mixed, they did have a 
significant component of CFI management participants, as they are the most engaged and 
knowledgeable group available on the subject matter. Nevertheless, this does appear to be 
offset by the other sub-panels of experts in the study, and overall the issues raised appear to be 
quite broad and representative. 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, CFIs provide a fundamental perspective on how 
proper financial intermediation should be conducted in a non-speculative way after most bank 
customers were disappointed by investor-owned banks. The recent call for more ethical and 
socially responsible banking considers the balanced needs of society, the environment and the 
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economy, and positions CFIs to play an important role going into the future. To play this 
increasing role, CFIs will need to understand their performance drivers and inhibitors and 
develop alternative strategic options to achieve sustainable growth. However, technology, 
quality human capital, effective marketing and culture shift are of paramount importance in 
this competitive environment characterized by rapid financial innovation. In addition, 
sustainable CFI development requires an appropriate and adaptive regulatory framework that 
ensures members’ funds are safeguarded to promote confidence in the CFIs movement. In 
contrast, too strict policies may stifle CFI performance, while too lax an environment is also 
detrimental as it may lead to CFI failures and place the movement as a whole in jeopardy. 
The study findings have relevance to CFI practitioners, governments, development agencies, 
researchers, regulators and policymakers, who have interests in promoting access to financial 
services to enhance inclusive economic participation. The identification of performance drivers 
and inhibitors provide insights for stakeholders’ attention to weaken the inhibitors and 
maximize drivers for better performance. We recommend three areas for further study 
leveraging on what we now understand. Firstly, consider doing a case study on the best and 
worst performing CFIs to understand what differentiates performance. Secondly, would be to 
split CFIs into different types such as professional association or worker-based, rural-based 
and community-based CFIs, and study them separately as performance drivers and inhibitors 
might not be homogenous. This will enable accurate identification of specific issues and 
strategies rather than general recommendations which might not apply to different common 
bonds. Lastly, in-depth member interviews to understand CFI value proposition for better 
informed outreach strategies.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF KEY FINDINGS15 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research is a collection of empirical research papers which have examined four thematic 
areas – sustainability, efficiency, productivity and qualitative performance drivers – in the co-
operative financial institutions in South Africa. The whole thesis comprises eight publishable 
chapters of which four are empirical papers. Chapters One, Two and Three focus on the 
introduction, global overview, and a historical perspective and overview of co-operative 
movement in South Africa respectively. These chapters set the stage for empirical 
investigations. The first three empirical papers utilized an up-to-date dataset of CFIs’ audited 
financial statements obtained from the Co-operative Banks Development Agency (CBDA) 
covering the reporting financial years 2009/2010 to 2016/2017.  
The first empirical paper, in Chapter Four, specifically examined the level of financial 
sustainability in the CFI industry and its major determinants in the provision of financial 
solutions to the poor, the marginalized and local communities. In Chapter Five, the research 
examined the social and financial efficiency and identifying sources of inefficiency. Chapter 
Six extended the efficiency study to cover the performance dynamics over time (productivity) 
to identify areas of performance regress and progress and tested whether there are other factors 
influencing the industry’s productivity. The last empirical analysis in Chapter Seven 
investigated the qualitative drivers and inhibitors of CFI performance by engaging with the co-
operative finance experts and coming up with growth strategies to turnaround the industry for 
high performance.  The final chapter of the thesis summarizes the findings of the empirical 
chapters and discusses managerial and policy implications of the findings. This enables the 
thesis to outline the major contributions made by the empirical findings and discusses the 
limitations and areas for future research.  
8.2 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
In this section, the overview and key findings of each of the empirical chapters are summarized 
in sequence. Inasmuch as our results validate some previous empirical research findings, some 
differences exist. Our findings highlight key areas that require urgent attention of co-operative 
finance practitioners and policy makers in order to improve the performance of CFIs for their 
                                                          
15 An article based on this chapter, “Promoting financial co-operatives a circular economy scheme for community 
development: A South African perspective” is under review by the Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services. 
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meaningful contribution to the broad economic agenda of improving access to financial 
services, poverty reduction and sustainable community development in the South African 
economy.  
8.2.1 Global overview of CFIs and the South African perspective 
The first global overview chapter reveals trends that give evidence that CGIs do matter in the 
world economy as they address some of the market failures and help reduce exploitation of 
economically active poor people and marginalized communities from scarce and expensive 
financial services. CFIs are gaining global attention as a source of sustainable and ethical 
finance since the recent 2008/2009 global financial crisis with its membership, savings and 
assets increasing massively due to their resilience to the financial crisis than mainstream banks. 
Their reputation was further enhanced when the United Nations declared year 2012 as the 
International Year of Co-operatives, putting it on the global agenda of policy makers and 
economists. It is unsurprising that credit unions have a significant penetration rate of 13.55% 
whilst it is as high as 40% in Ireland, the US, Canada, France, Korea, Germany, Italy and the 
Caribbean. Surprisingly, Africa has the lowest penetration despite having a high prevalence of 
credit market failures and financial exclusion and strong social capital. Some argue that there 
are many informal rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) active in the economy. 
On the African continent, Kenya is the only financial co-operative market in the transition 
stage, with a penetration rate of 13% and membership of slightly above 6 million, whilst the 
rest of African countries are still in the nascent stage of development.  
Our study shows that South Africa has the lowest penetration rate in the world of 0.06% despite 
the long history of its co-operative movement which dates back to the early 1890s. The post-
apartheid government put in place some enabling policies and incentives to promote the 
formation of co-operative businesses. However, government grants and donations had negative 
consequences as co-operatives were being formed as conduits to benefit from government 
funding resulting in a high failure rate and unsustainable enterprises. From 2010 to 2017 CFIs 
and CFI membership dropped by nearly 50%. However, South African CFIs have great 
potential to make a meaningful contribution to the societal and financial well-being of its 
members. Surprising, CFIs, particularly those that are rural or township-based, are mobilizing 
members savings and investing them in financial investments rather than lending back to their 
communities to stimulate local community development. All these raise the question of the 
financial sustainability of South African CFIs to aid local economy development. 
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8.2.2 Financial sustainability of CFIs in South Africa 
The study starts by providing a motivation of why sustainability is important for social 
enterprises such as member-owned financial institutions and why financial sustainability is of 
paramount importance over other forms of sustainability. Using CFIs financial information for 
eight years, our results indicates that FSS and OSS indices average 0.913 and 1.027 below the 
expected minimum performance of 1.00 and 1.10 respectively. The difference between these 
indices indicates that our sample CFIs are receiving grants and donations to fund some of their 
operations. In summary, the FSS index indicates that the industry is not financially sustainable.  
Further analysis at a disaggregate level reveals that rural-based FSCs are the least sustainable 
with an FSS index of 0.825, followed by township/city-based SACCOs at 1.005, whilst 
cooperative banks perform better on average with an index of 1.056. Our third level of 
investigation reveals that the major significant driver of CFIs financial sustainability is 
profitability measured as ROA, followed by investments-to-assets ratio, loans-to-assets ratio 
and growth in deposits. Our results identified grants, credit risk and cost-to-income ratio as 
having a negative impact on CFIs’ financial sustainability. Surprisingly, interest rate and age 
have no influence on our sample CFIs in the period under study. Analysis by sub-sample again 
reveals that ROA and cost-to-income ratios influence have an influence in both FSC and 
SACCOs but portfolio yield was found to make a positive contribution to FSS of SACCOs as 
most of their assets (57%) are in loans. However, there is no significant impact on FSC financial 
sustainability as only 37% of their assets are in loans, with 45.4% in investments. Given these 
different asset allocations, investment-to-assets contribute significantly to the financial 
sustainability of FSCs rather than to SACCOs, whilst loans-to-investment ratio drive SACCOs’ 
financial sustainability with no impact on FSCs. 
Our documented evidence requires swift enhancement in efficiencies to reduce operating costs, 
credit risk and grants reliance whilst improving revenue generation through product 
diversification and embracing new innovative delivery channels that reduce transaction costs. 
The adoption of mobile money and strengthening of social ties will contribute to cost structure 
reduction, whilst at the same time adopting or strengthening the group lending approach to 
reduce the high credit risk. In addition, members need to be motivated and committed to work 
together for their individual and common benefit as co-operative enterprises are as strong as 
their members make them. Since the ultimate objective of financial sustainability is to help 
CFIs contribute effectively to the social impact of their members, one will wonder whether 
they are able to achieve their dual objectives of social and financial efficiency. 
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8.2.3 Social and financial efficiency of CFIs 
The main objective of our study was to understand how financial co-operatives are attaining 
their dual objectives of social and financial efficiency. The study employed the bootstrapping 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) method to estimate the level of social and financial efficiency 
of our sample financial co-operatives. The results of the study indicate the average overall bias-
corrected efficiency score was 44.8%, meaning that our CFIs are 55.2% inefficient or are 
producing 55.2% less outputs (loans, investment, financial revenue and outreach) given the 
level of inputs they currently use. Decomposing the overall efficiency into social and financial 
efficiency reveals that our CFIs are just 8.9% efficient, meaning their social impact is minor as 
there is a huge 91.1% social inefficiency given the level of resources currently being used. 
Only 12 of the DMUs are efficient above 50% which constitute only 5.8% of total CFIs, whilst 
the financial efficiency score averages 38.4% leaving 61.6% inefficiency in financial outputs, 
with 72 DMUs (35%) being efficient above 50%. Overall, only eight DMUs are socially and 
financially efficient above 50% which is less than 4% of the 206 observations. 
Our results confirm that, for social enterprises such as financial co-operatives to achieve their 
social objectives they need to meet their financial goals first, that is, being financially 
sustainable. Further analysis results suggest that ROA, average savings per member and FSS 
have a significant positive contribution to efficiency. The allocation of nearly 38% of assets to 
financial investments reduces the chances of members having access to much needed credit to 
finance their economic activities that can contribute to improved incomes and help them to 
gradually escape from the trap of low productive and poverty. This asset allocation strategy 
works against the motives of CFIs which is to mobilize local savings and circulate them in their 
communities to promote sustainable local development. The current case is that the savings of 
the poor are flying away to the cities and earning a low rate of return of 8.5% as compared to 
33.4% from loans which also affects financial efficiency. In addition, outreach is very low. 
Membership of CFIs has been on a decline over the years from nearly 60,000 in 2011 to around 
30,000 in 2017, which is nearly a 50% reduction. However, financial efficiency although low 
has been improving from 31.6% in 2010 to 45.3% in 2017 whilst social performance declined 
from 12.3% in 2010 to 10.8% in 2017. Given these dynamics, the study finds it interesting to 
investigate the total performance dynamic over time (productivity). 
8.2.4 Productivity change in CFI performance 
In an endeavour to understand the total performance dynamics of the CFI industry in South 
Africa the study employed the DEA Malmquist Productivity Index to identify and understand 
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how the industry performance is regressing and progressing over time, and secondly, to 
understand the sources of that productivity change. Empirical findings show productivity 
regress of 3.9% annually, driven by the inability of CFIs to adopt industry best practices as 
shown by TECH regress of 12.3%, although TCH progressed by 9.1% annually. Worryingly, 
TFPCH has been on a decrease over the years since the period 2012-2013 without any sign of 
stagnation or rebound. On a balanced panel of 15 CFIs there was a productivity decline of 0.2% 
annually emanating from TECH regress whilst there was much progress in TCH. By CFI type, 
only CBs had an annual productivity gain of 3.2%, whilst SACCOs and FSCs experience 
TFPCH decline of 6.8% and 3% respectively, driven mainly by TECH (PTECH and SECH). 
Overall, the CFI industry needs to improve its managerial acumen, and scale optimization for 
full resources utilization especially in SACCOs and FSCs. 
The bootstrap second stage regression results suggest that financial sustainability is very 
important in driving productivity growth and technological advancement in CFIs. Younger 
CFIs appear to be experiencing better productivity progress than mature ones, the same as in 
technological advance but not at a significant level. Growth in members also revealed as having 
positive influence on technological and productivity progress but not a significant level in the 
study period. 
8.2.5 Qualitative performance drivers, inhibitors and the future of CFIs 
Chapter Seven investigated the performance drivers and inhibitors in South Africa’s CFIs by 
employing the Delphi method combined with SWOT analysis to gather experts’ opinion and 
formulate informed growth strategies. Many issues were generated by our 36 experts over four 
rounds. The results of the survey suggest that the industry is suffering more from internal 
challenges than external threats. The major drivers identified are related to social capital, self-
governance, need for economic empowerment and enabling policy environment, whilst 
inhibitors are low outreach, poor concept perception, deteriorating economic performance, 
poor governance and low technological diffusion in operations to enhance efficiencies and 
reduce operating costs. 
The study also managed to identify future developments that need to be implemented for the 
growth of the industry. Six of the suggested strategy interventions are within the control or 
influence of the industry management: adoption of technology, quality leadership, marketing 
or CFI concept visibility, culture shift, environment and policy intervention to position the 
industry for sustainable growth. The study ended with a CFIs performance ecosystem that 
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contributes to the scholarly knowledge by identifying key drivers, inhibitors to performance 
and growth strategies to achieve high-performance growth. 
8.2.6 Synthesis, implication of the findings and recommendations 
The key results of the various chapters are synthesized in this section to highlight important 
areas that require managerial action to significantly improve the performance of the member-
owned financial institutions to contribute meaningfully to their economic and social well-
being. Our empirical research found out that the challenges affecting the CFI industry in South 
Africa are more internal than external. The findings reveal that financially unsustainable 
practices, managerial inefficiency, scale inefficiency, low technology diffusion, poor industry 
perception and weak supporting institutions are the major challenges hindering performance.  
Financial sustainability challenges in the industry have a ripple effect on the attainment of 
social and environmental goals. First and foremost, management need to manage CFIs on a 
cost-recovery basis by charging market-based rates and finding cost-effective ways of 
delivering financial services to its members. This means the CFIs should be managed with a 
long-term view as a going concern by growing and preserving its capital base. In addition, 
management need to reduce their dependency on grants, by avoiding complacency or market-
distortions with low priced credit from donor funding. The industry also needs to diversify its 
income streams by broadening financial product offerings by being an intermediary in 
insurance, funeral cover and payment services on behalf of its members which will also benefit 
from a range of services to help them cope with life shocks. 
Critical managerial inefficiencies as evidenced by our findings are rampant and reducing 
them requires competent, qualified and experienced leadership. These skills can be developed 
by enrolling for college or university qualifications for management to be better equipped to 
provide effective leadership as most of the challenges are as a result of deficiencies in 
managerial capabilities or failure to reduce resource wastages. Addressing managerial 
challenges will enhance the ability of the CFIs to operate closer to their optimum capacity and 
attract more members as visible social and financial performance give potential members 
confidence to trust the organization with their hard-earned savings. Management should 
implement innovative technological and social ways to reduce their cost-to-income ratio which 
currently averages 143%, cost-per-member of R1,617 and credit risk at 10.1%. The cost 
structures are unsustainable and are a signal for potential insolvency. The adoption of new 
technologies as a means of improving operations and efficiency in resource utilization will 
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reduce operating costs. In theory CFI costs should be lower than those of traditional banks due 
to the existence of social capital which is hypothesized to reduce information asymmetry, 
transaction costs and default risk in people sharing the same common bond. Secondly, the 
group lending approach needs to be considered for community-based CFIs to mitigate against 
default risks. 
Social or scale inefficiency in our sample is attributable to the small size of CFIs in terms of 
total members and savings. The situation is worsened as 38% of total assets is being invested 
in financial investment with only 48% circulating in local communities as loan disbursed back 
to members. The approach will negatively impact financial sustainability as annual returns on 
investments are 8.5% lower than the loan portfolio yield of 33.4% although there is a default 
risk of 10.1%. In the process members might not see the value proposition as they are denied 
loans to start or expand their economic activities. To eliminate the incidence of resource under-
utilization in the industry, CFIs should reduce the amount they allocate into investments to not 
more than 10% for liquidity support purpose and lend back as much as possible. As already 
recommended in Chapter 7, the industry should reach out to the affluent section of the society 
for cost-hybridization of their long-term savings to be lent to the poor. This can be achieved 
when management provides a fair savings interest rate and the industry is financially 
sustainable. In addition, innovative channels such as mobile money and appropriate banking 
platforms that enhance efficiencies will assist in maintaining up-to-date financial records of 
members for timeous decisions. 
Perception transformation in the mind of potential middle and working-class members that 
CFIs are the poorest people’s bank will affect further growth. Achieving this requires not only 
an active campaign to potential members to improve the appreciation of what CFIs stand for 
and their value proposition but also support by their financial sustainability to win their 
confidence. As part of providing complete financial solutions, financial literacy programs are 
necessary for members to effectively manage their personal and household finances. 
Strengthening of supporting institutions should be of importance to policy makers and 
industry management. Our research findings reveal that NACFISA, the representative body of 
the industry, is currently inactive, ill-structured and lacks a strong voice to advocate for the 
industry. Such lack of industry co-ordination is making the industry fragmented in terms of 
how to effectively engage with government agencies or policy makers. The situation is made 
worse due to a legal dispute between the CBDA and NACFISA where the CBDA was refusing 
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to accredit NACFISA as the representative body for the cooperative banking sector. Recently 
(May 2018) the Appeals Board of the Cooperative Banks settled the matter in favour of 
NACFISA to be registered by the CBDA as the legitimate representative board of CFIs in 
South. This is a welcome development at a time when major policy and regulatory 
developments in sector are taking place without the collective voice of the sector being heard. 
However, with such a strained relationship will have a short- to medium-term impact to 
effectively engage and co-ordinate for the growth of the industry. In addition, the industry 
needs to establish a secondary co-operative bank (SCB) to act as a bank-of-last-resort to the 
industry, where CFIs can put their financial investments knowing that such investments can be 
lent out to other CFIs experiencing short-term liquidity challenges. This will enhance the co-
operative culture to be well established, making it easy again to attract other diverse co-
operative enterprises to bank with CFIs. However, to effectively achieve this CFIs need to be 
technologically connected through the national payment systems to improve members 
convenience to financial solutions.  
8.2.7 Contribution and limitations of the study 
Overall, this thesis extends the literature focused on performance of member-owned 
community financial institutions. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this thesis presents 
the first comprehensive assessment and evaluation of the co-operative finance industry in South 
Africa. The investigation and analysis undertaken in this thesis makes some major 
contributions to the empirical literature on co-operative financial institutions in the following 
ways. 
First, the analyses in the thesis contribute to prior studies that examine performance in the 
broader context as well as prior studies that examine co-operative financial institutions 
efficiency and sustainability (see Martínez-Campillo and Fernández-Santos, 2017; 
Amersdorffer et al., 2015; Piot-Lepetit and Nzongang, 2014; Hartarska et al., 2012; Marwa and 
Aziakpono, 2015; Martínez-Campillo et al., 2016; Cull et al., 2007). These studies show that 
CFIs which are financially sustainable are better able to achieve good social performance as 
well. To be able to achieve these dual objectives, these studies recommend that operations be 
cost-effective through efficient delivery channels in the intermediation process. However, these 
studies did not examine the case of South African CFIs as their financials are not in the MIX 
database which is usually utilized by researchers conducting studies in this area. The findings 
of this thesis reveal that the CFI industry performance in South Africa is very low. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
221 
 
221 
 
Second, the findings from this study also provide a better understanding of the status quo in 
terms of productive efficiency and evidence needed for making informed policies and decisions 
to achieve high performance growth of the industry so that it makes meaningful economic, 
social and environmental returns to its members and their communities. The study identified 
areas of strategic change starting with strong managerial competencies to effectively drive 
other important strategic options. 
Third, a survey investigation through engaging co-operative finance experts provided better 
qualitative insights through gathering additional information that financial statements cannot 
reveal. This improved further our understanding of the operating environment and how it is 
contributing to the performance we are currently witnessing (Mushonga et al., 2018). Previous 
studies limited their analysis and based their recommendations on the findings generated from 
modelling the financial information only. Obtaining empirical evidence through quantitative 
and qualitative methods makes this study’s contributions and recommendations holistic, unique 
and easily acceptable by management, practitioners and policy makers as they were actively 
engaged throughout the study. This increases the chances of the recommendations made by 
this study being implemented rather than it being seen as “another academic research” which 
will end up on the shelf and not on the tables of decision makers. Hence, the conclusions drawn 
from the empirical analysis are not limited to the secondary data only.  
Despite the contributions enumerated above, this study suffers from certain limitations. Due to 
inadequate observations for co-operative banks on a sub-sample by legal status, a regression 
analysis could not be performed on them to understand what drives their financial 
sustainability. Hence, the conclusions drawn from empirical analysis are limited to an 
aggregate level and to the two sub-samples of FSCs and SACCOs only. Secondly, due to non-
disclosure and classification of non-performing loans the current study employed the loan loss 
provisions in the balance sheets over gross loan portfolio as a proxy for credit risk. This could 
have over- or under-estimated the level of credit risk the industry is facing. The third limitation 
relates to the sample period. Due to data limitations, comparative analysis of the period before 
and after the CBDA supervision and regulation could not be undertaken. This could have been 
useful to assess the impact of the implementation of the regulation on the performance of the 
financial co-operatives across periods. Finally, the findings and recommendations from this 
research relates only to South African co-operative financial institutions. Hence, extrapolation 
of the findings to other financial co-operatives industries in Africa may be limited due to the 
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differences in operating environment, culture, historical background, development and 
regulatory framework. 
8.2.8 Area for future research 
The empirical analysis undertaken is this research seeks to serve as a catalyst to stimulate 
further academic inquiry into the co-operative finance industry. Future research should 
consider doing a comparative research pre- and post-CBDA regulation if five years pre-CBDA 
financial statements can be received from individual CFIs to properly appreciate the impact of 
regulation on their performance. This will enable regulatory specific recommendations to be 
drawn. Secondly, a case study on the best and worst performing CFIs could identify and 
understand the qualitative attributes that distinguish their performance and what worst 
performers can learn from that. Finally, the analysis employed in this paper could also be 
replicated for the agricultural co-operatives in South Africa, and markets in the nascent stage 
of development, learning as much as possible from the Kenyan market which is already in the 
transitional phase of development. 
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